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1.1. David French examined British counter-insurgency policy between 1945 and 
1967 and concluded that although ‘the British conducted their counter-insurgency 
operations according to the rule of law’1 the legal framework within which they 
operated gave the British ‘such sweeping powers that short of genocide, they 
could do almost as they pleased’.2 While David French made these comments in 
relation to British counter-insurgency operations in various parts of the British 
Empire, this thesis will examine the extent to which the same could be said of 
Operation Banner in Northern Ireland. In order to do this the role of Parliament, 
the courts, and the lawyers will be examined and an assessment made as to the 
extent to which they constrained the activities of successive British governments 
and other State actors. In addition, an assessment will be made about the 
commitment of successive British governments, the civil service and the Security 
Forces, to promoting the rule of law during the Troubles.3   
 
1.2. There are various well-understood devices and mechanisms that governments in 
democratic States use to limit the reach of law and shield themselves from 
criticism. These devices and mechanisms include exploiting failings in the 
legislative framework, using mechanisms that restrict Parliamentary oversight, 
using discretionary powers to shield members of the Security Forces 4  from 
prosecution and exploiting any jurisdictional uncertainties that exist in order to 
frustrate legal challenges.  
                                                        
1 David French, The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967 (Oxford University Press 
2011) 29. The emergencies examined by David French occurred in various corners of the British 
Empire in territories that were not governed democratically. As a consequence, the term the rule of 
law will inevitably be defined narrowly compared to how the term the rule of law might be used in 
relation to parts of the United Kingdom in the 1970s and 1980s. See later in this chapter at para 
1.17 - 1.38 for a further discussion of the definitions of the rule of law. 
2 ibid 103.  
3 The ‘Troubles’ is a euphemism used to refer to the most recent period of civil and political unrest 
in Northern Ireland beginning in the late 1960s.  
4 The Security Forces here include members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the British 
Army, including the Ulster Defence Regiment.  The role of the Security Service and the Secret 
Intelligence Service is not considered in this thesis since the British government did not 
acknowledge their existence for much of the Troubles. The Security Service was recognised in law 




1.3. Examples of these devices and mechanisms would include an over reliance of 
public inquiries which, some have argued, divert focus away from the justice 
system and thereby avoid those responsible for abuses being held to account. 
Another example would be a heavy reliance on covert operations. Covert 
operations are by their very nature secret, making suspected illegality by covert 
operatives difficult to prove in court. This is not to suggest that this is the only 
reason States rely on covert operations because that is clearly not the case. There 
are many circumstances where covert operations are the only effective method of 
gathering intelligence. However, an over-reliance on covert operations, in other 
words, using covert operatives in circumstances where uniformed officers could 
be deployed with equal effectiveness is a known device to limit the reach of law.  
Another example would be for governments to implement emergency and anti-
terrorism legislation giving sweeping powers to the Security Forces but draft the 
legislation in such a way as to make those powers as ‘judge proof’ as possible. In 
other words, draft the legislation in vague terms making it difficult to pursue 
abuses through the courts.  
 
1.4. In relation to international law there are equally well–understood mechanisms 
available to States that allow them to sidestep their treaty obligations. These 
include, exploiting legal uncertainties, for example by asserting the 
appropriateness of one legal standard over another.  Another mechanism is to use 
derogations and reservations to allow behaviour by the State that would otherwise 
be illegal. Another example would be deliberately failing to co-operate with fact-
finding attempts by international bodies in order to limit criticism.  
 
1.5. The extent to which successive British governments relied on all or some of these 
mechanisms and devices will be examined and some assessment made of the 
response to the use of these devices and mechanisms by Parliament, the courts 
and the lawyers. 
 
1.6. Northern Ireland has been the subject of many newspaper columns, journal 
articles and books. Simon Winchester commented that, ‘Acre for acre, Ireland has 
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probably suffered more books than any other country on earth.’5 While a lot has 
been written on Northern Ireland, the focus has largely been on counter-
insurgency strategies, although in recent years the legal aspects of the conflict 
have received more attention.6  However, no one has brought together in one 
place an overview of the legal framework within which the British government 
and the Security Forces operated and attempted to assess its effectiveness in 
limiting the activities of the British authorities during the Troubles.  
 
1.7. Chapter one, whilst acknowledging the complexity of the conflict, aims at nothing 
more ambitious than to provide a brief summary of the main theories that try to 
explain the causes of the Troubles and provide the historical context within which 
the Troubles occurred.  
 
1.8. Chapter two examines the concept of a state of emergency in a democratic State 
and charts the history of emergency legislation in the United Kingdom in the 
second half of the twentieth century.7 This chapter will also examine whether or 
not the emergency legislation that was implemented to deal with the conflict in 
Northern Ireland gave sweeping powers to the Security Forces and whether that 
legislation was drafted in vague terms making it more difficult to pursue alleged 
abuses through the justice system.  
 
1.9. Chapter three examines the constitutional status of the British Army operating in 
Northern Ireland. The United Kingdom is ideologically underpinned by the rule of 
law, 8  legitimacy and the subordination of military forces to government. 
However, the crisis in Northern Ireland brought into sharp relief the inconsistency 
between the constitutional status of the military and the widely-held assumptions 
made in a democratic liberal State about who controls the military. This chapter 
examines how administrative processes were introduced in order to paper over the 
cracks between the constitutional status of the British Army and the need for 
                                                        
5 Simon Winchester, In Holy Terror: Reporting the Ulster Troubles (Faber and Faber Ltd 1974) 13. 
6 See the work of Brice Dickson, Colm Campbell, Sean Doran, Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Stephen 
Livingston, Tom Hadden, David Bonner, Paddy Hillyard, Kevin Boyle, Angela Hegarty, Patricia 
Lundy, Bill Rolston, Kieran McEvoy Michael O’ Boyle, and Ita Connolly to name but a few. The 
works of all these authors are referred to in this thesis. 
7 Non-democratic nation States also experience emergencies but these are not examined here.  
8 The definition of the term rule of law is discussed at para 1.17-1.38. 
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ministerial control of the military. This chapter concludes by examining the Falls 
Road Curfew in July 1970. The curfew lasted for just 35 hours and was an 
isolated incident. However, it highlighted the gulf between the constitutional 
framework on the one hand, and the administrative norms on the other.  
 
1.10. Chapter four examines the use of the ordinary criminal law to govern the use of 
force, including lethal force, by members of the Security Forces on duty in 
Northern Ireland. In other words, the focus of this chapter is the use of ordinary 
law to investigate, charge and prosecute allegations of unjustifiable force by 
individual members of the Security Forces. The aim is to assess whether or not the 
ordinary law provided an effective constraint on the actions of individual soldiers. 
There will also be some assessment of whether normal processes were ‘bent’ in 
order to avoid charges being brought and/or to secure acquittals or lighter 
sentences for those members of the Security Forces accused of offences including 
murder. This chapter also examines the role of the coroner during the Troubles.  
 
1.11. Chapter five examines the legal basis of undercover operations undertaken by the 
police and British Army in Northern Ireland. It examines the British government’s 
approach to agent recruitment, handling and running, and examines the 
importance of covert operations in the fight against terrorism. This chapter also 
looks at the allegations that the British authorities colluded with paramilitary 
groups, facilitating and directing crimes including murder. Any truth to such 
allegations would undermine claims by the British authorities that throughout the 
Troubles they were committed to operating within the law. 
 
1.12. Chapter six considers Operation Folklore, the contingency plan drawn up in the 
1970s by officials from various departments across Whitehall and senior military 
officers to deal with the situation in Northern Ireland should the Troubles become 
more violent but fall short of becoming a civil war. Specifically, the plans shed 
light on the attitudes of officials in Whitehall and senior officers in the British 
Army to operating within the law. Although the government files released so far 
relating to Operation Folklore do not reveal that these plans ever received 
ministerial approval, the plans are nevertheless interesting because of what they 
reveal about British Army and official thinking at the time. This is particularly so 
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in relation to what the military and officials in Whitehall were willing to 
contemplate in terms of civilian casualties. This chapter tries to assess whether the 
plans drawn up by the Security Forces and Whitehall officials reflect a 
determination to operate within the law, or whether they tended to sideline the 
rule of law and focus instead on winning the ‘war’ and restoring order at all costs. 
If the plans tended to ignore the rule of law, was this accompanied by a 
recognition that the perception of the rule of law would nevertheless need to be 
maintained, or was the plan to ignore the rule of law and move towards a system 
of martial law giving the military autonomy to deal with the violence?  
 
1.13. Chapter seven examines the legality of two of the policies introduced by the 
British government in the early 1970s, namely internment and interrogations in-
depth. This chapter will also look at the use of public inquiries to deal with 
allegations of abuse in relation to these two policies. It will explore whether 
setting up public inquiries should be understood as a device used by the British 
government to both shield itself from criticism and frustrate attempts to bring 
State actors to account.  
 
1.14. Chapter eight provides an analysis of the role of the British government in 
determining the legislative framework within which the conflict in Northern 
Ireland came to be viewed. It also examines the role of the courts, both domestic 
and international, in holding successive British governments to account in relation 
to the policies of internment and in-depth interrogations. The role of lawyers is 
also examined and the extent to which they used their professional status and 
expertise to highlight wrongdoing by the British government and bring allegations 
of abuse before the courts. The chapter also examines the British government’s 
commitment to the rule of law by looking at what was said behind closed doors by 
senior members of the British government at the time.  
 
1.15. The conclusion will attempt to look at the overall picture and make some 
assessment about the extent to which government Ministers, the Security Forces 
at an organisational level and individual soldiers were able to act with impunity 





1.16. Various familiar terms, like the rule of law, terrorism, martial law and civil war 
are used throughout this thesis. Yet despite their familiarity, there are no 
universally accepted definitions for these terms. It therefore seems sensible to set 
out how these terms are being used in this thesis.  
Rule of Law 
 
1.17. Even a quick glance at the literature reveals that there is little agreement on the 
definition of the ‘rule of law’. Despite this lack of clarity, it remains pervasive as 
an ideal and ‘almost universally advocated’.9 In fact, it has been suggested that 
‘no other single political ideal has ever achieved such global endorsement’. 10 It 
has been glorified as an ‘unqualified human good’,11 ‘the motherhood and apple 
pie of development economics’,12 ‘that potent fiction’,13 ‘a shibboleth of English 
politics’14 and has been said to have ‘amorphous and talismanic qualities’.15 In 
addition, ‘there appears to be widespread agreement, traversing all fault lines, on 
one point and one point alone: the rule of law is good for everyone’.16 Joseph Raz 
observed that there is a ‘tendency to use the rule of law as a shorthand description 
of the positive aspects of any given system’.17 It seems to be viewed as not only a 
good in itself because it is central to a just society, but also because it causes other 
good things to happen, namely economic growth.18  
                                                        
9 Amichai Magen, ‘The Rule of Law and Its Promotion Abroad: Three Problems of Scope’ (2009) 
45(1) Stanford Journal of International Law 51, 55. The degree to which the rule of law is 
universally desirable can be overstated. In the past Marxist and Fascist regimes rejected the rule of 
law as a capitalist concept. Radical Islamic groups like Al-Qaeda also reject the rule of law 
believing that it abrogates Allah’s will on earth.  
10 Brian Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge University Press 
2004) 3. 
11 E P Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (Pantheon Books 1975) 266. 
12 ‘Economics and the Rule of Law: Order in the Jungle’ The Economist (London, 13 March 2008). 
13 Edmund Morgan, ‘The Great Political Fiction’ (1978) 25(3) New York Review of Books 13.  
14 John Brewer, John Styles, ‘Popular attitudes to the law in the eighteenth century’ in Mike 
Fitzgerald, Gregor McLennan, Jennie Pawson (eds), Crime and Society Readings in History and 
Theory (Open University Press 1981) 24. 
15 Nasser Hussain, Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule of Law (University of 
Michigan Press 2003) 8. 
16 Tamanaha (n10)1. 
17 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law; Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford University Press 1979) 
212. 




1.18. E. P. Thompson’s analysis of England during the eighteenth century began with 
the assertion that almost all Englishmen, rich or poor considered the rule of law to 
be their common inheritance.19 He later wrote referring to the rule of law that, ‘It 
seems to me a legacy as substantial as any handed down from the struggles of the 
seventeenth century and eighteenth century; and a true and important cultural 
achievement.’20 
 
1.19. Despite the fact that the rule of law is generally understood to promote and 
safeguard values that are intrinsically good it is unfortunately ‘afflicted by an 
extraordinary divergence of understandings’.21 So much so, that Judith Shklar has 
claimed that this lack of agreement on the definition of the rule of law has 
rendered the concept meaningless by ‘ideological abuse and general over-use’.22 
Of course its attraction as an ideal may stem from this imprecision, ‘which allows 
each of us to project our own sense of the ideal government on the phrase ‘rule of 
law’’.23  
 
1.20. Conceptions of the rule of law can be divided into two general types: ‘thin’ and 
‘thick’.24 The ‘thin’ concept of the rule of law sometimes referred to as ‘formal’,25 
‘rule-book’ 26 or ‘negative’27 conceptions of the rule of law, divorces law from 
politics. Joseph Raz provides an example of a ‘thin’ definition of the rule of law. 
He states that ‘the rule of law means literally what it says: the rule of laws. Taken 
                                                        
19 E P Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (Victor Gollancz 1963) 83. 
20 Thompson (n11) 265. 
21 Magen (n9) 55.  
22 Judith Shklar, ‘Political Theory and the Rule of Law’ in Allan Hutchinson, Patrick Monohan 
(eds), The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology (Carswell 1987) 1. 
23 Daniel Rodriguez, Mathew McCubbins, Barry Weingast, ‘The Rule of Law Unplugged’ (2009-
2010) 59 Emory Law Journal 1455, 1458. 
24 Randall Peerenboom, ‘Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom, One Hundred Schools Contend: 
Debating the Rule of Law in China’ (2002) 23(3) Michigan Journal of International Law 471, 473.  
25 Paul Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework’ 
(1997) Public Law 467.  
26 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Harvard University Press 1985) 11-13. 
27 Philip Selznick, ‘Legal Cultures and the Rule of Law’ in Martin Krygier, Adam Czarnota (eds), 
The Rule of Law after Communism: Problems and Prospects in East-Central Europe (Dartmouth 
Publishing Company Ltd 1999) 21-38. 
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in its broadest sense this means that people should obey the law and be ruled by 
it’.28 
 
1.21. The rule of law in this ‘thin’ sense focuses on the minimal conditions necessary to 
retain authority. The ‘thin’ notions of the rule of law when unpicked and 
disaggregated into their component parts stress procedural rules and focus on due 
processes. The rule of law in this ‘thin’ sense is not about the content of the laws 
nor is it about the political system that produces the laws. Instead the focus is on 
whether the laws are prospective, accessible, clear and consistent with each other. 
What is important is that the laws provide guidance, and that guidance is 
relatively stable over time and the courts are reasonably efficient and accessible. 
Slightly ‘thicker’ versions of the term the rule of law have linked the rule of law 
with order and the requirement that on the whole people obey the law and are 
ruled by it. In this slightly thicker sense, the rule of law has also been tethered to 
the idea of equality under law and before the courts and linked to an independent 
judiciary that has authority to interpret the laws. 
 
1.22. Understanding the rule of law in this ‘thin’ or ‘thinner’ sense can mean, as Joseph 
Raz has pointed out that:  
 
A non-democratic legal system, based on the denial of human rights, on 
extensive poverty, on racial segregation, sexual inequalities, and religious 
persecution may conform to the requirements of the rule of law better than any 
of the legal systems of the more enlightened Western democracies.29  
 
1.23. One rationale for restricting the rule of law to the ‘thin’ sense of the word is that 
by doing so it gives the concept an independent function. In other words, although 
most people would agree that laws should be just and that laws should protect 
individual rights, if the concept of the rule of law is taken to encompass only 
‘good’ laws then the term absorbs the idea of a just society. As a consequence, 
laws will be judged as conforming with the rule of law when in fact they are 
really being judged as reflecting a particular political philosophy. Debates about 
                                                        
28 Raz (n17) 212. 
29 Raz (n17) 211. 
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what constitutes a just society are important but that debate need not be yoked to 
the concept of the rule of law. The content of the law is a matter of substantive 
justice, which is ‘an independent ideal, in no sense part of the ideal of the rule of 
law’.30 
 
1.24. However, this ‘thin’ concept of the rule of law has evolved into a ‘thicker’, more 
positive liberal-democratic conception. ‘Thicker’ versions of the rule of law 
include a ‘thin’ version of the rule of law with a large set of rights and principles 
bolted on top. These rights and principles tend to include ‘democracy, human 
freedom, equality, justice, economic well-being and national identity’.31 The rule 
of law is the foundation for these rights that are then used to evaluate the quality 
of the laws. In order to conform to the rule of law in this ‘thick’ sense the laws 
themselves must reflect the principles of justice and moral and political rights.  
These principles must be protected by the law and must be capable of being 
enforced through the courts. However, the problem here is that there is no 
consensus about which rights and principles are to be included.  
 
1.25. A ‘thick’ conception of the rule of law makes the assumption that the institutions 
making up the justice system, the lawyers, the courts and the police will act fairly 
and that the judges are impartial and independent from other State apparatus. 
Others have gone further and suggested that focusing on the justice system 
because it is the key institution responsible for implementing the rule of law is a 
mistake. Instead, more importance should be placed on the stability of the wider 
political system in which the legal institutions are embedded.32  
 
1.26. The ‘thick’ or positive conception of the rule of law tethers the rule of law to both 
morality and institutional processes. The ‘thick’ definition of the rule of law treats 
the rule of law as the core of a just society. The law protects political and civil 
liberties and provides procedural guarantees. Rachel Kleinfeld provides an 
example of a thick conception of the rule of law in which the term ‘rule of law’ is 
used to convey five different meanings that are distinct but rarely distinguished. 
                                                        
30 Dworkin (n26) 11. 
31 Rodriguez, McCubbins, Weingast (n23) 1457. 
32 ibid 1469. 
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The five meanings are (1) government bound by law; (2) equality before the law; 
(3) law and order; (4) predictable, efficient justice, and (5) public power respectful 
of human rights.33 International bodies have tended to interpret the rule of law in 
this thick sense. For example, the Council of Europe and the United Nations (UN) 
have interpreted the rule of law in a ‘thick’ rather than ‘thin’ sense.  
 
1.27. The Secretary General of the Council of Europe has stated that the rule of law 
depends on five fundamental building blocks. These are an independent and 
efficient legal system, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom 
of association, functioning democratic institutions and inclusive societies.34 This 
concept of the rule of law first appeared in the European Court of Human Rights 
case law in the judgment of Golder v United Kingdom.35 The European Court of 
Human Rights chose to interpret Article 6(1) (right to a fair trial) to mean the right 
of access to a court. This wide interpretation was based, according to Davit 
Melkonyan, ‘on the reference to the rule of law36 made in the Preamble to the 
Convention’.37 Following on from that judgment the rule of law has since become 
‘a guiding principle for the Court’38 and the rule of law has been defined by the 
Court as ‘one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society’.39 
 
                                                        
33 Rachel Kleinfeld, ‘Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law’ (2005) 55(1) Carnegie 
Endowment, Rule of Law Series 1, 3. 
34 Council of Europe, 2016 Report of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe on the state of 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Europe (Council of Europe 2016) 
<https://edoc.coe.int/en/an-overview/6926-pdf-state-of-democracy-right-and-the-rule-of-law.html> 
accessed 30 November 2017. 
35 Golder v United Kingdom (1975) 1 EHRR 524 para 34. 
36 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3b04.html [accessed 6 March 2018] 
Preamble to the Convention: 
Reaffirming their profound belief in those Fundamental Freedoms which are the foundation of 
justice and peace in the world and are best maintained on the one hand by an effective political 
democracy and on the other by a common understanding and observance of the Human Rights 
upon which they depend; 
Being resolved, as the Governments of European countries which are like-minded and have a 
common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law, to take the first steps 
for the collective enforcement of certain of the Rights stated in the Universal Declaration. 
37 Davit Melkonyan, ‘Concept of the Rule of Law in the Case-Law of the European Court of 
Human Rights’ (2014) Yerevan State University Press 339. 
38 ibid. 
39 Klass v Germany, 25 June 1996, § 55 quoted in Melkonyan (n37) 339.  
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1.28. The United Nations (UN) Secretary General defined the rule of law in the 
following way: 
 
A principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public 
and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly 
promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are 
consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as 
well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, 
equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of 
the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, 
avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.40  
 
1.29. Amichai Magen has identified eight attributes that are fundamental to the 
conceptualisation of the rule of law in a liberal democratic State. They are as 
follows: 
 
(1) There is a constitutional order - a legal hierarchy in which the relationship 
between legal rules are themselves legally ruled, and where all actors are 
permanently subject to rules that govern their conduct;  
(2) The constitutional order (whether fully or partially codified) is supreme and 
is interpreted by a constitutional court; the state apparatus is effective - 
legislative, executive and justice system institutions (courts, prosecutors, 
police, detention centres and jails) possess and exercise effective institutional 
and administrative capacity;  
(3) No one is above the law - the law is equally applied across the country's 
territory, to everyone, including government and state agents;  
(4) Illegality and corruption are discouraged, detected and sanctioned across all 
branches of the government and state administration;  
(5) Fundamental political and civil rights are guaranteed and upheld equally (so 
                                                        
40 UN Security Council, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
Societies: report of the Secretary-General, 23 August 2004, S/2004/616 1, at 
hhtp://www.refworld.org/dpcid/45069c434.html [accessed on 3 October 2017]. 
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that they also apply to disadvantaged groups, including women and minorities);  
(6) All security forces are subservient to civilian government, the police force 
is professional, efficient, and respectful of individuals' legally protected rights, 
and treatment of detainees and prisoners is humane;  
(7) The judiciary is independent from undue influence from executive, 
legislative and special interests, and;  
(8) Access to justice in criminal, civil, and public matters is fair and reasonably 
expeditious.41 
1.30. In this thesis, the concept of the rule of law being used is a ‘thick’ rather than a 
‘thin’ sense but not so ‘thick’ as to include any notion of economic prosperity.  
The thesis will look at the extent to which the rule of law in a thick ‘ish’ sense 
was undermined during the Troubles and rely to some extent on the sort of 
conceptualisation of the rule of law described by Magen.  
 
1.31. It seems appropriate to use a ‘thick’ rather than ‘thin’ version of the rule of law as 
a yardstick against which to measure the activities of the British during the 
Troubles because using a ‘thicker’ version of the rule of law allows some 
assessment of the impact of the emergency measures on civil and political rights. 
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, it allows the reasonableness of the 
emergency measures introduced by the British to be judged against the level of 
perceived threat.  
Martial Law 
 
1.32. There appears to be competing theories about the legal basis and therefore the 
status of martial law in Britain. This lack of agreement perhaps explains the lack 
of clarity regarding the scope of the powers involved.  
1.33. One approach, taken by A.V. Dicey, in what has been described as the most 
famous work on the English constitution,42 is to define martial law in its proper 
sense, as ‘the suspension of ordinary law, and the temporary government of a 
                                                        
41 Magen (n9) 62.  
42 David Dyzenhaus, ‘The Puzzle of Martial Law’ (2009) 59(1) The University of Toronto Law 
Journal 1, 4.  
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country or parts of it, by military tribunals’.43  This concept of martial law echoes 
Lord Wellington’s sentiments in 1851 when he pronounced in relation to martial 
law in Ceylon that it represents the ‘will of the General who commands the 
army’.44 However, Dicey claimed that this understanding of martial law ‘was not 
known to the law of England’.45 Instead Dicey understood martial law as a system 
of military rule which temporarily replaces the established system in times of 
national crises but which is subject to constitutional constraints. 46  On this 
understanding of the term martial law, authority would never pass entirely to the 
military.  
 
1.34. British government officials have also grappled with the meaning of the term 
martial law.  In 1937, the Foreign Office sent a telegram to Colonel Mackereth 
stationed in Damascus explaining martial law in the following terms:  
 
In English law, it implies the replacement in part or the whole of the country of 
the civil power in every respect of government, administrative as well as 
judicial, by the military, acting not under a specific legal provision but on the 
fundamental principle giving military commanders the power and the duty to 
take charge when all the means provided for government under existing law 
have broken down.47 
 
1.35. In 1972 Whitehall officials sought confirmation from government lawyers on the 
meaning of the term martial law. 48  Government officials were making these 
inquiries because they were planning Operation Folklore in Northern Ireland. 
Operation Folklore was the contingency plan drawn up by officials and senior 
military officers to deal with the violence in Northern Ireland if it ever reached a 
point where the British Army was close to losing control. The response from 
                                                        
43 A Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th edn, Macmillan 1971) 
287-8. 
44 Hansard, cxv 880 (1 April 1851). 
45 Dicey (n43) 287-8. 
46 Dicey (n43) 283-4. 
47 The National Archives (TNA): Public Records Office (PRO) WO 32/9618 Telegram from the 
Foreign Office to Colonel Mackereth in (October 26, 1937).  
48 The National Archive (TNA): Public Records Office (PRO) CAB 164/110 Northern Ireland 
Contingency Planning 1972 Operation Folklore Folio 16 [TNA (PRO) CAB 164/110 Operation 
Folklore 1972 Folio 16]. 
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government lawyers explained that properly understood martial law means ‘the 
suspension of ordinary law and the government of any part of the country by 
military tribunal of the army’. 49 On this understanding, martial law can only exist 
in a state of war, when the laws of war will apply. In a state of war then the civil 
courts lose any right to interfere in the actions of the military. Martial law is the 
will of the commanding officer limited only by the laws and customs of war. 
However, this concept of martial law cannot be applied to internal conflicts where 
the civil government is still operating, despite what might be widespread disorder. 
In this situation, the military is acting to regain control and establish order. It is 
acting as military aid to the civil power.  
 
1.36. The legal advice goes on to explain that ‘In time of rebellion, or expectation 
thereof, exceptional powers are often exercised by the Crown, acting usually 
through its military forces, for the suppression of hostilities or the maintenance of 
order.’50 The advice explained that the expression martial law is sometimes used 
in this sense to mean ‘the common law right of the Crown to repel force by force 
in the case of insurrection or riot and to take such exceptional measures as may be 
necessary for the purpose of restoring order’.51 
 
1.37. Martial law in this second sense is generally announced by proclamation but this 
is not a legal requirement. A proclamation of martial law does not suspend the 
ordinary law. Instead it operates as a warning that the government is about to 
resort to such forcible measures as are necessary to suppress an insurrection. The 
legal advice explains that the usual device used to preclude any questions being 
raised afterwards about the legality of the measures taken to suppress an 
insurrection or rebellion is an act of indemnity that would at the very least cover 
actions taken in good faith. If there was no act of indemnity then the ordinary 
courts could enquire and decide whether the circumstances justified the action 
taken to suppress the violence.  
 






1.38. The details of Operation Folklore will be examined in chapter six and references 
by officials to martial law should be interpreted in this second sense rather than 
being the suspension of ordinary law.  
Terrorism  
 
1.39. UN Resolution 1566 defined terrorism in 2004 as: 
 
…criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause 
death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to 
provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or 
particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an 
international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act, which 
constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international 
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances 
justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, 
ethnic, religious or other similar nature …52 
 
1.40. However, the Supreme Court in R v Gul found that there is no internationally 
agreed definition of terrorism.53 Despite the fact that there may be no universally 
agreed definition of terrorism, there is perhaps a common understanding about the 
essence of terrorism. The central ingredient of the phenomenon is the use of 
violence for political ends by private individuals. For example, Simon Anglim 
treats terrorism as ‘the use of violence in order to influence the enemy’s political 
decision-making through instilling an on-going sense of fear and insecurity that 
might cease if the terrorist’s demands were met’. 54  Peter Neumann defined 
terrorism as ‘the deliberate creation of fear usually through the use or threat of use 
of symbolic acts of violence in order to influence the political behaviour of the 
target group’.55 Richard Baxter defined terrorism as:  
                                                        
52 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1566 (2004) [concerning threats to 
international peace and security caused by terrorism], 8 October 2004, S/RES/1566 
(2004), available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/42c39b6d4.html [accessed 1 December 2017].  
53 R v Gul (Mohammed) [2013] UKSC 64, 23.  
54 Simon Anglim, ‘Orde Wingate and the Special Night Squads: A Feasible Policy for Counter-
Terrorism?’ (2007) 28(1) Contemporary Security Policy 28. 
55 Peter Neumann, M L R Smith, The Strategy of Terrorism: How It Works and Why It Fails 
(Routledge, Taylor and Francis 2008) 8. 
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…the deliberate killing, wounding, or deprivation of the liberty of innocent 
civilians for political purposes in time of armed conflict (but not incident to 
the conflict), whether accomplished by members of regularly constituted 
armed forces or persons not recognised as belligerents.56  
 
1.41. Terrorism is defined in the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 
and also in the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976. The 
first piece of legislation applies only to Northern Ireland and the second piece of 
legislation applies to the whole of the United Kingdom. In both pieces of 
legislation terrorism is defined as ‘the use of violence for political ends and 
includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of 
the public in fear’.57 
 
1.42. The term has evolved since the 1970s and section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 
now defines terrorism to mean the use or threat of action, inside or outside the 
United Kingdom designed to influence a government or an international 
governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, 
and the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, 
racial, or ideological cause. 
 
1.43. Action will fall within the meaning of the Act if it – 
 
(a) involves serious violence against a person,  
(b) involves serious damage to property,  
(c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the 
action, 
(d) creates a serious risk to public health, or safety of the public, or a section of 
the public, or  
(e) designed to seriously interfere with or seriously disrupt an electronic 
system.58 
 
                                                        
56 Richard Baxter, ’A Skeptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism’ (1974) 7(3) Akron Law Review 
380.   
57 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 s 31(1) and the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1976 s 14(1). 
58 The Terrorism Act 2000 s1. 
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1.44. Commenting on this definition Leslie Green noted that: 
 
At first blush this definition would appear wide enough to include any act of 
violence, particularly if a fire arm was used, committed anywhere in the world 
by any person regardless of nationality, especially if it can be argued that it is 
intended to intimidate, as most acts of violence are.59  
 
1.45. David Anderson in his review of the terrorism legislation suggested that the 
‘definition was remarkably broad - absurdly so in some cases’60 and was so wide 
that it would catch certain ‘activities carried out by UK forces engaged in 
conflicts overseas’.61 
 
1.46. The problem is that if the definition is too broad then it will fail to correctly 
determine the scope of the term. This in turn leaves public officials to determine 
whether an act is to be classified as terrorism or not, leading to a lack of certainty 
which undermines the rule of law. Greene makes the point that giving public 
officials discretion ‘creates “legal black holes” where the discretion of the 
decision maker cannot be questioned, leaving the definition of terrorism only as a 
facilitator of power rather than a constraint upon it’.62 In other words, a wide 
definition leaves the assessment of whether an act is to be classified as terrorism 
to the discretion of officials which Greene states is ‘in practical terms … no 
different than if terrorism is not defined at all’.63 In relation to this thesis it is not 
important which definition is used since the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and all 
its splinter groups64 fit within all of these definitions.65 
                                                        
59 Leslie Green, ‘The Relevance of Humanitarian Law to Terrorism and Terrorists’ in John Carey, 
William Dunlap, Robert Pritchard (eds), International Humanitarian Law: Prospects 
(Transnational Publishers Inc. 2006) 8. 
60 David Anderson, Terrorism, Prevention and Detection Measures in 2012 First Report of 2013 
(TPIMS 2012) 4.3 at <http://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/publications/first-
report--tpims?=Binary> accessed 5 October 2017. 
61 ibid 4.4. 
62 Alan Greene, ‘The Quest for a Satisfactory Definition of Terrorism: R v Gul’ (2014) 77(5) The 
Modern Law Review 780, 792. 
63 ibid 791. 
64 Examples of splinter groups and groups with similar aims would be the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (PIRA), the Real Irish Republican Army, the Continuity Irish Republican Army, 




1.47. It may be very obvious but it is worth making the point that the IRA and its 
splinter groups did not view themselves as terrorists. Instead, they regarded 
themselves as being part of a national liberation movement fighting a war on 
behalf of their ‘people’ against an illegitimate British government.66 The British 
government condemned the IRA as terrorists but at the same time the IRA 
accused the British government of resorting to terrorist activities to suppress their 
legitimate claims. The use of the term terrorist in these circumstances ‘is often 
nothing more than an emotional reaction to the violence’. 67  Richard Baxter 
suggests that ‘we have cause to regret that a legal concept of ‘terrorism’ was ever 
inflicted upon us. The term is imprecise, it is ambiguous, and above all, it serves 
no operative legal purpose’.68 
 
1.48. The fact that one of the most prominent figures associated with the IRA during 
the recent Troubles, Martin McGuiness was imprisoned as a terrorist during the 
early years of the conflict but has subsequently been praised as eminent statesman 
and ‘an honourable man’ for his part in the peace process by former American 
president Bill Clinton, serves to blur the lines between freedom fighters and 
terrorists.69 The lines are further blurred because this is not an isolated example. It 
does seem to be the case that ‘not a few of today’s presidents and prime ministers 
were yesterday’s guerillas’.70 Hence, the cliché that ‘one man’s terrorist is another 
man’s freedom fighter’. 71 The implication is that there is no moral distinction 
between freedom fighters and terrorists when they use violence. Sebastian 
                                                                                                                                                                       
65 The largest Protestant paramilitary organisation, the Ulster Defence Association was not a 
proscribed organisation until August 1992. Nevertheless, the activities of the Ulster Defence 
Association would fall within the definitions of terrorism provided here.  
66 Ciaran McCauley, ‘McGuiness was a freedom fighter, not a terrorist’ BBC News 23 March 2017 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-Northern-Ireland-39368451> accessed 24 March 2017. Gerry 
Adams spoke at the funeral of Martin McGuiness and stated that ‘Martin McGuiness was not a 
terrorist. Martin McGuiness was a freedom fighter.’  
67 Green (n59) 3.   
68 Baxter (n56) 380.   
69 Henry McDonald, ‘Bill Clinton urges leaders at Martin McGuiness funeral to finish his work’ 
The Guardian (London, 23 March 2017) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/23/martin-mcguinness-funeral-former-foes-
come-together-in-tribute-to-ex-ira-leader >accessed on 24 March 2017 
70 Baxter (n56) 380.  
71 Sebastian Schnelle, ‘Abdullah Azzam, Ideologue of Jihad: Freedom Fighter or Terrorist?’ (2012) 
54(4) Journal of Church and State 625. 
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Schnelle effectively summed up this point of view by stating that ‘The only 
difference between the two is one of perspective, or more cynically, the difference 
is a matter of military or political propaganda success.’72 
 
1.49. Walter Laqueur has lamented the fact that the differences between different forms 
of violence are often misunderstood. He claims that, ‘some Western experts, and 
especially the media have great difficulty accepting the basic differences among 
various forms of violence’.73 He argues that various terms including, gunmen, 
freedom fighters, partisans, urban guerrillas, terrorists, insurgents and commandos 
are used interchangeably. 74  He believes that some of this confusion may be 
genuine but that frequently it has a political motive.  
 
1.50. Freedom fighters are often understood to be combating social and national 
injustice, and in these circumstances ‘violent resistance to authority is often 
justified’. 75  Consequently, ‘freedom fighters have a positive public relations 
image’. 76  Terrorists, however, do not.  It has been argued that the crucial 
difference between the two is their choice of targets.77 Freedom fighters strike at 
military and strategic targets, and although there is often collateral damage in 
terms of civilians, civilians are never the intended target. Terrorists, on the other 
hand, intend to harm civilians and attacks on civilians provide the means by 
which the terrorist hopes to effect change. ‘It is the political motivation and the 
targeting of noncombatants that distinguishes terrorist violence from other forms 
of violence.’ 78 This has led to the claim that an ‘essential feature of modern 
terrorism is the severing of the link between the target of violence and the reason 
for violence’.79 
                                                        
72 ibid. 
73 Walter Laqueur, ‘Reflections on Terrorism’ (1986) 65 Foreign Affairs 86, 90. 
74 ibid. 
75 Louise Goldie, ‘Profile of a Terrorist: Distinguishing Freedom Fighters from Terrorists’ (1987) 
14 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 125, 127. 
76 Laqueur (n73) 90. 
77 Goldie (n75) 127. 
78 Alex Bellamy, Fighting Terror: Ethical Dilemmas (Zed Books 2006) 38-41. 






1.51. Prior to 1949 traditional customary international law distinguished between three 
categories of internal violence, where the violence was used as a tool to challenge 
the authority of the State. On a scale of increasing intensity these categories were 
rebellion, insurgency and belligerency.80 ‘The rights and obligations of parties to 
a conflict were first decided by the status of the factions in a conflict.’81 The status 
of the parties involved in the fighting was in turn dependent of the status of the 
fight, whether it is a rebellion, insurgency or belligerency. 
Rebellion 
 
1.52. Rebellion involves sporadic outbursts of violence challenging the legitimacy of 
the State. Rebels are considered to be criminals and as such fall under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of domestic law. This is the case whether or not the 
rebellion has been recognised by a third State. If a third State did provide 
assistance to the rebels this would amount to unlawful interference with State 
sovereignty under international law. The level of violence required in order to 
pass the threshold necessary to be considered a rebellion is undefined. Richard 
Falk suggests that rebellion incorporates many ‘instances of minor conflict within 
a State including violent single-issue protests’.82  
Insurgency 
 
1.53. Insurgency is a more serious challenge to the State’s authority and involves more 
violence. In an insurgency ‘the rebel faction will be sufficiently organised to 
mount a credible threat to the government’. 83  However, the criteria for the 
recognition of an insurgency are not agreed.84 Heather Wilson notes: 
 
                                                        
80 Heather Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements 
(Clarendon Press 1988) 24. 
81 Richard Falk, ‘Janus Tormented: The International Law of Internal Law’ in James Rosenau (ed), 
International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton University Press 1964) 185, 197.  
82 ibid 198. 
83 Lindsay Moir, ‘The Historical Development of the Application of Humanitarian Law in Non-
International Armed Conflicts to 1949’ (1998) 47(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
337, 338. 
84 Morris Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare (University of California Press 1959) 619. 
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There are no requirements for the degree of intensity of the violence, the extent 
of control of territory, the establishment of a quasi-governmental authority, or 
the conduct of operations in accordance with humanitarian principles which 
would indicate recognition of insurgency is appropriate.85  
 
1.54. ‘Foreign states will be forced to acknowledge the factual situation to protect their 
own interests.’86 The necessity for outside powers to enter into agreements with 
insurgents in order to protect their nationals, their commercial interests and sea-
borne trade, has led Starke to suggest that these agreements are the only criteria 
for a conflict to be the categorised as an insurgency. 87  Heather Wilson also 
suggests ‘that insurgents have characteristics between rebels and belligerents 
which require that other States have some form of limited relations with them’.88 
 
1.55. There are two competing theories regarding the legal status of insurgents. Some 
academics, for example Morris Greenspan,89 argue that the categorisation as an 
insurgency brings that group firmly into international law. Others, for example, 
Eric Castren,90 argue that conferring the status of insurgents on a group does not 
provide that group with any protection from international law.  In other words, 
insurgents are exclusively subject to the criminal law of the State.  
Belligerency 
 
1.56. Belligerency is the most serious type of challenge to the States authority 
recognised by traditional customary international law. Recognition of belligerency 
formalises the rights and duties on all parties to the war. In other words, the 
recognition of belligerency triggers the use of international law on non-state 
actors and recognises that non-state actors can and do wage wars.91 Historically, 
recognition of both insurgency92 and belligerency has been rare.93 Recognition of 
                                                        
85 Wilson (n80) 25.  
86 Moir (n83) 338.  
87 J Starke, An Introduction to International Law (5th edn Butterworth 1963) 145. 
88 Wilson (n80) 25.  
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belligerency, which made the laws of war applicable, was the responsibility of the 
State and there was no obligation on the State to recognise a state of belligerency 
within its territory, even when various factual criteria were met. Recognising 
belligerency was so rare that one commentator has suggested that ‘recognition of 
this status has lost all practical significance’94 and another has suggested that any 
‘discussion of what rights and duties are applicable under traditional international 
law when belligerency of a national liberation movement is recognised is highly 
theoretical and devoid of practice in support of theory’.95 What this meant was 
that internal conflicts, on the whole, fell outside the application of international 
law.  
 
1.57. However, after the Second World War the situation in relation to internal wars 
changed because of the adoption of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.96 In 
these Conventions armed conflicts were classified as either international armed 
conflicts or non-international armed conflicts. Article 3, common to all four of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, covered situations of non-international armed conflicts 
(NIAC) and established fundamental rules that permitted no derogation. Common 
Article 3 has been described as a ‘milestone in the development of the law of 
war’.97  
                                                                                                                                                                       
93 Wilson (n80) 27.  
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Regulation of Civil Wars (Thames and Hudson 1972) 171. 
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12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 at http://www.refworld.org.docid/3ae6b3694.html [accessed 4 
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1.58. Common Article 3 provides that: 
 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be 
bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions, 
 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed 
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed ' hors de combat ' by 
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances 
be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, 
colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. 
 
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time 
and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, 
cruel treatment and torture; 
 
(b) taking of hostages; 
 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment; 
 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without 
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording 
all the judicial guarantees which are recognised as indispensable by 
civilised peoples… 
 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. 
 
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the 
Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. 





The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force, by 
means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the 
present Convention.  
 
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status 
of the Parties to the conflict.98 
 
1.59. The difficulty with Article 3 is identifying when a violent situation has passed 
from being a situation that ought rightly to be dealt with by national law 
enforcement agencies to one that ought rightly to be classified as a non-
international armed conflict.  
 
1.60. The problem arises because Article 3 fails to provide either a definition of the 
levels of violence that do not amount to an internal armed conflict or a definition 
of the levels of violence that do amount to an internal armed conflict. Levels of 
violence that do not amount to an internal armed conflict are referred to as 
‘internal disturbances and tensions’ and these do not trigger the protection of 
Article 3. The concept of internal disturbances is not defined but instead 
illustrated by way of examples.99 These include situations such as riots, which 
develop from demonstrations where there is no concerted plan from the outset. 
They also include isolated and sporadic acts of violence, as opposed to military 
operations carried out by armed forces or armed groups.   
 
1.61. Dietrich Schindler examined the distinction between situations of non-
international armed conflict and ‘internal disturbances and tensions’ and identified 
four conditions for determining the existence of an armed conflict. He stated that: 
 
In the first place, hostilities have to be conducted by force of arms and exhibit 
such intensity that, as a rule, the government is compelled to employ its own 
armed forces against insurgents instead of mere police forces. Secondly, as to 
the insurgents, the hostilities are meant to be collective in character, that is, 
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they have to be carried out not only by single groups. In addition, the 
insurgents have to exhibit a minimum amount of organisation. Their armed 
forces should be under responsible command and be capable of meeting 
humanitarian requirements. Accordingly, the conflict may show certain 
similarities to a war without fulfilling all conditions necessary for the 
recognition of belligerency.100 
 
1.62. In addition, the commentary to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 states: 
 
… that the conflicts referred to in Article 3 are armed conflicts, with armed 
forces on either side engaged in hostilities … conflicts, in short, which are in 
many respects similar to an international war, but which take place within the 
confines of a single country. In many cases, each of the Parties is in possession 
of a portion of national territory and there is some sort of front.101 
 
1.63. To summarise, it would appear that the level of violence that will trigger Article 3 
protection is measured against firstly, the sustained and concerted nature of 
violence, secondly, the degree of organisation of the terrorist group and thirdly, 
the control of territory.102 
 
1.64. The United Kingdom denied that the Troubles in Northern Ireland amounted to a 
non-international armed conflict and therefore maintained that Article 3 did not 
apply. This is despite the fact that the Northern Ireland Prime Minister, Brian 
Faulkner, said on the 9 August 1971, the day internment was implemented, ‘We 
are, quite simply, at war with the terrorists’103 and in 1971 Reginald Maudling, the 
then British Home Secretary, echoed this belief stating that ‘the British 
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government was at war with the IRA’.104 
 
1.65. The British government’s position was, however, controversial. Colm Campbell 
claims that:  
 
The Northern Ireland conflict is generally viewed as having hovered in the 
grey area between some form of non-international armed conflict (governed 
by common Article 3 and perhaps meeting at least some of the requirements 
of 1977 Protocol II), and the lower intensity category of ‘situations of 
internal disturbances and tensions.105  
 
William Abresch makes the point that ‘the IRA numbered in the hundreds and the 
conflict remained at a relatively low level of intensity suggesting that the official 
position that Common Article 3 did not apply was at least tenable’.106  In addition, 
there was no ‘front’ in the Northern Ireland conflict and the IRA never replaced 
the British government in any territorial area, despite having established ‘no go’ 
areas. 
 
1.66. The issue of whether or not Article 3 applies to any particular conflict is an issue 
not just because of a lack of definitions but also because Article 3 does not 
identify or provide a competent authority that can make that decision. The United 
Kingdom was therefore allowed to use its not inconsiderable political weight to 
have the conflict defined in a way that suited the British government’s interests.107 
 
1.67. The term civil war has come to be understood within the framework of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and the term is now used to mean a non-international armed 
conflict. However, in the main, this thesis focuses on events that took place in the 
late 1960s and 1970s. The British government documents relating to Operation 
Folklore developed in 1972 that are referred to in this thesis, mention the term 
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civil war many times. Unfortunately, no definition of the term is provided in the 
declassified files. One possible interpretation is that the government officials were 
using the term to mean a non-international armed conflict. In other words, the 
term civil war was used to describe an internal conflict that would be governed by 
Common Article 3. 
 
1.68. Alternatively, and a much more likely explanation is that Whitehall officials were 
using the term civil war to mean a situation where the British Army has 
constitutional authority to impose martial law. The term martial law is being used 
in the sense that the British Army has ‘the common law right of the Crown to 
repel force by force in the case of a riot, rebellion or insurrection and to take such 
exceptional measures as may be necessary for the purpose of restoring order’.108 
In a situation where martial law has been imposed the British Army would require 
no additional legal powers to suppress any violence and restore order. The 
released files distinguish the situation where no further powers are required, that 
is when a civil war is in progress, and the situation short of civil war where 
additional legal powers might be needed. Therefore, it seems likely that in relation 
to Operation Folklore, the term civil war should be understood to mean a situation 
where martial law has been imposed and the British Army requires no additional 
powers to deal with the violence. The position of the British government is that 
the conflict in Northern Ireland never amounted to a civil war. 
 
1.69. Before examining the substantive elements of the thesis, it might be helpful to 
first briefly outline the context within which the conflict played out. 
  
                                                        





Chapter 1: A Brief Overview of The Troubles  
 
2.1. John Finn claims that ‘the constitutional issues raised by political violence in 
Ireland cannot be understood without some appreciation of the historical context 
within which they are situated’.109 Therefore, before looking at the constitutional 
status of the Security Forces and examining the legislation and policies that were 
introduced during the Troubles, it might be helpful to provide some general 
background information about Northern Ireland110 and provide some historical 
context for the conflict.  
 
2.2. It has been claimed that ‘wars do not have a single and simple cause’111 instead 
there are ‘competing histories and often there is no sound way to choose between 
them’.112 Writing about Vietnam, Guenter Lewy commented that:  
 
…it was always more complex than ideologues on either side could allow. 
Like pieces in a kaleidoscope, the ‘facts’ of the Vietnam War could, and 
still can, be put together in a multitude of configurations which in turn lead 
to different political and moral judgments and conclusions.113  
 
Although Lewy was writing about Vietnam, he could very easily have been writing 
about the conflict in Northern Ireland. Writing in the Guardian Newspaper David 
Smith made the same point and cited comments made by Wynton Marsalis, 
‘sometimes a thing and the opposite of a thing can be true at the same time. Well, 
in war it may be dozens and dozens of things can be true at the same time’.114 
While acknowledging the complexities of the conflict in Northern Ireland, it might 
still be useful to provide a brief summary of the main theories of the causes of the 
conflict. 
                                                        
109 John Finn, Constitutions in Crisis: Political Violence and the Rule of Law (Oxford University 
Press 1990) 48. 
110 Northern Ireland, Ulster and the Province are used interchangeably to refer to the six counties of 
Ireland under British sovereignty.  
111 Joshua Goldstein, International Conflicts (Harper Collins–College Publications 1994) 138.  
112 Finn (n109) 48. 
113 Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (Oxford University Press 1978) vii. 
114 David Smith, ‘Epic, 10-part documentary re-examines Vietnam war’ The Guardian (London 16 





2.3. Northern Ireland has an area of 5,459 square miles and at the start of the Troubles 
in 1969 it had a population of about 1.5 million people, making it one of the most 
sparsely populated areas of the United Kingdom. At its closest point, it is just 
twelve miles from mainland Britain and the proximity of the two islands made a 
tangled history almost inevitable.  
 
2.4. According to the Census Religious Report of 1971, in Northern Ireland as a 
whole, 31.4% of the population were Roman Catholic and almost all the rest self–
identified as Protestant.115 The religious makeup of the population was however 
not uniform across Northern Ireland. In 1971 Belfast was 28.1% Roman Catholic 
and Londonderry was 57.3% Roman Catholic.116  
 
2.5. The Troubles claimed the lives of 3,532117 people and injured another 35,000.118 
John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary have calculated that in the context of 
population then this amounts to the equivalent of 100,000 deaths in Great Britain 
and represents the equivalent in the United States of ten times the number of US 
soldiers killed in Vietnam. 119  In terms of the numbers injured a ‘comparable 
figure in the United States would be 5 million and in Britain just over 1 
million’.120 
 
2.6. The cost of the Troubles, both human and economic, has been mounting since the 
time of the first civil rights marches in 1968. In 1993, the Labour MP Tony Benn 
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issued the following statement, ‘I asked the House of Commons research 
department to calculate the cost of the emergency and at current prices the cost of 
the war has been £14.5 billion’.121  
 
2.7. The Troubles became the focus of the longest major campaign in the history of 
the British Army. During the Troubles, troop numbers in Ulster varied between 
2,500 in 1969, then up to 8,500 in 1970, and in early 1971 they rose to 10,000. 
For Operation Motorman in July 1972 numbers peaked at 23,000 (The figure of 
23,000 does not include men from the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR)).122 ‘The 
British Army lost 763 soldiers in Northern Ireland, more than in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, the Falklands, and the first Gulf War combined.’123 The Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC) lost 302 officers from a force that numbered between 8,000 
and 10,000.124 
 
2.8. The conflict has generated a large volume of literature from academics and 
commentators alike making ‘Northern Ireland one of the most researched areas of 
the globe’.125 J Bowyer Bell quipped, ‘The only undeniable blessing to evolve 
from the recent troubles in Northern Ireland has been a miniboom in the 
publishing industry.’126  However, although a lot has been written there is very 
little consensus about any aspect of the conflict including what it was about or 
even when it started. For example, Eamonn McCann claimed that the Troubles 
began on 5 October 1968127 whereas Desmond Hamill identified the 14 of August 
1969, the day British troops were deployed, as the day the Troubles began.128 
                                                        
121 Statewatch Bulletin Nov/Dec 1993 3(6) <http://www.statewatch.org/docin/bulletin/bul-3-6.pdf> 
accessed 24 December 2017.  
122 David Chartres, ‘The Changing Forms of Conflict in Northern Ireland’ (1980) 1(2) Conflict 
Quarterly 32. 
123 John McGarry, ‘Conflicts and Metaconflicts: Northern Ireland and Lessons for Other Hard 
Cases’ [2013] (5) The Trudeau Foundation Papers 
<http://www.trudeaufoundation.ca/sites/default/files/an_academic_conflict_resolution.pdf> 
accessed 17 April 2016. 
124 ibid. 
125 Paul Dixon, ‘The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland’ (1998) 21(2) Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism 224. 
126 J Bowyer Bell, ‘The Chroniclers of Violence in Northern Ireland: The First Wave Interpreted 
(1974) 34(2) The Review of Politics 147. 
127 Eamonn McCann, War and an Irish Town (Pluto Press 1993) 83. 




While Landon Hancock claims that the Troubles ‘did not start on a specific date, 
but emerged as a result of several years of escalating conflict between Catholic 
and Protestants’.129 
 
2.9. Bowyer Bell claims that ‘without exception the [conflict] is seen as a product of 
forces, institutions, currents of thought, social structures and habits of mind that 
have a long, long history’.130 He claims that the most recent conflict begins ‘back 
there in the grim Celtic mists of old grievances, old wars and old hatreds’.131 But 
although all agree that the Troubles have historical roots, ‘the present political 
violence in Northern Ireland results from the clash of interpretations of this 
history and the differing aspirations and allegiances to which it gave rise’.132 
The Historical Context 
 
2.10. Explaining the Troubles in terms of the different constitutional aspirations of the 
Protestant and Roman Catholic communities in Northern Ireland is simple. The 
Roman Catholic community tended to identify as Irish and wanted to become part 
of the Republic of Ireland. The goal of the Unionists and the overwhelming 
Protestant majority in Northern Ireland was to remain part of the United 
Kingdom. There is no doubt this disagreement about the constitutional status of 
Northern Ireland lies at the heart of the conflict. However, it has been argued that 
‘this over-arching conflict cannot alone serve as the basis for an explanation for 
the turn to violence at the end of the 1960s and the start of the 1970s’.133  
 
2.11. Before looking at the different explanations that have been put forward to explain 
the Troubles it might be useful to give a brief overview of the historical narrative. 
Identifying the beginnings of the conflict is perhaps the first problem. Given this 
is a very brief outline perhaps the Act of Union in 1801,134 which followed the 
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piecemeal conquest of Ireland by the English after 1169, is as good a place to start 
as any. The Act of Union united Great Britain and Ireland to create the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.135 The union was created despite centuries 
of tension, including armed and political uprisings, between the Protestant 
minority and the Roman Catholic majority in Ireland.  
 
2.12. However, in the late nineteenth century the Irish Nationalist Party and the Home 
Rule Party began lobbying the British government for some form of self-
government for Ireland. Opposing any idea of home-rule for Ireland were the Irish 
Unionists, a significant Protestant minority, who wanted to retain the Union in its 
existing form, but failing that wanted to exclude the nine counties of Ulster from 
any home-rule arrangements. As the lobbying for some form of home-rule 
gathered momentum, the Protestants too began to organise themselves politically 
and created the Ulster Volunteer Force to resist home-rule. And so, the battle lines 
were drawn.  
 
2.13. After WWI, the pressure for independence mounted and the British government 
eventually agreed to a limited independence. Northern Ireland was created as a 
separate legal entity on 3 May 1921 under the Government of Ireland Act 1920. 
The Act partitioned the island of Ireland into Northern Ireland made up of six 
Northeastern counties of Ulster 136  and the Irish Free State made up of the 
remaining twenty-six counties including three counties from Ulster.137 The Free 
Irish State at the time of partition was 90% Roman Catholic 138 and the new 
Northern Ireland had an in-built Protestant majority of roughly 65%.139 The first 
Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Sir James Craig, declared that they had 
created ‘a Protestant Parliament and a Protestant State’.140  
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2.14. Under these new arrangements, a twin-chambered legislature was created in 
Stormont, near Belfast, that had authority to enact laws for the ‘peace, order and 
good government’ 141  over a number of devolved powers, including policing, 
education, local government and social services. But sovereignty was retained in 
Westminster along with responsibility for policy relating to defence, foreign 
affairs and taxation.142 
 
2.15. The courts in Northern Ireland were to administer the laws passed at Westminster 
that expressly stated that they were to apply to Northern Ireland, as well as the 
laws enacted by the Stormont Parliament.  The common law continued to be 
applied to the extent it was consistent with legislation from both these sources. 
The Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland referred cases for final appeal to the 
House of Lords.  
 
2.16. The split, in terms of religion, left Northern Ireland in an unstable situation. The 
majority of the total population in Northern Ireland supported the constitutional 
link with the United Kingdom but the Roman Catholics, making up a significant 
minority, generally favoured the reunification of Ireland. In addition to the 
differing aspirations of the two communities, there was also mistrust and 
separateness between the two communities, with each community continuing to 
be defined by its religious allegiance. It has been suggested that, ‘Had the 
architects of the 1921 Settlement set out to create an inherently unstable entity, 
they could scarcely have done better than to design Northern Ireland in the way 
they did.’143 
 
2.17. The depth of division between the two communities is revealed in the perceptions 
of ordinary members of the public who lived through the violence, which were 
recorded by Ronnie Munck. Many of the comments vividly capture the nature and 
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extent of the divisions felt by ordinary people. A good example would be the 
observations made by Michael Farrell144 who commented:  
 
I just never mixed with any Protestants of my own age because we went to 
different schools, played different games, and even when we played the same 
games like tennis, there was a Protestant and Catholic tennis club.145 
 
2.18. Bowyer Bell described the deeply divided community in similar terms, observing 
that:  
 
Children prattle different nursery rhymes, play different games, curse with 
different words, live from the moment of birth in an alien world to that of 
the child across the lane - and when full grown gain certain benefits from 
the difference.146  
 
2.19. The divisions were both social and physical. The Protestants and Roman 
Catholics attended different schools, different clubs and pubs, they worked in 
different factories and institutions, and they lived in separate areas of the cities.  
 
2.20. Before looking at the various explanations of the conflict that have been put 
forward it is worth briefly stating what the conflict was not about. Throughout the 
conflict there was nothing of strategic value at stake.  ‘There were no oilfields or 
goldmines to be captured.’ 147  For this reason the Troubles were unlike the 
intractable conflicts of the Middle East and yet throughout the conflict ‘no one 
could really see an end to it’.148  
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2.21. However, the Troubles can be understood as having ‘a beginning, a middle and 
some sort of an end’.149 If each phase can be understood to exist within a different 
context, then this would arguably allow State behaviour to be judged according to 
a different yardstick in each phase.  
 
2.22. The main phases of the conflict are ‘outbreak and militarisation (1969-1976); 
criminalisation (1977-94); and transition (1995-2004)’.150 The first phase was the 
most violent, and saw the deployment of British troops, the re-emergence of 
paramilitary groups (both republican and loyalist), and resort to internment 
without trial. The second phase saw the policy of police primacy introduced in 
1976 and the rhetoric tended to emphasise the criminal nature of the conflict. It 
also saw the level of violence stabilise. The final phase covers the transition from 
violence to a political process.151 
 
2.23. When looking at the constraints imposed by law the phase of the conflict arguably 
takes on a greater significance. The argument is that States should be allowed 
greater latitude at the beginning of an emergency when the State is attempting to 
stabilise a sudden, turbulent but temporary violent situation rather than at the 
middle or end of a conflict when the situation is still violent but relatively 
predictable.152  The focus of this thesis is mainly the early years of the conflict 
and any conclusions drawn relate primarily to those years.  
Explanations of The Troubles 
 
2.24. The Troubles have been explained in various ways. McGarry and O’Leary explain 
the conflict in terms of two national communities, one Irish and one British, and 
both wanting to be governed by its own nation State. In other words, Northern 
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Ireland was a deeply divided society along national lines. This explanation of the 
conflict has gained traction and has been described as ‘the most orthodox 
explanation of the conflict’153 having achieved ‘hegemonic status’.154  
 
2.25. There are however other explanations for the conflict, one of which is that the 
conflict was essentially a conflict over religion. McGarry argues that this ‘is the 
most common, popular [explanation] of them all, at least outside Northern 
Ireland’.155 This belief is echoed by Bowyer Bell who makes the point that ‘to the 
common viewer of BBC it seemed almost inexplicable - a ‘religious’ war in the 
mid-twentieth century in Great Britain’.156 For the British public it appeared to be 
a religious war because Roman Catholics were fighting Protestants. The view that 
the conflict was about religion took various forms. One version of this theory was 
that the conflict was caused by educational segregation in religious-based 
schools.157 However, any explanation based on religion, in which ever form it 
takes, is to some extent inadequate because the Protestants were not fighting to 
prove the superiority of their version of Christianity and nor were the Roman 
Catholics. The Roman Catholics were fighting for the unification of Ireland and 
the Protestants were fighting to remain united with Britain.  
 
2.26. However, other explanations have also been put forward. John Whyte argued, in 
what Gormally and others have described as his seminal work,158 that there are 
essentially four interpretations of the conflict in Northern Ireland.159 These he 
described as being the traditional nationalist, the traditional Unionist, the Marxist 
and the two community or internal conflict interpretation. These four 
interpretations can be summarised in the following way. 
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2.27. The traditional nationalist perspective focuses on the 1920 Government of Ireland 
Act, passed by the British government, which created two devolved Irish 
Parliaments and split the country against the wishes of the majority of the people 
of Ireland. Northern Ireland’s borders were drawn up with the twin aims of 
maximising the size of the country and ensuring a Protestant majority. From the 
traditional nationalist perspective, members of the IRA (and its splinter groups) 
were viewed as fighting a ‘war’ of liberation against the British occupation. The 
IRA mounted periodic bombing campaigns and armed attacks in Britain and 
Northern Ireland targeting military and police institutions as well as civilians.160 
For their part in this war the British put the British Army on the streets of Ulster, 
introduced repressive emergency legislation including internment, sponsored 
Loyalist paramilitary violence and promoted revisionist histories. The goal of the 
nationalists was British withdrawal from Northern Ireland and Protestants to be 
peacefully integrated into a united Ireland.  
 
2.28. The traditional Unionist perspective was that Northern Ireland should be further 
integrated into the United Kingdom. In other words, Stormont should be 
dismantled, and Northern Ireland should be governed by Westminster in the same 
way that Wales was at the time. The problem with this view is that it ignored the 
views of the Roman Catholic minority and their strong support for a united 
Ireland. The traditional Unionist perspective saw Northern Ireland as being under 
threat from within by the minority Roman Catholic community and from a hostile 
government to the South that claimed Northern Ireland as part of its own national 
territory.161  
 
2.29. Adrian Guelka has identified a third threat facing the Unionists in the form of a 
treacherous British government, willing to sell them out in order to bring an end 
to the violence.162 This view is echoed by McGarry who states that: 
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Even by partition in 1921 many of the British elite were willing to abandon all 
of Ireland, seeing its retention as a risk to Britain’s political security. By the 
end of the 20th century the consensus shared by the British elite and the British 
public alike was that Northern Ireland was more of a drain on the British 
treasury than it was an exploitable colony.163  
 
2.30. The Cameron Committee, appointed by Northern Ireland’s Prime Minister, 
Terence O’Neill, to examine the causes of violence in Ulster in 1968 and 1969, 
reported that it had heard ‘sentiments of fear and apprehension of a threat to 
Unionist domination and control of government by increases in the Catholic 
population’. 164 In order to protect the State, the Unionist government of 1920 
created an armed or militarised police force165 and then under the Civil Authority 
(Special Powers) (Northern Ireland) Act 1922166 introduced wide ranging powers 
which included powers to introduce curfews,167 powers to ban political parties, 
rallies and marches,168 powers to close licensed premises, powers to introduce 
internment.169 The Cameron Report commented that the Special Powers Act was 
remarkable because of the width of powers it gave to the RUC.170  
 
2.31. So, both of these explanations separate people into Irish Nationalists and Ulster 
Unionists and then sub-divide both camps into moderates and extremists. The 
important division that existed was the Nationalist/Unionist divide. Any rifts that 
existed within the various camps thereafter related to proposed strategies on how 
to achieve the agreed goals, rather than a disagreement over what those goals 
should be. Neither explanation attempts to de-couple the violence from the 
problem of who has the right to rule Northern Ireland.  
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2.32. The Marxist perspective, as applied to Northern Ireland, believed that victory for 
the workers was impossible to achieve through the partition of Ireland. The 
partition would fuel nationalism at the expense of class politics and would also 
lead to the emergence of strong conservative capitalist forces in both countries. 
The capitalists on both sides of the border would seek to divide and therefore 
weaken the working class by setting the Roman Catholic and Protestant workers 
against each other. The solution was therefore a united Ireland.171 
 
2.33. The internal conflict theory is the most popular approach taken in official reports 
and in the academic literature.172 Taking this approach the conflict is understood 
to be between two communities ‘with very different traditions, identities and 
allegiances’.173 Political violence is understood to be largely the product of the 
state of relations between the communities. The role of the Irish government in 
the south and the British government is downplayed.  
 
2.34. One variant of this explanation for the violence that occurred in Northern Ireland 
from 1968 is that the violence was a response by the Roman Catholic community 
to systematic discrimination by the majority Protestant community in both 
Stormont174 and at a local government level.175 This explanation for the violence 
focuses on the grievances of the Roman Catholic community and those 
advocating this explanation either implicitly or explicitly downplay the role of 
nationalism as a cause of the violence. It focuses on economic inequality as a 
source of Catholic alienation.176 ‘Catholics had worse jobs, incomes, houses and 
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other material goods than Protestants.’177 The Cameron Committee confirmed that 
these ‘social and economic grievances or abuses of power ... were in a very real 
sense an immediate and operative cause of the demonstrations and consequent 
disorders’.178  
 
2.35. This explanation is often coupled with the idea that at the time Irish nationalism 
was on the decline and that there was a movement towards left-wing 
ideologies. 179  The Cameron Report also reported a reduction in concern with 
partition.180 However, Christopher Hewitt challenges this idea, claiming that there 
is no evidence to support this assertion. In fact, he cites data relating to the 
number of votes cast for parties committed to a united Ireland that tends to 
support the reverse position. He shows that in 1955, 1959, 1964 and 1966 
elections candidates standing for a united Ireland contested every election. In 
1951, as a percentage of the total Northern Ireland vote, the nationalist vote was 
26%. This dipped to 14.5% of the total Northern Ireland vote in 1959 but by 1964 
and 1966 as a proportion of the total vote, the nationalist vote was 18.2% and 
21.1% respectively.181  
 
2.36. Those who saw inequality as the problem pointed out that Roman Catholic 
protests had begun in the mid-1960s with the mobilisation of the Northern Ireland 
civil rights movement. 182  The Scarman Report suggested that the civil rights 
movement was inspired by the student riots in France which encouraged the 
‘belief that a policy of street demonstrations at critical places could achieve 
results, if only because they would attract the attention of the mass media’.183 It 
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has also been suggested that the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland was 
inspired by the civil rights movement in the United States.184   
 
2.37. Hewitt makes the point that:  
 
There is general agreement as to the Catholic grievances. They were the 
franchise gerrymandering, the allocation of houses and jobs by local councils, 
discrimination by private firms and lack of economic aid leading to high rates 
of unemployment in Catholic areas.185  
 
2.38. The Cameron Report lists seven causes of the violence and all these issues were 
cited.186 The franchise problem had two aspects to it. The first concerned the 
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giving of up to six extra votes to businessmen in local government elections. The 
second problem was that large numbers of people were deprived of a vote because 
they did not own property. This was the case for both Roman Catholics and 
Protestants. But the argument ran that the system gave the prosperous protestant 
business community additional votes while depriving the vote to poor Roman 
Catholics who lived in rented accommodation.  
 
2.39. Hewitt argues that the franchise issue provided the Northern Ireland Civil Rights 
Association (NICRA) with its ‘most emotive slogan, ‘One man, one vote’.187 In 
addition to the franchise issue, there was also the manipulation of ward 
boundaries or gerrymandering, which led the Cameron Committee to comment 
that:  
 
In particular, the arrangement of ward boundaries for local government 
purposes has produced in the local authority a permanent Unionist majority 
that bears little or no resemblance to the relative numerical strength of 
Unionists and non-unionists in the area.188  
 
2.40. However, gerrymandering was not limited to Derry. The Sunday Times Insights 
Team maintained that the gerrymandering in Derry was ‘one of a pattern’.189 And 
Elliot and Hickie identified gerrymandering in Dungannon, Downpatrick, 
Enniskillen and several other towns in Southern Ulster.190  
 
2.41. Rod Thornton gives an example of gerrymandering in Derry where 14,000 Roman 
Catholic voters could return eight councilors to the city council while 8,000 
Protestant voters could return twelve.191 The Cameron Committee concluded that 
‘the complaint that electoral arrangements were weighted against non-
unionists...[was] abundantly justified’.192 
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2.42. Another grievance was that the Protestant-run councils abused their power and 
systematically discriminated against Roman Catholics in the allocation of council 
houses and local government jobs. Yet another grievance was that central 
government funds were disproportionately spent on large infrastructure projects in 
Protestant areas while the economic development of Roman Catholic areas was 
sidelined. The usual example given is the building of the University of Ulster in 
Coleraine rather than Derry. There was further economic discrimination in that 
Protestant firms tended to give jobs to Protestant applicants. For instance, the 
Belfast shipbuilders, Harland and Wolff, had 10,000 Protestant workers and only 
400 Roman Catholic workers.193 The unemployment figures for Northern Ireland 
in the 1971 Census Reports show that for male and female Protestants 
respectively the percentage unemployment figures were 7% and 4% but for male 
and female Roman Catholics the figures were 17% and 7% respectively.194 
 
2.43. These grievances were belatedly recognised by the Protestant community and 
acknowledged by David Trimble, former leader of the Ulster Unionist Party and 
First Minister of Northern Ireland when he described Northern Ireland as a “cold 
house for Catholics” in his Nobel Lecture in 1998 in Oslo. 195 Inequality and 
discrimination ignited the protest movement in mid-to-late-1960s but if inequality 
and discrimination were the problem then very quickly the solution became a 
united Ireland.  
 
2.44. However, although some discrimination is undeniable the extent of the 
discrimination is contested. Hewitt for example, explains that the franchise issue 
was grossly exaggerated and that in terms of numbers it affected only 1.3% of the 
total electorate affecting 8,370 people, some of whom were Roman Catholic.196 In 
relation to the disenfranchisement issue Hewitt claims that in fact 60% of those 
disenfranchised were Protestant. Hewitt also contests the extent of the 
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gerrymandering, suggesting that the areas classified as gerrymandered were done 
so incorrectly due to an ‘ignorance of fertility differences between Catholics and 
Protestants’.197 Hewitt goes on to explain that ‘higher Catholic fertility means that 
the proportion of Catholics in the voting age population is noticeably lower.’ 198 
The use of the word ‘fertility’ is a source of some confusion here.  However, his 
argument seems to be that it is misleading to look at the percentage of the total 
population who are Roman Catholic and then look at the percentage of Roman 
Catholic councillors that get elected because a greater percentage of the Roman 
Catholic total population are not of voting age when compared to the make-up of 
the protestant population.  
 
2.45. Hewitt further suggests that discrimination was systematically practiced by 
Roman Catholic-run councils as well as by Protestant-run councils. He quotes the 
Loyalty Survey which shows that the ‘greatest bias lies in the treatment of 
Protestants by Catholic Councils’.199 He also argues that Protestant firms hired 
Protestants and Roman Catholic firms hired Roman Catholics but that is just the 
nature of communal solidarity. Hewitt goes on to assert that:  
 
Certain examples of discrimination such as the low proportion of Roman 
Catholics working in the Belfast shipyards or the placing of a university in 
Coleraine rather than Londonderry are cited ad nauseam implying that they are 
the only examples of discrimination available.200 
 
2.46. The Cameron Report concluded that a sense of injustice had been a general 
contributory factor in the violence and noted that ‘resentment and frustration 
among the Catholic population at the failure to achieve either acceptance on the 
part of the government or any agreement to investigate these complaints or to 
provide any remedy for them’.201  
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2.47. An alternative interpretation of the role of systematic discrimination and 
inequality exists and that is that although there was a need for reform in Northern 
Ireland, talk of reform was a ‘blind’, a kind of camouflage for an attack on the 
State. Caroline Kennedy-Pipe makes the point that, ‘the Provisionals, operating 
behind the façade of the civil rights movement, reignited the battle between the 
forces of Irish Republicanism and Britain’. 202  The civil rights movement, 
according to this interpretation, was simply a Trojan horse for the IRA now 
seeking new means to obtain old objectives.203  
 
2.48. However, this theory has been heavily criticised by Bob Purdie who states that the 
weight of evidence suggests that ‘the IRA were totally unprepared for the 
communal violence of the late 1960s’.204 And he argues that although the Official 
IRA did play an influential part in the Northern Ireland civil rights movement, the 
Official IRA were seeking a political solution and ‘came to be seen as moderate 
compared with the Provisional IRA and its supporters’.205  
 
2.49. Whatever the inspiration and whether or not it was a Trojan horse for the IRA, the 
civil rights movement in Northern Ireland in 1968 gathered support. The Derry 
Citizens’ Action Committee marches in November 1968 were larger than any of 
the American civil rights marches held in Birmingham in 1963 and in Selma in 
1965.206 The Northern Irish civil rights movement has been described as ‘one of 
the largest and most successful non-violent movements for change in the post–war 
world’.207 
 
2.50. Through peaceful means it had achieved notable successes by November 1968.  
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A points system for public-housing allocation was to be adopted, a British-
style Ombudsman was to be appointed, the emergency powers that breached 
the European Convention on Human Rights were to be withdrawn, a 
Commission was to replace the Unionist-controlled Derry Council…and the 
company vote was to be abolished.208  
 
The Northern Irish government also promised to investigate the violence and 
review policing in the Province. In addition, universal adult suffrage in local 
elections had been accepted by the spring 1969.209 Yet these significant advances 
did not prevent the descent into violence.  
 
2.51. The violence is generally understood to be an escalation of the long-standing 
intractable conflict between unionists and nationalists. The violence took the form 
of rioting but then evolved into a low intensity conflict with the main protagonists 
being the British State, the republican paramilitaries 210 and loyalist 
paramilitaries. 211  On this understanding the Troubles are viewed as a 
‘continuation, and intensification, of the communal struggle’. 212   The deep 
divisions in society are the necessary precondition and all that is required is to 
identify the particular ‘trigger’ that sparked the escalation. Hennessey points to 
the decision of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in January 1970 to 
embrace violence. 213  Niall O’Dochartaigh suggests that the trigger was the 
repressive action of the State. He argues that on the 5 October 1968 the RUC 
charged into a civil rights march, and revealed a State that was both ‘aggressive 
and weak ... making violence a logical outcome’.214  
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2.52. An alternative understanding of the violence has been provided by Prince and 
Warner who argue that the violence was not simply an escalation of what had 
gone on before but ‘instead a distinct form of conflict’.215  The violence was not 
inevitable but rather a choice. They reject the usual two–sided contest between 
Irish nationalists and Ulster unionists. Instead they argue that the fragmentation 
and competition ‘among and within the organisations which made up the Northern 
Irish civil rights movement are actually central to explaining why some of those 
groups chose violent strategies’.216 They maintain that the infighting within the 
civil rights movement is more important to understanding the descent into 
violence than the overarching nationalist/Unionist conflict. Their explanation 
focuses on the intense political competition between the different groups within 
the civil rights movement and the Republican movement causing both movements 
to fracture.  
 
2.53. In an attempt to trace out the significant events that led to the Troubles, the 
Scarman Report 217  identified a series of protest marches and Orange Order 
marches that descended into violence. The Report identified one matter that 
seemed to ignite the imagination of the non-unionist minority in the Province and 
greatly increased the standing and influence of the NICRA. The matter involved 
the allocation of a house to an unmarried Protestant girl over Roman Catholic 
families with children. In protest, Roman Catholics took to the streets in June 
1968.  
 
2.54. Later that year a civil rights demonstration was planned for the 5 October 1968 in 
Derry. The Northern Ireland government at Stormont banned the march but the 
ban was defied and violence between police and demonstrators occurred. Further 
violence broke out on a march on the 4 January 1969 from Belfast to Derry that 
saw clashes between Protestants and Roman Catholics at Burntollet Bridge. The 
rioting on this occasion spread to Derry and continued until the 5 January 1969. 
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2.55. The Scarman Report noted that the demonstrations left the Protestant majority 
feeling insecure and hostile. 218  Outraged loyalists responded with more civil 
unrest and violence. There was serious rioting by Protestants from the Crumlin 
Road area on the 2 August 1969 when efforts were made to invade Unity Flats. 
On this occasion, the police held back the rioters with difficulty. The Scarman 
Report states that ‘The Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner concluded that 
they were unable any longer to control the serious disturbances in the City of 
Belfast. Both of these officers felt the time had come to call in the Army.’219  
 
2.56. The police were simply not strong enough to deal with the violence. The overall 
strength of the RUC was 3,200. The ‘B’ specials of which there were 8,500 had 
already been committed.220 There were no policemen available from the mainland 
to reinforce the RUC.221  
 
2.57. On the 12 August 1969, the traditional Apprentice Boys Parade was due to take 
place in Derry.  The march degenerated into a three-day pitched battle in Derry 
that sparked violence elsewhere including serious disturbances in Belfast. The 
violence in Derry is referred to as the ‘Battle of the Bogside’.  
 
2.58. The British Army was deployed on the 15 August 1969 as military aid to the civil 
power.222 The troops were drawn from the normally established garrison of some 
2,500 soldiers based in the Province. The fact that the levels of violence 
necessitated troops on the streets of both Belfast and Derry indicates that Northern 
Ireland was in crisis. The next chapter will examine the various theories that try to 
explain how democratic governments are controlled when faced with such crises. 
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Chapter 2: Theories of Emergencies in Democratic States  
 
3.1 With British soldiers deployed on the streets of Belfast and Derry and the levels 
of violence in Northern Ireland rapidly rising, the British government treated the 
situation as an emergency. Both the devolved Northern Irish government and 
Westminster simply introduced emergency legislation giving the State enhanced 
powers in order to deal with the spiraling violence. This chapter will look at 
various theories that attempt to explain how governments, facing a crisis and 
seeking increased powers to deal with that crisis, are limited in democratic States. 
These theories are projected onto a stable functioning Western democracy that has 
an elected government, a separation of powers and a justiciable system of rights. 
Of course, authoritarian governments experience emergencies too but as Kim 
Lane Scheppele argues, ‘For an executive to seize power and suspend rights under 
a democratic constitutional government it is an entirely different matter, 
normatively speaking, than for a monarch (even a constitutional monarch) to do 
so.’223 
 
3.2 Emergencies have been called various names over time. UN Special Rapporteur, 
Mr. Leandro Despouy, stated that:  
 
The expression state of emergency encompasses the whole range of situations 
described by the terms ‘state of siege’, ‘state of urgency’, ‘state of alert’, ‘state 
of readiness’, ‘state of war’, ‘suspension of guarantees’, ‘martial law’, ‘crisis 
policies’, ‘curfew’ etc. as well as all the other measures adopted by 
Governments involving restrictions on the exercise of human rights beyond 
those properly authorised in normal circumstances.224    
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3.3 In his report, Mr. Leandro Despouy chose to use the expression ‘state of 
emergency’ on account of its legal precision and the extent of its current use.225 
‘The issue of emergencies is usually understood through a dichotomised world-
view in which there is a normal or ordinary state of affairs and then there is an 
exceptional state or state of emergency.’226 
 
3.4 Historically a state of emergency would have been a situation where a nation was 
facing internal rebellion or was put on a war footing due to the threat of an 
invasionon and what was being defended was the King or Queen. Kim Lane 
Scheppele states that an emergency ‘refers to a situation in which a state is 
confronted by a mortal threat and responds by doing things that would never be 
justified in normal times, given the working principles of that State’.227 Therefore, 
Kim Lane Scheppele understands an emergency to be a challenge to the State that 
is so grave that the State must violate its own principles to save itself. Bruce 
Ackerman makes the same point, ‘the paradigm case for emergency powers has 
been an imminent threat to the very existence of the state, which necessitates 
empowering the executive to take extraordinary measures’.228  
 
3.5 The state of exception is justified in terms of the extreme nature of the threat. 
Ordinary laws and human rights are suspended or eroded by the executive in order 
to save them. This brings to mind Robert Taber’s description of a report from a 
United States Air Force officer in Vietnam on the destruction of Ben Tre, a 
Mekong Delta city of 35,000 people. The Air Force officer is reported to have 
said, ‘We had to destroy the town in order to save it.’229  
 
3.6 The problem for the State is not that it cannot win against the terrorists but that 
winning must be balanced against protecting and maintaining a liberal democracy 
and abiding by the rule of law. Paul Wilkinson made this point very eloquently 
saying ‘Any bloody tyrant can 'solve' the problem of political violence if he is 
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prepared to sacrifice all consideration of humanity and trample down all 
constitutional and judicial rights.’ 230   Joseph Bishop makes the same point 
claiming that:  
 
No totalitarian government with a ruthless and efficient secret police, 
possessing unlimited powers of surveillance, censorship, arrest, 
interrogation, search and seize, imprisonment and execution without trial, 
has much to fear from dissidents – violent or otherwise.231 
 
3.7 The intrinsic problem is that in a democratic State the government is constrained by 
law, but when faced with a situation threatening the survival of the State the 
government will do whatever is necessary to defeat that threat to ensure the 
survival of the State. This is the case even if it involves the government breaking 
the law. In other words, the debate focuses on the balance between liberty on the 
one hand and security on the other in the face of an emergency. ‘The debate about 
the relationship between security and liberty has intensified in liberal democracies 
since September 2001.’ 232  The debate has not just been about the trade-off 
between liberty and security but also about the ‘the meaning of security and the 
power of civil liberties’.233  
 
3.8 The misgivings about sacrificing fundamental rights can be split into principled 
misgivings and pragmatic misgivings.234 Principled misgivings include the idea 
that some rights are non-derogable and that giving up these fundamental rights 
represents a victory for the enemy. The pragmatic objections to sacrificing 
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fundamental rights include the idea that once lost these rights are difficult to 
regain and that losing such rights is in any case at best unnecessary to combat the 
threat and in the worst-case scenario counterproductive.  
 
3.9 There is some evidence from Northern Ireland to suggest that concerns that 
emergency legislation will remain after the emergency has ended are legitimate. 
As part of the security normalisation program parts of the Terrorism Act 2000235 
relating to Northern Ireland was repealed on 31 July 2007. Only to be replaced by 
the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007 that contains a provision for 
non-jury trials. 236  The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) may issue a 
certificate that allows a trial on indictment to proceed without a jury if certain 
conditions in s1 of the Justice and Security Act 2007 are met.237 The DPP must 
satisfy himself that ‘there is a risk that the administration of justice might be 
impaired if the trial were to be conducted with a jury’.238 The fact that the non-
jury trials still take place, although in falling numbers,239 is evidence that even 
contentious emergency powers can prove difficult to remove after the emergency 
has ended.  
 
3.10 The trade-off between liberty and security is actually more complicated than it 
might appear at first glance. This is because implicit in the trade-off are the 
numbers – national security for everyone versus civil liberties for those few who 
are suspected of crimes. Waldron makes the point when he claims that ‘if security 
gains for most people are being balanced against liberty–losses for a few, then we 
need to pay attention to the few/many dimension of the balance, not just the 
liberty/security dimension’. 240  This is the case despite the fact that the 
improvement in security is incalculable and potentially very slight. In other 
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words, the rights of the many are balanced against the rights of few and the 
interests of both the few and the many are being weighed against future 
uncertainties.  
 
3.11 ‘One of the ironies of pursuing security is that whilst claiming to protect liberty 
from one source - terrorism, it diminishes the protection of liberty from another - 
the state.’ 241   To overcome this tension, Lucia Zednar suggests that the 
security/liberty trade-off should be abandoned and replaced with an inter-
dependency between liberty and security.242 In other words, promoting security is 
not an end in itself. Promoting security involves protecting various ends and one 
of those ends is liberty.  It is important to promote security because by promoting 
security, liberty is protected. Therefore, on this understanding, measures aimed to 
promote security but which undermine liberty ought to be reconsidered. 
 
3.12 Since the terrorist attacks on 9/11 interest in the powers of government and the 
consequences of expanding executive powers has been ‘revitalised’. 243  David 
Rudenstine has speculated that this is at least in part, ‘due to the expansion of the 
national security state and the growing concerns that the power of the government 
is not meaningfully controlled by the legislature nor meaningfully held 
accountable by the courts’.244 This increased interest has led to the development 
and refinement of various theories of emergency. 
The Evolution of the Concept of a State of Emergency 
 
3.13 The concept of a state of emergency has evolved over time. The number of 
reasons used to justify declaring a state of emergency has increased and the terms 
involved, initially defence of the realm, and then later national security, have 
themselves evolved and expanded to cover many more situations. 
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3.14 By the twentieth century the possible reasons used to justify declaring an 
emergency in Britain had come to include industrial action245 and terrorism in 
Northern Ireland,246 as well as the defence of the realm.  The expansion of the 
justifications used to declare an emergency has had an impact on the concept of 
an emergency itself. Emergencies were originally understood as threats that 
jeopardised the very survival of the State but by incorporating industrial action 
and acts of terrorism as justifications for an emergency, the concept of an 
emergency is widened to include threats that do not threaten the very survival of 
the State but instead threaten vested interests within the State and/or the social 
order. This change has weakened the link between necessity and emergency.  
 
3.15 The concept of an emergency has also been complicated by changes to the 
meaning of the term defence of the realm. Over time the term had widened and 
had come to mean defending a political community rather than just the sovereign. 
In other words, wars were waged not to defend the Sovereign but instead wars 
were waged on behalf of everyone. This shift in focus in terms of what is being 
defended, complicates our understanding of what constitutes a threat and what 
survival means.  
 
3.16 ‘The expression ‘national security’ had not been in common use before WWII.’247 
However, in the second half of the twentieth century the term national security 
came to largely replace the term defence of the realm. Emergencies came to be 
justified on the basis of protecting national security. It has been suggested that this 
change in terminology reflected a shift in perception about what constitutes a 
threat to the State.248 The suggestion is that ‘actions far afield in the world would 
now count as direct threats’ to the State.249  
 
3.17 The problem is that the term national security is not defined in law and is 
consequently imprecise. So, the discussion of emergencies is further complicated 
by the fact that the term national security, which is used to justify an emergency, 
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is itself imprecise. What is clear is that emergencies are commonplace. 
Emergencies are so commonplace that some commentators have observed that 
emergency government has or will become the norm.250 A UN study in 1997 
concluded that ‘about 100 states, or around half of the countries of the world had 
been under a state of emergency actual or declared, during the period between 
January 1985 and May 1997’.251 
 
3.18 Emergencies can be legal, in the sense that they can be declared or proclaimed in 
accordance with constitutional or legislative provisions, or they can be de facto 
states of emergency. The United Nations has defined a de facto emergency as 
involving the adoption of exceptional measures without a state of emergency 
having previously been proclaimed or the maintenance of exceptional measures 
after a state of emergency has been officially lifted.252 Between 1985 and 1997 at 
least 20 countries were at one time or another under a de facto emergency.253 
There is also what is sometimes referred to as an institutional emergency, where 
exceptional measures are incorporated into ordinary laws before the state of 
emergency is finally terminated. Proclaimed or declared emergencies have been 
sub-categorised as either national or international in nature. This distinction, at 
least in part, seems to rest on interpreting national security in a very broad sense.  
 
3.19 The State responds to the threat in a way that would not normally be justified but 
it is generally understood that once the threat disappears then the laws enacted to 
deal with the emergency will no longer apply and the previous laws will be 
restored. In other words, the aim of the emergency constitution is to protect the 
pre-existing constitutional order. However, this understanding of an emergency is 
problematic in situations where the legitimacy of the pre-existing arrangements is 
the cause of the emergency, as was the case in Northern Ireland. In such 
situations, in a democratic State, the aim of introducing emergency legislation 
ought not to be to ensure the restoration of the old order but rather to allow the 
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creation a new order, a new order that addresses at least some of the issues that 
caused the emergency in the first place. 
 
3.20 Looking generally at emergency powers in the USA and the kinds of 
extraordinary measures that have been permitted by them, Sharon Pickering 
commented that the:  
 
[E]mergency powers were widely regarded as having reduced due process 
protections, increased police powers, boosted executive powers to 
unprecedented levels, while simultaneously reducing judicial oversight, 
eroding the once closely monitored demarcation between intelligence and 
security agencies on the one hand and the state and federal police services on 
the other.254  
 
Elements of an Emergency 
 
3.21 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted by the 
General Assembly in the UN on 19 December 1966.255 Article 4 of that Covenant 
states:  
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the 
existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present 
Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the 
present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other 
obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on 
the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.256 
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3.22 An emergency must involve a threat to the life of the nation and the situation must 
make it necessary for a state to violate specific Covenant norms in order to 
maintain a minimum level of public order.  
 
3.23 Article 15 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR or the European 
Convention) states:  
 
In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any 
High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations 
under this Convention to the extent i) strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation, ii) provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other 
obligations under international law.257 
 
3.24 This again provides for the possibility of violating specific Covenant norms in 
order to maintain a minimum level of public order in times of public emergency 
that affects the life of the nation. The European Court of Human Rights has 
looked at the meaning of the phrase ‘a public emergency which affects the life of 
a nation’.  In the case of Lawless v Ireland, the phrase was said to mean ‘an 
exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole population 
and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community of which the state is 
comprised’.258  In its report on the Greek case, the Commission stated that:  
 
Such an emergency may then be seen to have, in particular, the following 
characteristics:  
 
(1) It must be actual or imminent.259  
(2) Its effects must concern the entire population.  
(3) The continuance of the organised life of the community must be threatened. 
(4) The crisis must be exceptional, in that the normal measures or restriction, 
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permitted by the Convention for the maintenance of public safety, health and 
order, are plainly inadequate.260 
 
3.25 In Brannigan and McBride v United Kingdom261 the European Court of Human 
Rights concluded that the situation in Northern Ireland amounted to an emergency 
that affected the life of the nation.  The decision was controversial because the 
entire population of the United Kingdom was arguably not threatened,262 and so 
the focus appears to be on the nature of the threat rather than on the level of the 
threat. The IRA did not have the capability to launch an attack that would prevent 
the State from guaranteeing a minimum level of law and order. In fact, it could be 
argued that threats to civilians and non-essential government targets would never 
normally justify recourse to emergency powers precisely because they do not 
jeopardise the prerequisites for legal order. The argument being that terrorism 
creates fear in a population rather than threatens the life of a nation. Lord 
Hoffman articulated this idea in A and others v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department 263  when he said, ‘I do not underestimate the ability of fanatical 
groups of terrorists to kill and destroy, but they do not threaten the life of the 
nation.’264 He went on to say that ‘Terrorist violence, serious as it is, does not 
threaten our institutions of government or our existence as a civil community.’265   
Theories of Emergency 
 
3.26 States of emergency can be broadly understood, in one of two ways. They can 
either be understood as operating outside the constitutional framework sometimes 
referred to as the ‘sovereignty’ approach266 or inside the constitution sometimes 
referred to as the ‘rule-of-law’ approach.267 
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3.27 The ‘sovereignty’ approach views the State as acting outside the constitution 
during times of emergency. In other words, the State is understood to be operating 
outside the rule of law. In an emergency, the constitution is relaxed or suspended 
and power shifts from the legislative and judiciary and concentrates in the 
executive. The executive operates outside the usual channels of government and is 
therefore able to by-pass constitutional procedures.  Therefore, the executive can 
act unilaterally to address the emergency. Applying the ‘sovereignty’ approach 
Frederick Cowell has described emergency powers as being ‘autonomous spheres 
of action separate to or beyond the law’.268  
 
3.28 The question then becomes to what extent should the executive be allowed to act 
unilaterally and the answer to that question may be dependent on the scale of the 
threat facing the State. An extreme position would be to argue that it is desirable 
for the executive to have unlimited freedom to deal with the emergency since to 
limit executive powers may result in the State being overwhelmed by the threat it 
faces. A more moderate position would be to allow the executive greater freedom 
than it would otherwise have, but impose limits to those powers. 
 
3.29 As constitutional norms are relaxed and power gravitates to the executive, there is 
an increased risk that the executive will abuse that power. However, that risk can 
be justified during an emergency on the grounds of improved national security.269 
Clinton Rossiter put it as follows, ‘no sacrifice is too great for our democracy, 
least of all the temporary sacrifice of democracy itself’.270 An interesting feature 
of states of emergency understood in this way is that they originate from law. In 
other words, the law is used to suspend itself.   
 
3.30 The idea that states of emergency exist outside the law is associated with the 17th 
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century philosopher John Locke 271  and the German right-wing constitutional 
theorist Carl Schmitt.272 Schmitt argued that the executive needed the ability to 
act outside of the rules.273 In fact, the survival of the State may depend on the 
executive not being bound by any rules. So, in times of emergency Schmitt 
conceived of the rule of law as a threat to the survival of the State. He wrote: 
The precise details of an emergency cannot be anticipated, nor can one spell 
out what may take place in such a case, especially when it is truly a matter of 
an extreme emergency and it is to be eliminated. The precondition as well as 
the conduct of jurisdictional competence in such a case must necessarily be 
unlimited. From the liberal constitutional point of view, there would be no 
jurisdictional competence at all. The most guidance the constitution can 
provide is to indicate who can act in such a case.274 
3.31 Schmitt believed that emergencies exposed a fundamental weakness in liberalism. 
The law can spell out who may exercise emergency power but it cannot set out in 
advance what would be a necessary and permissible response to a threat and so he 
famously claimed that ‘in an emergency, the state remains, where law recedes’.275 
However, the absence of a formal power to act cannot be allowed to inhibit the 
executive’s ability to mount a proper defence of the community. The executive 
resorts to raw political power out of necessity regardless of the lawfulness of its 
actions.  
 
3.32 So, Schmitt understood emergencies to be ‘a suspension of regular law, even a 
space of non-law’276 or as David Dyzenhaus put it ‘a state of emergency is a 
lawless void, a legal black hole, in which the state acts unconstrained by law’.277 
Dyzenhaus also coined the term ‘legal grey holes’ to describe disguised legal 
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black holes. That is ‘situations where there are some legal constraints on 
executive action - it is not a lawless void - but the constraints are so unsubstantial 
that they pretty well permit the government to do as it pleases’.278  
3.33 Adrian Vermeule and Eric Posner go further and suggest that this is true not just 
in times of emergency but is true in general in the modern State. 279  This 
unconstrained power exists with respect to foreign, military and domestic matters. 
So, it is often said that ‘in times of war, the laws are silent’ but Posner and 
Vermeule argue that the laws are always silent when it comes to executive power. 
This they suggest is true of both constitutional laws and statutes that purport to 
regulate the executive. Posner and Vermeule state that, ‘The basic aspiration of 
liberal legality to constrain the executive through statutory law has largely 
failed.’280 When attempts are made to impose legislative constraints, the laws are 
often vague enough and the courts typically deferential enough to allow the 
executive room to maneuver. The ‘laws provide an impressive façade of legal 
constraint on the executive, but actually blocking very little action’.281  
 
3.34 Nasser Hussain argues that the problem with this view of emergencies as 
essentially lawless spaces is that it is at odds with what is actually seen to happen 
during emergencies. It may well be that there is an under regulation of 
emergencies at a constitutional level but there is an over regulation of 
emergencies at a micro-level. Hussain states that ‘what we witness in 
contemporary global emergencies is a proliferation of new laws and regulations, 
passed in an ad hoc or tactical manner, and diverse administrative procedures’.282 
Hussain describes the emergence of these new laws as ‘hyperlegality’. He claims 
that hyperlegality operates through two mechanisms. It first extends the use of 
classifications of individuals and then expands the use of special tribunals and 
commissions to deal with individuals depending on their classification category. 
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Hussain gives examples of new classifications or labels that emerged after 9/11 
including individuals of ‘special interest’, ‘enemy combatants’ and ‘non-enemy 
combatants’. 283  He makes the point that being labeled in these ways had 
‘significant ramifications for the detainees’. 284  Hussain claims that 
conceptualising states of emergency as spheres of legal exclusion is ‘inadequate to 
explain the use of bureaucratic and administrative classifications’.285  
 
3.35 Alternatively, the ‘rule-of-law’ approach views emergencies as operating within 
the constitutional framework and in fact many constitutions have provisions for 
enhancing executive power during emergencies. 286  Lord Hoffman in A v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department287 argued that emergency powers are 
inherent within our constitution. He claimed that ‘the necessity for draconian 
powers in moments of national crisis is recognised in our constitutional 
history’.288 So the executive alone possesses constitutionally based authority to 
undertake emergency action. This is because only the executive possesses the 
‘requisite capacity for decision, activity, secrecy and dispatch’.289 In the ‘rule-of 
law’ approach the authority to manage an emergency is found in the constitution. 
It follows that this authority must be bounded by constitutional constraints.  
 
3.36 On this understanding of emergencies as existing inside law, ordinary powers and 
rights are temporarily suspended, but that does not mean that executive power is 
unlimited. Instead it means that the emergency powers are bounded by some form 
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of constitutional regulation. That supervision could come from the legislature or 
judicial review or the people or some combination thereof. In the ‘rule-of-law’ 
approach emergencies, it is assumed that there is no prerogative attaching to any 
institution within the State that allows that institution to act outside of the law. It 
is accepted that there is a space outside of law, ‘but there is no authority, inside or 
outside of the law, that can authorise state action outside of the law’.290 It is the 
responsibility of State institutions to work together to ensure that political power 
is always exercised within the rule of law. Dyzenhaus refers to this as the rule of 
law project.291  
 
3.37 In broad terms emergencies are understood as operating either inside or outside 
the constitution. At a more detailed level, political theorists have developed 
various models offering up a variety of ideas about how to understand states of 
emergencies.  These models either attempt to explain emergency power in terms 
that are consistent with the rule of law and constitutionalism or examine how best 
judicial or political institutions can constrain emergency powers invoked by the 
State. Contemporary theories of emergency powers can be divided into three basic 
models according to the type of check on State power that they favour. The three 
models are the legality model, the neo-Roman model and the extra-legal measures 
model.292 
The Legality Model 
 
3.38 This model, also sometimes referred to as the common–law model, views 
emergency legislation as being integrated in ordinary law. The model focuses on 
the roles of the courts in scrutinising emergency legislation to ensure that it is 
consistent with the rule of law in a ‘thick’ sense. In this model, the courts are the 
principal institution that acts to constrain the use of executive power during 
emergencies. In other words, the function of the courts is to both scrutinise 
legislation to ensure it upholds the rule of law and to police the boundaries 
between the legislature and the executive in order to keep each branch within its 
own sphere of power.  
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3.39 The judiciary is well placed to fulfill this function for three reasons:  
 
[T]hey have the advantage of hindsight; they take up issues relating to 
emergency powers not in the abstract … but in the context of specific cases; 
and they are required to give reasons for their decisions thereby restricting 
what can be done in the next emergency.293  
 
It is also arguable that judicial scrutiny takes place at a time when the ‘heat’ of the 
emergency has cooled and by judges who are not reliant on public support and therefore 
able to scrutinise the legislation in a more measured way.  
 
3.40 However, this model’s reliance on the courts as ‘guardians’ of rights and liberties 
during emergencies is difficult to square with the courts historical reluctance to 
challenge the executive once national security has been raised as a motive for any 
particular activity.  
The Extra-Legal Measures Model 
 
3.41 The extra-legal measures model accepts that the courts and the legislature have a 
part to play in checking the power of the executive but the principal constraint is 
society or the people. Oren Gross is closely associated with this model. In his 
extra-legal measures model, Gross states that when the executive acts without a 
legal basis then those actions should be performed in full view of the public and 
then scrutinised later either directly by the people or alternatively by the people’s 
legislative representatives. 294  According to Gross this model best preserves 
fundamental principles of the constitution.295 Gross’s extra-legal measures model 
is based on three assumptions. Firstly, that in emergencies the executive must be 
enhanced. Secondly, constitutional arrangements will inevitably fail to place 
constraints on executive power during an emergency and thirdly, the enhanced 
powers used by the executive during an emergency will ‘leak’ into ordinary law 
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after the emergency has ended. 296  Therefore, Gross accepts that in times of 
emergency public officials may need to act contrary to the law, but that by 
publicly acknowledging their acts they leave it to the people to judge them later 
and decide their fate.297 
 
3.42 Reliance on ex-post facto scrutiny is arguably hopeful rather than realistic but it 
does reintroduce law back into the space of the emergency. Laws play an 
important part for Gross after the emergency has ended because it is through law 
that officials will be either punished or not. It therefore distances Gross from 
Locke and Schmitt who both conceive a state of emergency as entirely lawless 
space.  
The Neo-Roman Model 
 
3.43 The neo-Roman model298 is based on the work of Schmitt.299 Schmitt argued that 
the rule of law has no place during an emergency and that an emergency by its 
nature requires the suspension of democratic constitutional order. 300  Modern 
theorists who accept the neo-Roman approach have developed versions of this 
model that advocate well-drafted formal emergency powers clauses to be inserted 
in the constitution. These clauses provide prospective guidelines for the 
emergency authority, time restrictions and standards against which actions can be 
judged legal or illegal. These clauses distance the emergency law from the 
ordinary law and in doing so frustrate both any blurring of the boundaries between 
the two types of law and any seepage of emergency law into ordinary law. Clinton 
Rossiter301 and Bruce Ackerman 302 are closely associated with this model and 
have both developed a version of this model arguing for entrenched emergency 
clauses in a State’s constitution.  
 
3.44 This model has the advantage of specifying how and when an emergency can be 
declared and forces the executive to rely on the legislature to set up an emergency 
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government. This overcomes the troubling idea that an executive ‘defines, 
declares and potentially gains from an emergency situation’. 303  William 
Scheuerman also makes the point that by making the executive reliant on the 
legislature, the model increases the potential for differences of opinion on what 
constitutes an emergency.  
The Role of Stormont during The Troubles 
 
3.45 At the start of the Troubles Northern Ireland had its own parliament at Stormont 
in Belfast. The statutory basis of that parliament was the Government of Ireland 
Act 1920.304 Stormont was always subservient to Westminster and in 1972, due to 
rising levels of violence, the British government imposed direct rule on Northern 
Ireland from Westminster. The Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act 
1972305 suspended or prorogued the Stormont Parliament and the Northern Ireland 
Constitution Act of 1973306 abolished it a year later.  
 
3.46 The British Army had been deployed on the streets of Northern Ireland since 
August 1969. The consequences of the imposition of direct rule for the military in 
Northern Ireland were insignificant. In fact, it was understood by civil servants at 
the time that the imposition of direct rule would translate into ‘a slight advantage 
because what at present requires legislation at Stormont could be dealt with by 
Order in Council after it is imposed’.307 The British Army would continue to act 
in its capacity as military aid to the civil power. The only new factor would be 
that the civil power in whose aid the British Army would be acting would now be 
Westminster.  
 
3.47 Legislation currently in force in Northern Ireland would continue. Orders under 
the Northern Ireland Special Powers Act308 would continue to be made by the 
                                                        
303 Scheuerman (n289) 272. 
304 Government of Ireland Act 1920. 
305 Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act 1972. 
306 Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973. 
307 The National Archive (TNA): Public Record Office (PRO) CAB 164/110 Northern Ireland 
Contingency Planning ‘Operation Folklore’ 1972 Folio 16 letter from Head of DS 6 to head of DS 
10 T Sol (Mr. Hooton) dated June 1973.  
308 The Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922. This was repealed by the 
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973. 
67 
 
Minister responsible for Northern Ireland. Legislation that would have been 
capable of being passed by the Stormont Parliament would become capable of 
being passed by Order in Council at Westminster and matters already requiring 
legislation from Westminster would continue to do so.  
 
3.48 The Sunningdale Agreement309 of 1973 attempted to reintroduce devolved power 
in Northern Ireland. However, the attempt failed and direct rule did not end for 
another 25 years with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.310 
 
3.49 The emergency legislation for Northern Ireland was enacted at Westminster where 
it ought to have been heavily scrutinised by Parliament. However, there are 
reasons to be suspicious about the level of scrutiny it received. Firstly, ‘The 
British political parties quickly adopted a bipartisan approach to managing the 
conflict.’ 311  This bipartisan approach taken by all the major British political 
parties to the conflict in Northern Ireland may have translated into limited 
scrutiny of emergency legislation. Secondly, as Whelan points out, at the time 
Northern Ireland elected 17 of the 650 Members of Parliament at Westminster.312 
He maintains that the ‘limited number of Northern Ireland’s representatives and 
the intractability of its problems give Parliament little incentive to devote 
attention to Northern Ireland’.313 Bowyer Bell echoes those thoughts stating that 
‘except after an immediate atrocity [Ireland] remains a marginal matter in 
London’. 314  He went on to describe Northern Ireland as ‘still a mix of the 
Cornwall and the Congo, charm and black violence, a faraway place, little 
understood, seldom visited, rarely a crucial matter in Parliament or 
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Westminster’.315 Thirdly, most of the laws that would have been the responsibility 
of Northern Ireland’s legislature were enacted through the abbreviated Order in 
Council procedure established by the Northern Ireland Act of 1974.316 Orders in 
Council are drafted under the direction of senior government ministers and laid 
before Parliament for approval. However, Orders in Council are secondary 
legislation and as a consequence are Parliamentary debate ‘is limited to no more 
than one–and-a-half hours, and the draft must be approved or rejected in its 
entirety’.317  
3.50 What this means is that successive British governments had the opportunity to 
introduce emergency legislation drafted in vague terms, granting sweeping 
powers to the Security Forces, and have confidence that the legislation would be 
passed by both Houses of Parliament.  
The Emergency Legislation 
 
 
3.51 In relation to an emergency the State’s response to terrorism can be broadly 
understood as taking either a ‘criminal justice’ approach or a ‘war approach’. The 
‘criminal justice’ approach is heavily reliant on the State’s legal framework as the 
main means of combating terrorism.  Terrorists are arrested and processed 
through the justice system in the same way as any other criminal. The ‘war’ 
approach on the other hand, views the terrorists as enemies to be annihilated by 
military force. Taking the ‘war’ approach may involve suspected leaders of 
terrorist groups being assassinated or coming under ‘targeted’ air strikes. 318 In 
other words, States have a choice about how to respond to terrorist activities. 
They can either respond to acts of terrorism as large crimes or respond to them as 
small wars. However, ‘in most cases the democratic response incorporates aspects 
of both models’319 although this may not be fully admitted publicly by the State. 
                                                        
315 ibid. 
316 Northern Ireland Act 1974 Schedule 1(1). 
317 Whelan (n313) 151. 
318 A recent example would be the alleged assassination of Osama bin Laden. In 2015 Seymour 
Hersh wrote, ‘It has been 4 years since a group of Navy Seals assassinated Osama bin Laden.’  See 
Seymour Hersh, ‘The Killing of Osama bin Laden’ (2015) 37(10) London Book Review 3-10. 
319 Geraint Hughes, ‘The use of undercover military units in counter-terrorist operations: A 
historical analysis with reference to contemporary anti-terrorism’ (2010) 21(4) Small Wars and 
Insurgencies 561, 567. 
69 
 
Arguably this happened in Northern Ireland because on the one hand the British 
government used the justice system to deal with suspected terrorists and on the 
other hand, behind the scenes, developed contingency plans, certain aspects of 
which, looked like plans for a military offensive.320 
 
3.52 Britain tended to treat terrorism in Northern Ireland during the Troubles as a large 
crime and applied the criminal justice approach when dealing with those 
suspected of terrorist offences. The British government’s position was that the 
activities of the IRA remained criminal despite their motives. This policy of 
criminalisation was designed to influence and shape public opinion. Finn has 
suggested that it was ‘an attempt to persuade Northern Irish Catholics that 
terrorists were not heroic Irish patriots but brutal criminals’.321  
 
3.53 However, taking the criminal justice approach and using the ordinary criminal law 
to deal with suspected terrorists was problematic. The recommendations made in 
the Diplock Report 322  relating to special measures were enacted in order to 
overcome some of the problems. The special arrangements put in place allowed 
the British government to maintain its position that those suspected of terrorist 
offences in Northern Ireland were processed in the ordinary courts whereas in fact 
those courts were anything but ordinary. Writing specifically about the 
Emergency Provisions Act 1978 Finn states that ‘The Act does not merely work 
changes in the trial of suspected terrorists but instead restructures the entire 
criminal justice process from arrest and detention to sentencing and appeal.’323  
 
3.54 Although those suspected of terrorist offences were dealt with in the criminal 
justice system as criminals and denied political prisoner status, they were 
processed under legislation that explicitly defined terrorism as ‘violence for 
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political ends’.324 In other words, the British government simultaneously treated 
terrorist suspects like criminals while acknowledging that those suspected of 
terrorist crimes had political objectives. 
 
3.55 During the recent Troubles the British government relied heavily on both anti-
terrorist legislation and emergency powers legislation which when combined are 
sometimes referred to as the security legislation. The Emergency Powers Acts 
tended to deal with terrorists once they have been caught and the Prevention of 
Terrorism Acts ‘supposedly perform[ed] the preventative role’. 325  The ‘goal 
behind each of these laws was to limit or eliminate acts of terrorism’.326  
 
3.56 Emergency powers were nothing new in Northern Ireland. From its creation in 
1920 there was always political tension in Northern Ireland that sporadically 
erupted into violence. As a consequence, the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) 
Acts (Northern Ireland), 1922 (SPA) was enacted. The SPA was renewed on an 
annual basis until 1928 when it was introduced for a five-year period and it was 
made permanent in 1933 through the enactment of the Civil Authorities (Special 
Powers) Act (Northern Ireland), 1933. 
 
3.57 The SPA was ‘cast in the most sweeping terms, with a minimum of restriction in 
executive discretion and procedural protection for the accused’.327 This legislation 
has been described as ‘draconian’ 328 and it has been claimed that it operated ‘with 
a minimum of interference by the courts for most of the time’.329 It has also been 
claimed that it gave such sweeping powers to the Security Forces that they 
enjoyed similar powers to those granted under martial law, despite the fact that 
martial law was never declared.330  
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3.58 The SPA also created very vague offences like s2 (4). This catchall clause stated: 
 
If any person does any act of such a nature as to be calculated to be prejudicial 
to the preservation of the peace or maintenance of order in Northern Ireland 
and not specifically provided for in the regulations, he shall be deemed to be 
guilty of an offence against the regulations. 
 
3.59 Commenting on the SPA, Everlegh stated that s2 (4) was so vague that ‘It is 
possible to think that merely to be a Roman Catholic in Northern Ireland would 
have been an offence under that section.’331 The Cameron Commission, set up to 
identify the causes and nature of the violence in Northern Ireland since 1968, also 
commented in its Report332 that the SPA was remarkable because of the ‘width of 
powers given to the RUC and the Ulster Special Constabulary’.333  
 
3.60 The Cameron Report also noted that certain of the powers contained in the Act 
were in conflict with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).334 The 
Report gave the following examples of conflicts with the UDHR: 
 
In particular Article 10 (against arbitrary arrest) Article 12 (the right to be 
presumed innocent until proven guilty) Article 13 (against subjection to 
interference with personal privacy, home or correspondence) Article 20 
(freedom of opinion and expression).335 
 
Although the UDHR had moral authority it created no corresponding legal 
obligations on States, and whatever moral authority it possessed was not enough to 
cause the British government to review and amend its legislation. The UK also had 
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obligations under the ECHR. These obligations may also have conflicted with the 
SPA but they were not mentioned.336 
 
3.61 The SPA gave the RUC far reaching powers including powers to authorise 
curfews, close down licensed premises, prohibit meetings, assemblies and 
processions, prohibit the wearing of badges and uniforms and restrict the 
circulation of any newspaper. The SPA also gave powers to the RUC to enter all 
land and buildings and take possession of both. It also included the power to 
introduce restriction and exclusion orders and authorise internment. In addition, it 
‘served as a model for subsequent legislation granting emergency powers’.337 The 
emergency powers legislation included the Northern Ireland (Emergency 
Provisions) Acts of 1973, 1978, 1987 and 1996.338 
 
3.62 Running in parallel with these emergency powers acts was a series of Prevention 
of Terrorism Acts. The first of these was introduced in 1974, with new versions 
enacted in 1976, 1984 and 1989, 339  and the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Supplemental Temporary Provisions) (Northern Ireland) 1976 and 1984. 340 
 
3.63 The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 (EPA 1973) came into 
force on the 2 April 1973 following a period of increased violence. It comprised 
of 31 sections and 5 schedules. Its passage through the House of Commons was 
not smooth but in the end, it passed by the narrowest of margins.341 Speaking 
years later in the House of Commons, Ian Paisley explained that the EPA 1973 
had been passed by a very narrow margin, in fact ‘the Government won by one 
vote, a vote of a Roman Catholic’.342  
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3.64 The EPA 1973 was based on the recommendations made in the report by the 
commission headed by Lord Diplock issued on 20 December 1972, known as the 
Diplock Report. 343 This Act increased the powers of the police and arguably 
eroded the rights of the population of Northern Ireland. Perhaps the most 
important provision in the legislation was the power to conduct certain trials 
before one judge without a jury. The Act included a list of scheduled offences that 
would revoke the right to a jury trial.344 This list of offences included the murder, 
arson, serious violent offences against the person and property, various explosive 
and firearms offences, robbery and aggravated burglary using explosives or 
firearms or other offensive weapons, intimidation and blackmail.  
 
3.65 According to the Diplock Report the reason for abolishing the right to a jury trial 
for anyone suspected of a scheduled offence was that removing the jury would 
remove ‘perverse acquittals’ by partisan juries and the intimidation of jurors by 
terrorist organisations. The Diplock Report failed to provide evidence of either 
perverse acquittals or juror intimidation by terrorist organisations. Furthermore, 
Lord Diplock conceded this lack of evidence in his Report.345  
 
3.66 The EPA 1973 also changed the conditions under which statements made by 
suspects in the police station could be introduced into evidence at court. Under the 
common law such statements were generally excluded if those statements had 
been the result of ‘inducement, a threat or…oppression’.346 However, the EPA 
1973 made it much easier to get incriminating evidence into court by making 
statements admissible so long as the accused had not been subjected to ‘torture or 
to inhuman or degrading treatment in order to induce him to make the 
statement’.347 ‘Between July 1976 and July 1978 Diplock Judges heard almost 
4,000 cases and in the overwhelming majority of those cases, a confession was the 
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only significant piece of evidence establishing guilt.’348 Out of those 4,000 cases 
Diplock Judges ruled out confession evidence in just 32 cases (less than 1%).349 
 
3.67 The EPA 1973 also changed the procedures used in prosecuting scheduled 
offences in two important ways. Firstly, under s3 (1) bail was limited to situations 
where a High Court Judge was convinced that there would be no failure to 
surrender, witnesses would not be interfered with, and no further offences would 
be committed on bail. This provision had the effect of reducing the chances of 
being granted bail. Secondly, the new procedures reversed the burden of proof for 
certain scheduled offences. So, for example, anyone accused of being in 
possession of a firearm would be assumed to have knowledge of the possession 
and be required to rebut the assumption, rather than the prosecution having to 
prove knowledge of possession. In other words, the presumption of innocence was 
removed.  
 
3.68 Another important provision in the EPA 1973 was internment, the power to detain 
suspects without charge or trial. Internment had existed under the 1922 Act but 
Lord Diplock in his Report had recommended some amendments to internment 
and these were incorporated into the EPA 1973. Detention without charge would 
be allowed under s10 of the Act on certain conditions set out in the Act. Every 
case was put before the Secretary of State, who based on the evidence provided by 
the Security Forces, could issue an interim custody order for 28 days. At the end 
of the 28-day period the suspect would be freed unless his case had been referred 
to a ‘Commissioner’ ‘for determination’. One week before the determination 
hearing the suspect would be informed of the allegations that had been made. The 
suspect was also provided with legal representation. However, the hearing did not 
resemble a judicial hearing. Not all evidence was heard in open court. On some 
occasions the Commissioner heard evidence that was not heard by the accused 
and his lawyers. Clearly, without knowing the evidence against the suspect, the 
lawyer would not be in a position to advise on plea nor mount a proper defence.  
 
3.69 The Gardiner Report noted that the standard of proof applied by the 
                                                        




Commissioners was ‘a very high degree of probability’.350 Once that standard of 
proof had been met then the Commissioners were ‘satisfied’ and the suspect was 
further detained. ‘A very high degree of probability’ is arguably lower than 
‘beyond reasonable doubt’ the standard used in criminal proceedings.  
 
3.70 The EPA 1973 also permitted members of the British Army or the RUC to stop 
and question anyone to find out their identity, their movements and knowledge of 
terrorist activities. Failure to provide the relevant information was itself another 
offence. In other words, the right to silence was removed in relation to identity, 
recent movements and knowledge of terrorist activity. The Act also gave 
members of the Armed Forces the authority to enter and search anywhere that 
they suspected was linked to terrorism or for ‘the preservation of the peace’.351 
 
3.71 The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 352  (EPA 1978) went 
further and authorised the RUC to arrest and detain suspects for 72 hours.353 Finn 
claims that in ‘practice, the RUC cautioned its officers not to tell suspects they 
could see a solicitor’.354 The Bennett Report confirmed that ‘solicitors are not in 
practice admitted to see terrorist suspects before they are charged’. 355  This 
remained the case until 1992. Government statistics show that for the first time in 
1992 most requests for a solicitor were granted.356 
 
3.72 The EPA 1978 Act states that ‘Any constable can arrest without a warrant any 
person whom he suspects is a terrorist.’357 Terrorism was defined in s31 of the 
EPA 1978 as the ‘use of violence for political ends’. Finn makes the point that the 
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‘breadth and vagueness of the offence substantially impeded the ability of 
suspects to challenge the legality of the arrest through habeas corpus 
proceedings’.358 In fact, the level of vagueness would arguably preclude a review 
by any independent body unless the good faith of the arresting officer was being 
challenged.359 The suspicion need not be that the suspect has committed a terrorist 
offence but could be that he is involved in some indirect way, for example, 
training people for the purpose of terrorism or involved in some other preparatory 
activity. Furthermore, the suspicion need not be reasonable. All the officer was 
obliged to do was inform the suspect that he had been arrested under s11 as a 
suspected terrorist.  
 
3.73 The House of Lords ruled that merely being told to affect an arrest by a superior 
officer ‘was cause enough to give the arresting officer a reasonable suspicion’.360 
This led Kevin Boyle and others to conclude that ‘The RUC, therefore, was in a 
position to block judicial review of the arrest power by using the single expedient 
of a superior telling a subordinate that an individual was suspected of being a 
terrorist and instructing him to arrest him.’361 
 
3.74 The Bennett Committee concluded that the RUC used s11 powers in 90% of 
arrests under the emergency legislation.362 It went on to confirm that 66% of those 
detained under s11 were subsequently released without charge.363 This suggests 
that s11 was used to arrest suspects where the evidence was weak. Finn claims the 
suspects were later re-arrested and then charged under a scheduled offence. He 
alleges that arrests under s11 were made in order to gather intelligence that could 
then be used to arrest either that suspect or other suspects later.364 
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3.75 Finn concludes that s11 of the EPA 1978 ‘violated elemental constitutional 
principles by allowing state officials to exercise power on the basis of no reason 
or upon reasons that are arbitrary or capricious’.365 In its 1981 report, Amnesty 
International also raised concerns about the alleged abuses of the extended powers 
of arrest and detention.366 The report cites the case of Martin Lynch in which the 
Lord Chief Justice Lowry in 1981 rejected any judicial responsibility to provide a 
remedy of habeas corpus even against what he described as ‘unacceptable but 
ostensibly lawful exercise of the powers of arrest’.367 His remarks referred to the 
repeated arrest and detention by police of the same individual on the same 
suspicion, without bringing any charges. The Amnesty International report 
concluded that ‘There was no effective remedy against arbitrary use of the 
emergency powers of arrest and detention by the police - contrary to international 
law.’368 
 
3.76 The emergency powers of the 1970s eroded many civil liberties including 
‘freedom from self-incrimination, freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, 
presumption of innocence and trial by jury’.369 Claire Palley concluded that the 
result of the SPA 370 was that ‘when taken in conjunction with the existence of the 
Special Constabulary [then 44,000 men] was that apart from military courts, the 
Government enjoyed similar powers to those current in time of martial law’.371 
Although Palley was writing about emergency legislation in Northern Ireland in 
the 1920s her comments could arguably have been made about the 1970s.  
 
3.77 There is evidence that the British Army and RUC misused the security legislation 
in two ways. First, it was used to target the Roman Catholic community. This was 
acknowledged in the Gardiner Report of 1975 where it was recognised that, 
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‘proscription is distinctly uneven in Northern Ireland. 372  There are terrorist 
organisations which are not proscribed, but whose ‘members perpetrate 
intimidation, violence and sectarian murder’.373 Those comments were made in 
relation to Loyalist paramilitary organisations, such as the UDA that was not 
proscribed until 10 August 1992. The Security Forces considered the organisation 
a terrorist organisation and more than 100 of its members had been sent to jail for 
murder.374 This is confirmed in the de Silva Report that states that ‘the UDA in 
the late 1980s were to all intents and purposes a terrorist group’.375 
 
3.78 Second, the security legislation was used to combat normal crime rather than 
terrorist related crime. The numbers of people arrested under the security 
legislation was large. Under the Prevention of Terrorism Acts 376  and the 
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Acts,377 the number of people 
arrested between November 1974 and February 2001 was 22,282. 378 Between 
1975 and 1987, the Security Forces arrested a further 44,705 people under the 
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Acts.379 However, government statistics 
show that most of those arrested were never charged and of those that were 
charged, most were not charged with offences listed under the Acts. For example, 
of those arrested under the Prevention of Terrorism Acts, only between 1-2% 
were charged with a criminal offence under those Acts and 73% of those arrested 
were not charged with any offence at all.380  
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3.79 The claim is that instead of being used to combat terrorism the legislation and the 
expanded powers were used to combat ‘normal’ crime.381 The political authorities 
failed to act to limit the inappropriate use of these powers. In fact, it has been 
suggested that the Secretary of State granted extensions to the detention of 
suspects under the Acts as a matter of routine. In 1997 for example there were 72 
applications for an extension and all 72 were granted.382 The implication being 
that the use of the legislation was not scrutinised effectively, giving a ‘green light’ 
to its continued misuse. Allegations of abuse under the Acts were investigated by 
the RUC before 1987, arguably providing little basis for faith in the system. After 
1987 complaints were reviewed by the Independent Commission for Police 
Complaints (ICPC) but based on the original investigation by the RUC officer. 
‘During the years 1993-96, there were 1,118 allegations of misconduct by RUC 
officers made by people arrested under the Acts. … Yet the ICPC did not sustain 
a single one of these allegations’.383 This statistic is unlikely to have inspired 
confidence in the system and Brice Dickson described it as ‘difficult to 
believe’.384  
 
3.80 The way in which the security legislation was introduced and the bi-partisan 
approach taken by all the major political parties meant that the British government 
was allowed to enact vague legislation giving considerable powers to the Security 
Forces operating in Northern Ireland. One consequence of this was that 
allegations of abuse were very difficult to pursue through the courts. The security 
legislation also made sweeping changes to the justice system. Amnesty 
International claims that these changes put the United Kingdom in breach of 
international law in relation to the powers of arrest and detention.385 There is also 
evidence that the Roman Catholic population were targeted under the security 
legislation386 and that the legislation was used to combat ‘normal’ crime rather 
than terrorist activity.  
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3.81 It is because of these failings that some commentators387 have suggested that the 
security legislation tended to undermine the legitimacy of the British government. 
In other words, the security legislation tended to serve as another dimension to the 
conflict, providing another stage on which the two sides could do battle. It has 
also been suggested that it did not thwart terrorist activity but instead acted as a 
marshaling device for the IRA and consequently contributed to the violence.388  
 
3.82 The next chapter examines further the extent to which perceived illegality and 
discrimination fueled the conflict and also examines the constitutional basis of the 
British Army acting as military aid to the civil power. 
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Chapter 3: The Constitutional Position of the British Army in Northern 
Ireland during The Troubles 
 
4.1 As a consequence of the rising violence in 1969 the British Army was deployed to 
Northern Ireland in a role referred to as military aid to the civil power. This 
chapter will examine the constitutional basis of the British Army in Northern 
Ireland. It will first look at the relevant constitutional principles governing the 
suppression of internal civil unrest and then see to what extent those principles 
governed the actions of the military as a whole.  
 
4.2 In acting as military aid to the civil power British Army soldiers did not acquire 
the legal status of special constables. The position of soldiers is made very clear in 
an advice note from the Treasury Solicitors Department in 1973. That note stated: 
 
A member of the armed forces makes himself subject to his code of military 
law and has obligations at all times to obey the lawful commands of his 
superior officer. A Special Constable when sworn in makes himself subject to 
another code and to the commands of the force into which he is sworn. It is the 
view of the Treasury Solicitor that no man can in logic be made subject to both 
of these codes at the same time. In the case of a conflict of orders, he would not 
know which one to obey and would theoretically be liable to suffer as a result 
of disobedience to the one he disregarded this seems constitutionally 
unsound.389 
 
4.3 The British Army in Northern Ireland faced two distinct, although related, 
security problems. The first was a terrorist campaign by the IRA390 whose aim 
was for Northern Ireland to be absorbed into the Republic of Ireland. The second 
problem was a low-level sectarian ‘civil war’ waged between the Roman Catholic 
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and Protestant communities. This second problem took the form of street disorder 
‘ranging from minor ‘aggro’ to major riots’.391  
 
4.4 The British Army’s objectives were to contain terrorist activity on the one hand, 
and on the other, maintain law and order and suppress outbreaks of violence 
between the two communities. If the Army could achieve both these aims then it 
would ‘promote conditions that would lead to a negotiated settlement between the 
British government and the Republicans’.392  British government documents make 
it clear that the British objective was to force both political factions to realise the 
necessity for a political solution. 393 In dealing with both these security issues the 
British Army operated under a legal framework that comprised of constitutional 
principles, emergency legislation, ordinary criminal law, civil law,394 international 
law, in addition to military law.395 
 
4.5 Robin Evelegh claimed that:  
 
There is no substantial disagreement between the main law books, the 
leading cases, or the latest parliamentary report on the matter, which was in 
1908 about the constitutional principles that govern the military in the 
suppression of internal disorder.396  
 
He suggests the best place to find the law on suppressing civil disorder as it 
effects the military is Part II, V of the Manual of Military Law 1968.397  
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4.6 The Manual on Military Law summarises the position as follows: 
 
There is, however, nothing to compel a military commander to seek permission 
before answering a request for military support. 
 
The common law, which governs soldiers and other citizens alike, imposes two 
main obligations in such cases, which are first, that every citizen is bound to 
come to the aid of the civil power when the civil power requires assistance to 
enforce law and order and, secondly, that to enforce law and order no one is 
allowed to use more force than is necessary.  
 
When called to the aid of the civil power soldiers in no way differ in the eyes 
of the law from other citizens … 
 
Even though the civil authority should give directions to the contrary the 
Commander of the troops, if it is really necessary, is bound to take such action 
as the circumstances [of civil disorder] demand.398 
 
4.7 The Manual of Military Law makes it clear that a soldier, like any other citizen 
under the common law, has the right and duty to intervene to suppress civil 
disorder. The traditional view is that the soldier is merely a citizen in uniform and 
consequently has no additional legal powers over those possessed by any civilian. 
The soldier, like every other citizen, is expected to determine what action to take 
in order to suppress civil disorder and answer for those actions before a court at a 
later stage. The common law imposes two obligations on citizens (and soldiers) in 
civil disturbance. The first is that every citizen must support the civil power if the 
civil power requires assistance. The second is that no one can use more force than 
is necessary. Individual soldiers have a duty to obey the orders of superior officers 
only in so far as they do not conflict with the duties of a citizen. In other words, 
although soldiers are subject to two legal systems, the civilian and the military, 
obligations created by the civil law prevail over obligations created under military 
law.  
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4.8 This position was treated as settled and confirmed by Lord Diplock in Albert v 
Lavin. Lord Diplock stated that: 
  
Every citizen in whose presence a breach of the peace is being or reasonably 
appears to be about to be committed has the right to take reasonable steps to 
make the person…refrain from doing so… At common law this is not only the 
right of every citizen, it is also his duty although, except in the case of a citizen 
who is a constable, it is a duty of imperfect obligation.399 
 
4.9 Assuming Lord Diplock was correct, Peter Rowe has argued that this would mean 
that ‘a failure to act [to suppress civil disorder] would be a criminal offence on the 
part of the citizen (and soldier)’. 400 The legal obligation on the soldier would 
prevail despite ‘orders from anyone from the Prime Minister to a senior 
policeman on the spot telling him not to’.401 In other words, at a constitutional 
level the military are responsible to the law and are not responsible to Ministers of 
State or the police. The British Army cannot be put under the control of ‘any civil 
authority with an absolute duty to obey their orders, short of an Act of Parliament 
specifying it’.402  A senior military officer at the scene of a disturbance is not 
controlled by the government but must decide for himself what to do. The soldiers 
act on the orders of the military commander on the spot who is answerable in the 
civilian courts for his actions at some time in the future.403 
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4.10 Evelegh speculated that this is at odds with what the general population believes 
the situation to be. Evelegh suggested that:  
 
It is very probable that the majority of the private citizens, policemen and 
soldiers believe that, when civil disorder has to be suppressed in the United 
Kingdom, the Army has to obey the orders of the Government and that the civil 
authority responsible for keeping the peace is the Police. They would 
undoubtedly also say that the Army would operate in suppressing civil disorder 
in support of and under the command of the Police, and that soldiers could not 
operate independently.404  
 
4.11 In terms of constitutional theory, at times of civil unrest, the local magistrate, in 
his role as local Minister for the Crown, could call upon the British Army to come 
to the aid of the civil power to help restore order.405 In by-gone days identifying 
the magistrate would have been straightforward but in the modern world that 
position no longer exists. The modern view tends to treat the Chief Police Officer 
as the magistrate.406 The civil power is the authority responsible for preserving the 
peace and has control of the police. In Northern Ireland, the Chief Police Officer 
of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) would therefore have been the 
magistrate. Consequently, a request from him to the British Army for help to 
restore law and order ought to have brought the British Army onto the streets of 
Northern Ireland.  
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4.12 The Manual of Military Law407 defines various different levels of civil unrest 
graduating in seriousness from unlawful assembly408 through to riot409 and then 
insurrection.410  
It states that:  
 
An unlawful assembly is an assembly which may reasonably be apprehended 
to cause danger to the public peace, through the action of the persons 
constituting the assembly. As soon as violence is perpetrated it becomes a riot; 
while if the act of violence be one of a public nature, and with the intention of 
carrying into effect any general political purpose, it becomes an insurrection or 
rebellion, and not a riot.411  
 
It would seem to follow that at least on some occasions during the Troubles the 
British Army was attempting to contain an insurrection rather than disperse a riot.  
 
4.13 Military law allows all necessary measures to be taken for dispersing or otherwise 
putting an end to unlawful assemblies, riots and insurrection.412 
 
The degree of force that can be used in effecting the dispersion of the crowd is 
only so much force as is sufficient to affect the objective. In relation to 
                                                        
407 War Office, The Manual of Military Law (London, HMSO 1914) 
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also states that ‘insurrection almost always involves murder or attempts at murder.  
411 ibid.  
412 ibid 219.  
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unlawful assembly the military can command the crowd to go away and to 
arrest them if they do not disperse.413  
 
In the case of a riot deadly weapons ought not to be employed against the 
rioters unless they are armed, or are in a position to inflict grievous injury or on 
the point of committing, some felonious outrage, which can only be stopped by 
armed force.414  
 
4.14 In dealing with an insurrection the army has the right to resort to lethal force as 
soon as the ‘insurgents show an intention to use violence, and it becomes apparent 
that immediate action by the use of arms is necessary’.415 And it is for the military 
on the spot to determine what level of violence is occurring. So, the constitution 
places a duty on the military to act to suppress internal civil unrest and military 
law provides guidance as to what level of force can be used to deal with the 
disturbance. 
 
4.15 The chain of events that led to the deployment of the British Army on the streets 
of Northern Ireland, in its role as ‘military aid to the civil power’, are as follows. 
The first request for military assistance was made on 3 August 1969 but on that 
occasion no troops were deployed. 416  The request from the Commissioner of 
Police, Mr. Wolseley, had met with resistance from the Northern Ireland 
government who feared that the position of the Stormont government would be 
threatened by the deployment of British troops. 417  This original request was 
withdrawn two days after being made in order to allow the General Officer 
Commanding in Northern Ireland (GOC NI) to freely use his common law 
powers.418  
 
4.16 Mr. Wolseley made a second request on the 15 August 1969 and troops were 
deployed that day. However, the British government had contemplated the need to 
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send in troops some months earlier in April of that year. The Northern Ireland and 
Westminster governments discussed how the GOC NI should respond to a request 
by the Inspector–General of the RUC for assistance to suppress civil disorder. 
They concluded ‘that the General Officer Commanding should only consider the 
question after consultation with London and again it was understood that there 
would be consultation at government level’.419 
 
4.17 On the evening of the 14 August 1969 the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, 
Major James Chichester-Clark, announced that he had recalled the Northern 
Ireland Parliament and that the ‘B’ Specials would be called up and ordered to 
report immediately for duty. By doing so he signaled the possibility that the 
British Army might be requested to come to the aid of the RUC. This was because 
if all the police reserves (including ‘B’ Specials) had been committed, and still the 
violence could not be contained, then clearly military assistance would be 
necessary.  
 
4.18 At 4.30a.m. on the 15 August 1969 the Police Commissioner for Belfast, Mr. 
Wolseley, asked Lieutenant-Colonel J. Fletcher, Commanding Officer of the 2nd 
Battalion, The Queens Regiment, for military assistance. 420  At 4.45a.m. the 
Inspector-General of the RUC, Anthony Peacock, signed the official request for 
the British Army to come to the aid of the civil power.421 At 12p.m. Anthony 
Peacock called a meeting of the Security Committee.422 The direct request for 
military aid was then referred to the Northern Ireland Cabinet.423 At 12.25p.m. 
Major James Chichester-Clark, the Northern Ireland Prime Minister, authorised 
his Home Affairs Minister, Robert Porter, to request deployment of troops to 
Derry from the Home Office in London. 424  Harold Wilson, the then Prime 
Minister, took the decision to put troops on the streets of Derry, and then 
subsequently Belfast.  
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4.19 The British government ordered the GOC NI to deploy troops in Derry at 
3.10p.m. on the 15 August 1969.425 At the same time the GOC NI received a 
formal request from the Inspector-General of the RUC, Anthony Peacock, to 
deploy troops. This was because it was understood that the ‘common law required 
the request for military assistance to come directly from the police authorities’.426 
The fact that the request for military assistance followed two discrete pathways 
suggests that those involved were not clear which arrangements should be 
followed. At 3.45p.m. inter-sectarian shooting began.427 
 
4.20 In Westminster, James Callaghan, the Home Secretary told MPs: 
 
The General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland [GOC NI] has been 
instructed to take all necessary steps, acting impartially between citizen and 
citizen, to restore law and order... troops will remain in direct and exclusive 
control of the GOC, who will continue to be responsible to the United 
Kingdom Government…428   
 
4.21 At 6.30p.m. troops were deployed but according to Evelegh troops did not arrive 
at the right place, Cupar Street, the front line between Protestants and Roman 
Catholics until 9.35p.m. 429  It has been argued that the reason for delay in 
deploying the troops was that senior officers wanted more time spent on 
reconnaissance.430 ‘By the time the Queens Regiment arrived on the 15, [August] 
eight people had been killed and 100s injured and left homeless.’431 The delay 
meant several hundred more burnt houses and several deaths. 432 The Scarman 
Report gave an alternative explanation and blamed the delay on confusion and 
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misunderstanding of the procedures for civil authorities to obtain military 
assistance.433 
 
4.22 The following statistics convey, to some extent at least, the level of violence and 
destruction that the Security Forces must have been facing. By the end of the 
weekend 10 people had died, 1,600 had been injured, 170 homes had been 
destroyed, 16 factories had been gutted by fire and the total cost of the damage 
was estimated at around £8 million. 434 ‘In August and September 1969 some 
3,500 homes had to be evacuated, 85 per cent of which belonged to Catholic 
families.’435 
 
4.23 A meeting was held at 10 Downing Street436 on the evening of the 19 August 
1969 and after a six-hour discussion the British government issued the following 
communiqué:  
 
In a six-hour discussion the whole situation in Northern Ireland was reviewed. 
It was agreed that the GOC [General Officer Commanding] Northern Ireland 
will with immediate effect assume overall responsibility for security 
operations. He will continue to be responsible directly to the Ministry of 
Defence but will work in the closest co-operation with the Northern Ireland 
Government and the Inspector-General of the Royal Ulster Constabulary 
[RUC]. For all security operations, the GOC will have full control of the 
deployment and tasks of the [RUC]. For normal police duties outside the field 
of security the [RUC] will remain answerable to the Inspector-General who 
will be responsible to the Northern Ireland Government. 
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The GOC will assume full command and control of the Ulster Special 
Constabulary for all purposes including their organisation, deployment, tasks 
and arms. Their employment by the Northern Ireland Government in riot and 
crowd control was always envisaged as a purely temporary measure. With the 
increased deployment of the Army and the assumption by the GOC of 
operational control of all the security forces, it will be possible for the Special 
Constabulary to be progressively and rapidly relieved of these temporary duties 
at his discretion, starting in the cities. The question of the custody of Special 
Constabulary arms will similarly be within his discretion. Consideration will be 
given to the problem of country areas and the defence of vital public service 
installations.437 
 
4.24 ‘In short the General Officer Commanding became the Director of Operations for 
Northern Ireland.’438 It is clear from this communiqué that the British Army is 
understood to be an instrument of the British government and not as independent 
officers of the law aiding the civil power. An Army lawyer commented that 
‘Whatever the theory, in practice the GOC is controlled by his political 
masters.’439 
 
4.25 The gulf between theory and practice explains the fact that the night before the 
RUC asked the British Army for assistance, the Deputy Inspector-General of the 
RUC, Graham Shillington, stood in the shadows on the edge of the Bogside with 
Lieutenant-Colonel Todd, Commanding Officer of the Prince of Wales Own 
Regiment, one of the Province’s three garrison battalions, and watched the 
fighting and the overthrow of the police.440 Todd was not in uniform but he gave 
advice to Shillington about the use of CS gas, 441 also known as tear gas, to 
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incapacitate the rioters.442  The point is that he did not deploy his men to help 
disperse the rioters despite the clear need for his assistance.  
 
4.26 Evelegh’s analysis of this, and it is hard to disagree, is that ‘Ministers must have 
therefore ordered the Army to ignore the law and to accept the overthrow of the 
civil authority by riot.’443 Evelegh continues, ‘thus was made a mighty breach in 
the doctrine of the rule of law and the constitution as a firm framework for the 
control of the military engaged in the suppressing of civil disorder’.444 
 
4.27 The disparity between theory and practice is important not just because it 
breaches the rule of law. It is important because it has the potential to cause 
delays in military responses to requests for assistance, as arguably it did on 15 
August 1969 and that delay could potentially cost lives.  It is also important 
because if the chain of command is that the military take orders from the Cabinet, 
and the existence of the vital link in the chain between the military and the 
Cabinet is not acknowledged in law, then how is it possible to challenge decisions 
taken by members of the Cabinet?  
 
4.28 Normally, members of the public can challenge decisions made by the 
government in a court of law.  The courts will look to see if the government 
decision was made within the rules as laid down under legislation or at common 
law and then assess whether the decision was reasonable in the circumstances. 
However, the courts do not recognise the right of government Ministers to give 
the military orders. Government Ministers can use their prerogative powers to 
order troops to the scene of a riot or insurrection but they cannot then issue an 
order for the military not to suppress civil unrest, nor can they issue orders to the 
military on how to enforce the law at the scene of the disturbance. On this basis, 
the courts may find that the orders given to the military by Ministers were not 
really orders at all. Similarly, Parliament would face the same difficulties if it 
sought to challenge orders given to the military by the Cabinet since the Cabinet 
does not have the constitutional powers to give such orders. In other words, the 
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military is being controlled within a system that has not been legally formalised 
and therefore is not acknowledged in law and has no limits. 
 
4.29 On the one hand, this situation increases the possibility of abuse but on the other it 
removes a layer of protection from the government that the law can provide. The 
government can no longer distance itself from how the law is enforced by 
claiming that law and order operations are the responsibility of the military and 
that the military is simply enforcing the law of the land because the government 
clearly has the power to control the military.   
 
4.30 The disparity in this case between theory and practice is also important because it 
increases the risk of creating an unpredictable legal system for all those involved 
including the general public, those instigating civil unrest and the Security Forces. 
The problem is that if Ministers control what laws are enforced by the military 
and when they are enforced, then there is a risk they will do so with one eye fixed 
on public opinion and the pressures created by the democratic process.  
 
4.31 There is evidence of an unpredictable legal system or flexible legal system 
evolving in Northern Ireland during the Troubles. This idea is also sometimes 
referred to as the military operating in low profile.445 In essence, it means that the 
system is unpredictable – no one on any side, be it the side of law enforcement or 
the side of the rioters and terrorists, knows if the law will be enforced in any given 
circumstance. For example, in Northern Ireland there were well-documented ‘no-
go’ areas for the British Army. Lord Widgery in his Report on Bloody Sunday 
commented on the existence of ‘no-go’ areas in the Bogside and Creggan areas in 
which the ‘law was not effectively enforced’.446 Later the Commission chaired by 
Lord Diplock in 1972 stated that, ‘In Belfast and Londonderry the IRA terrorist 
groups operate from those areas which are Republican strongholds. For a long 
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time there were ‘no-go’ areas into which neither the police nor the army 
entered.’447  
 
4.32 According to Evelegh these ‘no-go’ areas were negotiated by the General Officer 
Commanding Northern Ireland, Lieutenant–General Sir Harry Tuzo, and a self–
appointed group of prominent citizens and ‘must have been authorised at Cabinet 
level’. 448 Hamill also states that the Security Forces ‘were specifically instructed 
not to enter the ‘No-Go’ areas because their presence might be seen as 
inflammatory’.449 
 
4.33 Another example would be the parades and processions that were allowed to 
proceed as the British Army looked on, ‘despite having been prohibited 
throughout Northern Ireland by law since 9 August 1971’.450 Lord Widgery stated 
that the decision to allow a march had been taken by a ‘higher authority’ than the 
Chief Constable and General Ford. 451  The only conclusion to draw is that a 
decision was made at Cabinet level to direct the British Army and the RUC to do 
nothing as the law was being broken. 
 
4.34 Another example would be the firing of Armalite rifles by members of the IRA at 
the very public funerals of deceased volunteers. Some of these examples of where 
the law was not enforced by the British Army were broadcast on television and 
watched by the British public night after night in their living rooms.  
 
4.35 Evelegh states that the ‘14th August 1969 marked a key point in the collapse of the 
general framework of constitutional legality in Northern Ireland’.452 In theory, the 
British Army should act on the initiative of the senior officer on the ground and be 
answerable for his actions in a civil court of law.  In practice, the British Army in 
Northern Ireland did as it was directed by Westminster and that gap between 
theory and practice remains unaddressed.  
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The Constitutional Position of the British Army during the Falls Road 
Curfew  
 
4.36 The Falls Road Curfew of 3 July 1970 highlights the constitutional issues outlined 
above. The Falls Road Curfew was an isolated incident in the sense that no other 
curfews were imposed during the Troubles in Northern Ireland. The fact that it 
was never repeated is evidence of the British government’s determination to retain 
ultimate authority, but the issues raised by the imposition of the Falls Road 
Curfew are of a much wider significance in the conflict.  
 
4.37 The Falls Road Curfew lasted 35 hours but it encapsulated the constitutional legal 
issues of the conflict. It highlighted the problematic question of who controlled 
the Army, not just in relation to the decision to deploy troops but also in relation 
to decisions regarding tactics employed once the troops had been deployed. It 
brought the gulf between the constitutional legal framework on the one hand and 
the administrative norms on the other, under the spotlight and challenged the 
assumption, based on those administrative norms, that the elected government 
would, at the very least, be informed of military tactics.453 
 
The Rising Levels of Violence in the Days Prior to the Curfew  
 
4.38 The Falls Road Curfew is an example of the tactics used by the British Army. The 
Falls Road Curfew should be understood in the context of rising violence on the 
streets, with more violence anticipated as another marching season approached. 
The fact that ‘between 30,000 - 40,000 people had left their homes because of 
intimidation and went to areas among their co-religionists’454 is indicative of the 
turmoil that existed in the Province at the time. Over the weekend of the 27/28 
June 1970 there were flashpoints on the Crumlin Road, Springfield Road in West 
Belfast and Ballymacarrett, in the east of the city. In all three areas, violent 
clashes between Roman Catholics and Protestants took place. Six people were 
killed and 113 people were wounded, 54 Protestants, four Roman Catholics, 52 
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soldiers and three members of the RUC.455 In response to this escalating violence 
and the threat of worse to come, the government imposed ever more draconian 
measures.  
 
4.39 In the week preceding the curfew the Joint Security Committee had noted 
increased levels of violence and had reviewed the options available, including the 
introduction of martial law.456 Interestingly the idea of a curfew was raised at the 
meeting but considered impossible. The discussion focused on whether to ‘impose 
a statutory curfew under Regulation 19 of the Special Powers Act457 on the 28 
June 1970, but concluded that a limited curfew was not a possibility under the 
emergency legislation as it stood’. 458 To combat the rising levels of violence the 
government had enacted the Criminal Justice (Temporary Provisions) (Northern 
Ireland) Act 459  on June 1 1970. 460  Simon Winchester, referring to the St. 
Matthews Church incident on the 27 June 1970 and the first shots fired by the 
Provisional IRA,461 noted that ‘The Bill was put before Parliament on Tuesday 
night, just two days after the violence of the weekend.’462 Brice Dickson makes 
the same point stating that:  
 
There can be no denying, however, that sometimes, anti-terrorist legislation has 
been little more than a knee-jerk reaction to a particular event. The first 
Prevention of Terrorism Act was enacted in a 24-hour period within seven days 
of the Birmingham pub bombings in 1974.463  
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What is not known of course is whether Whitehall officials had been working on 
this piece of legislation for some time prior to placing it before Parliament in 
anticipation of a rise in violence in the conflict.  
 
4.40 The Attorney-General of Northern Ireland, Mr. Basil Kelly, while introducing the 
legislation to the Stormont Parliament, admitted that it might lead to ‘wrong 
convictions and harsh cases’. 464  The head of the RUC, Sir Arthur Young, 
described the legislation at the time as ‘appalling’465 and it is easy to understand 
why. The legislation provided for a minimum mandatory custodial sentence for 
anyone found guilty of ‘riotous behaviour’, ‘disorderly behaviour’ or ‘behaviour 
likely to cause a breach of the peace’. The problem was that the legislation failed 
to distinguish between those doing battle with the Security Forces and those 
involved in ‘ordinary’ fighting that takes place in Northern Ireland just as it does 
everywhere else in the United Kingdom. Those individuals involved in public 
disorder would normally expect to be ‘bound over’ to keep the peace or be 
conditionally discharged or perhaps receive a small fine in a Magistrates’ Court. 
However, under the new legislation those individuals accused of the same 
offences in Northern Ireland would be sent to prison.  
 
4.41 The legislation placed the police in a difficult position when dealing with general 
public order incidents. The fact that the legislation was manifestly unjust would 
have tended to undermine the Stormont government’s legitimacy. The 
introduction of such a piece of legislation suggests that the Stormont government 
was operating under increasing pressure. It was against this backdrop, amid rising 




4.42 On the 3 July 1970 at 4p.m. the 1st Battalion Royal Scots Borderers sent a 
message to the 39th Infantry Brigade saying that they had received a tip-off from a 
housewife at 24 Balkan Street, in the Lower Falls Road area, that there weapons 
                                                        




and explosives hidden in the house. 466  The 39th Infantry Brigade had 
responsibility for that area of Belfast and arrived at Balkan Street at 4.30p.m.467 
This tip-off confirmed ‘information received the previous day, and backed up 
some long-term intelligence’.468 The joint British Army/police unit arrived at the 
address and uncovered fifteen pistols, one rifle, a Schmeisser sub-machine gun 
and a quantity of explosives.469 In terms of IRA weapons caches this was ‘a small 
arsenal’470 and so the whole incident ought to have been over quickly without any 
repercussions.  
 
4.43 What happened next is unclear. One version of events is that the British 
Army/police unit cordoned off both ends of Balkan Street and a small crowd 
gathered behind the barriers and threw stones and bricks at the departing forces. 
The Security Forces responded with CS gas471 and as things escalated a one-ton 
British Army Humber, referred to as a ‘pig’ by the locals, reversed into some 
railings crushing a man on the spikes in the process. 472  The British Army 
chronology of events is that as the British Army patrol left Balkan Street it met 
with ‘heavy organised rioting’.473 The British Army unit reported at 6.55p.m.that 
two grenades had been thrown.474 The commander of the 39th Brigade, Brigadier 
Hudson, ordered that the area be secured to prevent movement in or out at 
7.18p.m.475 The first shots were fired at 8.10p.m. and the curfew was imposed at 
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10p.m.476 It was broadcast by loudspeaker from a low-flying helicopter.477 The 
curfew affected 50 streets and 10,000 occupants.478 
 
4.44 Campbell states that the decision to impose a curfew was probably taken by the 
Sir Ian Freeland (GOC NI). Campbell draws this conclusion from the Army’s 
Situation Report for that day which states that at 10p.m. curfew orders were 
issued for the Falls Road area which he claims ‘strongly suggests that the decision 
was not made by local troops and points towards the Director of Operations/GOC 
(NI)’.479 Hamill claims that Sir Ian Freeland later admitted that he alone made the 
decision because getting permission for a curfew would have taken too long.480 
Hamill goes on to claim that the decision to impose the curfew was taken without 
any consultation with Stormont and further suggests that had Stormont been 
consulted then it was far from certain that ministers would have agreed to the 
curfew.481  
 
4.45 On the first night of the curfew the Security Forces conducted widespread house-
to-house searches during which the soldiers came under fire. During the 35 hours 
that the curfew was in place, the RUC and the British Army searched 3,000 
homes.482 The scale of the fighting is revealed by the following statistics. The 
curfew involved 3,000 British Army soldiers and they fired 1,452 rounds of 
ammunition, and used 218 CS gas grenades and 1,322 CS gas cartridges. The 
ammunition used has been broken down as follows - 17 rounds of .303 
ammunition from rifles equipped with telescopes, 10 rounds of 9mm ammunition 
from the Sterling sub-machine gun, and 1427 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition from 
standard self-loading rifles (SLRs).483 
                                                        
476 The imposition of a curfew was denied in Parliament on the 6 July 1970 by Lord Balniel. See 
HC Deb 6 July 1970, vol 803, col 328-34. Mr. Michael Foot MP questioned this denial, stating that 
it was contradicted by most independent journalists working at the scene at the time. He made the 
point that a curfew existed whether formally imposed or not.  
477 ibid 326.  
478 Mr. Gerry Fitt MP gave these statistics in a Parliamentary debate 6 July 1970 HC Deb 6 July 
1970, vol 803, col 328-34. 
479 Campbell, Connolly (n458) 353. 
480 Hamill (n417) 37. 
481 ibid.  
482 John Finn, Constitutions in Crisis: Political Violence and the Rule of Law (Oxford University 
Press 1990) 66.  




4.46 Apart from a firefight, the curfew involved the following four elements. No one 
was allowed to enter or leave the curfew area.  Those within the curfew area were 
ordered to stay inside.  There were mass house-to-house searches and lastly, there 
were a large number of arrests. During the 35-hour long curfew, these restrictions 
were temporarily lifted to allow those affected by the curfew to move around 
within the curfew area to shop for food and on Sunday morning to allow 
attendance at church.  
 
4.47 The curfew uncovered a total of 29 rifles and carbines, three submachine guns, 
eight shotguns, thirty-two revolvers, nineteen automatic pistols, 24,973 rounds of 
ball ammunition and 621 shotgun cartridges.484 It has also been claimed that the 
British Army discovered 250lbs of explosives and 100 homemade bombs and 
eight two-way radio sets.485 Hamill makes the point that the curfew was a success 
in military terms.486 By that he means that the violence was suppressed and the 
British Army won the battle.  
 
The Results of the Curfew 
 
4.48 The Falls Road Curfew resulted in four people dead, widely believed to be 
innocent, 487 (although this figure is disputed) 488 fifty-seven civilians wounded, 
eighteen soldiers wounded and 337 arrests.489 It seems almost unbelievable that 
more civilians were not killed or hurt since the Yellow Card issued to every 
British soldier made it clear that no warning shots should be fired above the heads 
of the crowd and instead every shot was to be fired at a target.  
 
                                                        
484 Warner (n455) 326. These figures are not consistently quoted and there is some disagreement 
about the numbers of guns of various types found in the house-to-house searches.  
485 Edward Burke, ‘Counter-Insurgency against ‘Kith and Kin’? The British Army in Northern 
Ireland1970-76’ (2015) 43(3) The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 658, 661. 
486 Hamill (n417) 39. 
487 Campbell, Connolly (n458) 343.  
488 Official casualty figures state six civilians killed quoted in Warner (n455) 326.  According to 
Desmond Hamill the number of civilians killed was 5. See Hamill (n417) 37.  
489 Warner (n455) 326.  
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4.49 The content of the Yellow Card was not published at the time but has since 
become known. The instruction not to fire warning shots is problematic. Under 
Article 2 of the European Convention490 members of the Security Forces are not 
allowed to kill except under strictly defined conditions when it is absolutely 
necessary.491 If firing warning shots could defuse a situation then it is difficult to 
argue that firing directly at those involved could ever be absolutely necessary. The 
result, should someone die, would be that taking aim and firing would be murder, 
since there was an alternative course of action that had it been tried may have 
resolved the situation. The RUC Force Instructions on the other hand directed 
RUC members to fire warning shots. The Yellow Card instructions also seem at 
odds with the Army’s stated policy of using minimum force.  
 
4.50 What is also interesting is that Eric Morris, who was stationed, on and off, in 
Northern Ireland from 1969-1979 as a member of the Army teaching staff, 
revealed that one of the main fears among senior Army officers was that British 
soldiers would baulk at firing on British citizens and would instead fire over the 
heads of the crowd. That fear may have been well-founded if 1,452 rounds of 
ammunition were fired and only 4 people died and 57 civilians were wounded. 
Either that or the soldiers were very poor shots. 
 
4.51 Commentators generally agree that the curfews significance was that it was very 
counter-productive.  The Falls Road Curfew is cited, along with the policy of 
internment and Bloody Sunday, as one of the three things responsible, above all 
else, for reversing previously good relations between the British Army and the 
                                                        
490 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3b04.html [accessed 26 October 2017] 
491 Art. 2 European Convention on Human Rights provides as follows: 
(1) Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life 
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for 
which this penalty is provided by law. 
(2) Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it 
results from the use of force which is necessary: 
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence. 
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained. 
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection. 
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Roman Catholic community.492 However, although the later incidents contributed 
to worsening relations between the Roman Catholic minority and the Security 
Forces, many identify the Falls Road Curfew as the tipping point in the relations 
between members of the Roman Catholic community and the British Army.493 
Paddy Devlin claimed that the effect of the curfew was to turn the ‘population 
from neutral or even sympathetic support for the military to outright hatred of 
everything related to the Security Forces’.494 This view was mirrored in the Home 
Office’s weekly summary of events in Northern Ireland published on 7 August 
1970 in which it was noted that the Roman Catholic community of Northern 
Ireland, ‘has lost much of its confidence in the Army to control the situation in an 
impartial way, and feelings against the Army are running high amongst Catholics 
in general’.495 It has also been suggested that the curfew ‘greatly increased the 
IRA’s membership and further hampered the efforts of moderate Catholic and 
Protestant leaders alike to keep the peace’.496 Others have described the curfew as 
a ‘serious mistake and public relations disaster’ 497 and it has been claimed that 
‘From almost every possible perspective the operation was an overwhelming 
disaster.’ 498  A view endorsed by the British Army’s report on ‘Operation 
Banner’. 499  This ‘backlash’ 500  may also explain why there were no further 
curfews imposed during the Troubles.  
                                                        
492 Daniel C Williamson, ‘Moderation under fire: The Arms Trial Crisis, The Lower Falls Road 
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(Martin Richardson and Co. 1975) 75-76. 
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4.52 This analysis is however not universally accepted. Raymond Quinn for example 
suggests that the relationships between the Catholic community and the British 
Army remained good after the curfew although it was deteriorating. He suggests 
that it was only at the end of 1970 that the IRA began to discourage friendly 
relations between the Roman Catholic community and the British Army.501 Simon 
Winchester echoes this understanding stating that: 
 
There were many months left in which Catholic people and soldiers would talk 
together and swap tea and gossip: but the curfew was the beginning of the end 
for the army, and before very long, any Catholic seen “fraternising” was in for 
a head shaving, a smashed kneecap, or a bullet in the brain.502  
 
4.53 The Falls Road Curfew was also significant politically because ‘it was one of the 
most clearly identifiable steps on the road that led, eventually and inexorably, to 
the downfall of the Stormont Government two years later’.503 
 
The Legality of the Curfew 
 
4.54 The legality of the curfew was upheld by a resident magistrate who found those 
who refused to obey Army instructions to go indoors, guilty of the offence of 
disorderly behaviour or behaviour likely to occasion a breach of the peace under 
s9 (1) of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (N.I.) 1968. The 
reasoning behind the decision of the magistrate was that the soldiers were 
regarded as individual citizens acting to prevent violent crime and were taking all 
reasonable steps to prevent violence and suppress a riot. The imposition of a 
curfew was upheld on this basis by a Magistrate’s ruling.504  
 
                                                        
501 Raymond Quinn, A Rebel Voice: A History of Belfast Republicanism 1925-1972 (Belfast 
Cultural and Local History Group 1999) 171 quoted in Warner (n455) 336.  
502 Winchester (n461) 75. 
503 ibid 68. 
504 Gen. Freeland’s Curfew Order Was Right, Rules City Magistrate’ Belfast Telegraph, 8 
September 1970 quoted in Campbell, Connolly (n458) 344.  
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4.55 The curfews legal significance was that it relied upon non-statutory powers that 
‘many had assumed were obsolete and ran directly counter to the […] democratic 
and constitutional norms of the twentieth century’.505 Given there was no statutory 
basis for the curfew then the lawfulness of the curfew must have been based either 
on the common law or on prerogative powers and both of these possibilities 
present difficulties, including the fact that these powers have a ‘democratic 
deficiency’. 506  That is, these powers allow the British Army to act without 
government authority or even government approval. They create a locus of power 
that exists outside of the elected government. So consequently, the government is 
responsible to Parliament for the British Army’s actions but has no control over 
what the British Army does.  
 
4.56 Theories about emergencies generally accept the need for a State to extend its 
powers in times of crises, but in a democratic State, even in times of emergency, 
there is little appetite for elevating the military to a position of power over the 
democratically elected government. For this reason, Colm Campbell makes the 
point that the curfew ‘was the closest any part of the state came to a form of 
martial law since the Irish Troubles of the 1920s’.507  
 
4.57 Aside from the democratic deficiency, the other issue is that because the law was 
out of step with established administrative practices, there was a lack of clarity as 
to the legal basis for action.508 If the legal basis for the imposition of the Falls 
Road Curfew was the common law, then this presents two potential issues. Firstly, 
there is a potential problem relating to whether the time for which the curfew was 
imposed was reasonable and secondly there is a potential problem in relation to 
whether the area covered by the curfew was again reasonable in the 
circumstances. In other words, if the necessity for the curfew can be established, 
then there is no issue relating to the ordering of the curfew itself.  If the situation 
justified these restrictions then the curfew would be lawful only for the time it 
took to clear the streets of the rioters and establish some level of order. Once the 
                                                        
505 Campbell, Connolly (n458) 343.  
506 ibid 370.  
507 ibid 344.  
508 After 30 years of the Troubles these issues have not been resolved.  
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violence had been suppressed then the Stormont government could issue an Order 
under the Special Powers Act for the curfew to continue. 509 Mr. Gerry Fitt MP 
(soon to be leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party) questioned the 
legality of the curfew in the House of Commons on the basis that once the 
violence was contained there was no necessity to maintain the curfew for a further 
24 hours. The legality of the Falls Road Curfew was also raised in the meeting of 
the Joint Security Committee held on the 4 July 1970 and it was decided that legal 
advice should be sought.510 
 
4.58 The alternative explanation is that the curfew was an exercise of prerogative 
power, but this explanation also runs into various problems. Firstly, as Campbell 
points out, it is not clear that historically such a prerogative power ever existed.511 
If it had existed then there is still a problem with this explanation.  At the time of 
the Falls Road Curfew there was already a statutory power to impose a curfew 
under Special Powers Regulation 19. Campbell argues that this statutory power 
would operate ‘to nullify any prerogative power that claimed to operate in the 
same sphere’ 512  and he cites various cases that confirm this position. 513  The 
argument follows that since the curfew was not ordered under Special Powers 
Regulation 19 then no prerogative power could be relied upon as the legal basis of 
the curfew.  
 
The Legality of the House-to-House Searches during the Curfew 
 
4.59 In the area where the curfew was imposed, house-to-house searches were 
conducted with little sensitivity. Simon Winchester claims that in some of the 
houses that were searched by the British Army there ‘was very little furniture left 
                                                        
509 HC Deb 06 July 1970, vol 803, col 330. 
510 The National Archive (TNA): Public Records Office (PRO) DEFE 13/370 Conclusions of a 
Meeting of the Joint Security Committee, 4 July 1970. 
511 Campbell, Connolly (n458) 370. 
512 ibid.  
513 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Northumbria Police Authority [1988] 
2 WLR 590; Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935 
quoted in Campbell, Connolly (n458) 371.  
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standing, or indeed intact. Gas and water pipes had been torn out, holes smashed 
in walls with rifle butts, beds upturned and broken, floorboards torn up’.514  
 
4.60 Campbell points out that some of these house-to-house searches must have been 
conducted using common law powers since no certificates of search were issued 
during the initial stages of the curfew.515 The fact that certificates of search were 
issued after the initial searches had taken place, suggests that the legal basis of the 
house-to-house searches was understood at the time as being potentially 
contentious, and that the issuing of certificates in the later stages of the curfew 
was a damage limitation exercise.    
 
4.61 The reason why the reliance on the common law as the legal basis for the house-
to-house searches was contentious was that it brought into sharp relief that not 
only did the British Army have independent authority to deploy troops in order to 
contain civil disturbances, but that it also had the authority to determine what 
tactics to engage once the troops had been deployed.516 And the decision to use a 
particular tactic had no built-in safety checks. In other words, there was no 
agreement in place ensuring that the government would be consulted on any 
action contemplated by the British Army post-deployment to the scene.  
 
4.62 Perhaps inevitably, one of the consequences of the curfew was that the imposition 
of any future curfews would need prior Ministry of Defence (MOD) approval.517 
In other words, the government moved quickly to re-assert its authority. What is 
even more interesting is that imposition of the Falls Road Curfew was never 
challenged in a superior court of law nor did it prompt a public enquiry518 nor was 
its legality challenged by any other European State.  
 
                                                        
514 Winchester (n461) 73. 
515 Campbell, Connolly (n458) 355.  
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517 The National Archive (TNA): Public Records Office (PRO) DEFE 25/273 MOD Signal 
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British Government Cabinet meeting held on the 29 July 1970 let alone prompt a Public Enquiry.  
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4.63 The conflict in Northern Ireland can be understood to have various battlegrounds. 
One of those battlegrounds is legitimacy and an important aspect of the battle for 
legitimacy is legality. So, when the State operates within the rule of law, it makes 
it more difficult for its enemies to undermine its legitimacy. So, the assumption is 
that the State will want to maintain the rule of law or the perception of it, in order 
to distinguish its own actions from the unlawful violence of the terrorists. On the 
other hand, if the State operates unlawfully it will provide powerful evidence of 
illegitimacy that can be used to attack the State in the courts. In this sense, the law 
itself is a dimension of the conflict, providing a platform on which the two sides 
can continue hostilities. Operating unlawfully will play into the hands of the 
terrorists because ‘The principle goal of an insurgency is not to defeat the armed 
forces, but to subvert or destroy the government’s legitimacy, its ability and moral 
right to govern.’519 
 
4.64 The ambiguity of the legal basis of the Falls Road Curfew and then the continued 
ambiguity of the tactics deployed throughout the curfew, doesn’t sit easily with 
the phenomenon of ‘legal black holes’.520 That is the idea that violent conflicts 
create lacunae where law doesn’t reach. Instead, the ambiguity fits better with the 
metaphor of ‘disguised legal black holes’ sometimes referred to as ‘legal grey 
holes’ in which ‘violent conflict is characterised by legal ambiguity, and a lack of 
accountability and indeterminacy as to whether the States action is lawful’.521  
 
4.65 Given the curfew’s ambiguous status it is not immediately obvious why the 
curfew did not generate any legal challenges. But the fact is that it did not, and 
that failure is significant because it raises questions about the effective 
functioning of the law in Northern Ireland at the time. If the law didn’t operate as 
it was supposed to and ensure that people were held to account, then it may 
provide some small insight into why in the second half of the twentieth century, in 
a Western democracy, people resorted to such violence.  The flip side of the coin 
is that, if obstacles existed that made bringing cases before the courts more 
                                                        
519 Courtney Prisk, ‘The Umbrella of Legitimacy’ in Max Manwaring (ed), Uncomfortable Wars: 
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difficult, then this might have resulted in Ministers and officials or both exploiting 
that situation and deliberately failing to seek clarification on the lawfulness or 
otherwise of measures that were being taken. In other words, government officials 
and Ministers could deliberately avoid seeking legal advice on certain policies 
because they feared those policies were unlawful or worse still, they had been told 
informally by government lawyers that those policies were unlawful.  
 
4.66 There is an example of this happening. There is clear evidence that officials in 
Whitehall were keen to keep the legal status of using CS gas, 2-
chlorobenzalmalononitrile, as a crowd-control agent as indeterminate.522 This is 
just one small example but it at least provides evidence that Ministers and 
officials were not above exploiting legal uncertainties.  
 
4.67 Writing in 1971 David Carlton and Nicholas Sims523 drew attention to the British 
government announcement on 2 February 1970, more than a year earlier, that the 
British government regarded the use of CS gas, and other such gases, in a war, as 
being outside the scope of the Geneva Protocol’s ban on chemical and biological 
warfare of 1925. Carlton and Sims focused on the announcement made by the 
Labour Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. Michael 
Stewart, in response to a Parliamentary question by Mr. Alexander Lyon, Labour 
MP for York. In a statement to Parliament Mr. Michael Stewart stated:  
 
I should like to take this opportunity to explain the Government’s view on the 
scope of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, as regards the use of tear gases in war. In 
1930, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Dalton, in reply to 
a Parliamentary question on the scope of the Protocol said: “smoke screens are 
not considered as poisonous and do not therefore, come, within the terms of the 
Geneva Gas Protocol. Tear gases and shells producing poisonous fumes are, 
                                                        
522 The National Archive (TNA): Public Records Office (PRO) DEFE 24/622 CS gas DS/13/3/1 
dated 14 December 1971 in a letter from Thomas Brimelow (FCO) to P. D. Nairne (MoD). (Letter 
from Brimelow to Nairne) 
523 David Carlton, Nicholas Sims, ‘The CS Gas Controversy: Great Britain and the Geneva 
Protocol of 1925’ (1971) 13(10) Survival Global Politics and Strategy 333.  
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however, prohibited under the Protocol”. 524  This is still the Governments 
position.525 
 
4.68 Michael Stewart went on to explain that: 
 
Modern technology has developed CS smoke which unlike the tear gases 
available in 1930, is considered not to be significantly harmful to man in other 
than wholly exceptional circumstances; and we regard CS and other such gases 
accordingly to be outside the scope of the Geneva Protocols. CS is in fact less 
toxic than the screening smokes which the 1930 statement specifically 
excluded.526 
 
4.69 The Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, prohibited 
the use in warfare of ‘asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous 
liquids, materials or devices’.527 The problem was that ‘tear gas came to occupy 
an ambiguous position within the terms of the Protocol’.528 The term tear gas 
became widely used to describe a range of agents that temporarily incapacitated 
those it was used on by affecting their eyes and the mucus membrane in the nose, 
throat and lungs, rather than just one specific agent.  
 
4.70 The British had developed CS gas in 1928 but it was not until 1956 that it was 
developed into a riot-control agent. The British shared the agent with the 
Americans and by 1971 American forces were using 10 million kilograms a year 
in Vietnam.529 American use of CS gas made the situation more sensitive that it 
would otherwise have been. The CS gas in use in 1960s and 1970s was 
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substantially less poisonous than the earlier gases available in 1930 when Mr. 
Dalton had told Parliament that tear gases were prohibited under the Geneva 
Protocol. 
 
4.71 The position behind the scenes was that there was ‘intense inter-departmental 
debate’.530  One of the MOD’s concerns was that the legality or otherwise of CS 
gas would affect British Army tactics in Northern Ireland where the British Army 
regularly used CS gas to disperse rioters and prevent an escalation of violence 
between the Protestant and Roman Catholic communities.531 The MOD wanted to 
continue using the CS gas, arguing that CS gas could be of value in conflict 
situations where minimum force was the priority. These situations included 
conflicts where the ‘enemy’ was indistinguishable for the general population.   
 
4.72 The Geneva Protocol governs armed conflicts and since the British position 
regarding Northern Ireland was that the violence did not amount to an armed 
conflict, the violence in Northern Ireland ought not to have been factored into any 
decision regarding CS gas and the Geneva Protocol. Except that approving CS gas 
for crowd control in the United Kingdom while at the same time making it clear 
that CS gas was too toxic for use in an international armed conflict could prove 
embarrassing for the British government. Spelling quotes the MOD as stating that 
the British public ‘will fail to be impressed by a logic that permits the use of CS 
gas on British citizens but condemns its use on…Soviet infantry’532 and could 
very quickly lead to demands for CS to be banned for domestic use. Another 
concern raised by MOD officials was that if it was decided that the use of CS gas 
fell inside the protocol then this risked jeopardising the ‘Special Relationship’ 
with the USA as it might be interpreted as a criticism of American forces in 
Vietnam who were using CS gas on a large scale.533 The position taken by the 
MOD was that CS gas in its less toxic form was outside the Protocol. The Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office’s (FCO) concern was that publicly announcing that 
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CS gas fell outside the Protocol would undermine the United Kingdom’s position 
at the UN during the coming negotiations on chemical weapons.  
 
4.73 The MOD and the FCO made preliminary approaches to the Law Officers who 
gave informal indications that their Opinion was likely to be that CS gas did come 
within the scope of the Geneva Protocol. Both departments then agreed that a 
formal Opinion should not be sought. 534 The logic is convoluted and difficult to 
follow but the point is that officials from the MOD and the FCO agreed not to 
seek formal legal advice on whether CS gas fell within the scope of the Geneva 
Convention 535  because they had already been told informally that it did but 
wanted to continue to use it. By 1972 the legal advice from the Solicitor-General 
and the Attorney General indicated that ‘there was very little doubt…CS gas was 
covered…’ by the Protocol.536 
 
4.74 This example is an indication that Whitehall was prepared to exploit legal 
ambiguities when the opportunity presented itself. It is just one small example but 
it sheds some light on official thinking and attitudes towards international law, 
and by implication law generally. 
 
4.75 Having examined the constitutional position of the British Army operating in 
Northern Ireland and looked at how in practice the British government managed 
to retain control over the British Army despite the constitution, the next chapter 
will examine the extent to which the ordinary criminal law was able to hold to 
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Chapter 4: The Use of Force by British Soldiers and the Operation of the 
Ordinary Criminal Law during The Troubles 
 
5.1 Soldiers operating overtly and covertly in Northern Ireland were governed by the 
ordinary criminal law in relation to the use of force.537 Emergency legislation co-
existed with the ordinary criminal law but was surprisingly silent on the use of 
lethal force by the Security Forces against suspected terrorists. This arrangement 
was very different to previous campaigns conducted by the British Army outside 
the United Kingdom, for example, in Aden, Borneo, Kenya, Malaya, where due to 
the declared Emergency, civil courts had no jurisdiction over the military.   
 
5.2 This chapter will concentrate on the use of ordinary law during the Troubles and 
the process by which individual soldiers were investigated, charged and 
prosecuted for using unjustifiable force. It will begin to look at how the system 
operated in terms of the three functions of law in relation to soldiers on the ground 
as opposed to officers formulating tactics and policy.  
 
5.3 Legal provisions can be understood, in an ideal world, as performing three basic 
functions. 538 Those functions are, firstly control, secondly guidance and thirdly 
the provision of a transparent process of investigation, prosecution and sentencing 
for those who break the law. This chapter will attempt to assess the extent to 
which the legislation governing the British soldiers operating in Northern Ireland 
performed those basic functions. In other words, in relation to the control 
function, did the law impact on decisions made by members of the Security 
Forces and if so to what extent. In relation to guidance, did the law set out clearly 
when and what actions were legitimate.  So was the law accessible and easily 
understood by members of the Security Forces. In relation to the third function of 
law, that is the provision of transparent processes in the justice system, the 
question is, did the law provide those working within the justice system, both 
                                                        
537 The ordinary criminal law was amended in various significant ways and as a consequence was 
arguably not so ordinary. See chapter two for a more detailed discussion. The amendments 
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investigating and prosecuting, with a clearly understood process? Did it provide 
those in the court system a clear framework by which actions can be assessed and 
appropriate sentences handed down? 
 
5.4 These three functions are discrete but to some extent interdependent. For example, 
the effectiveness of the law in controlling the actions of the Security Forces will 
be to some degree reliant on both the chances of a guilty verdict once charged 
with an offence, and then of course the likely sentence that would be imposed. 
Therefore, if the chance of a guilty verdict is slim and the sentence, even if 
convicted, is light, then it seems reasonable to assume that the control function of 
law will be weakened. Similarly, the effectiveness of the law in providing 
guidance and setting limits to legitimate action, will be to some degree dependent 
on the level of awareness of what the law is and when it applies.  
 
5.5 In order to assess the legal constraints imposed on the Security Forces 539 by 
operating within the ordinary criminal law, it might be useful to look at the impact 
of the law on the soldiers patrolling the streets. There is a perception among 
commentators that in relation to legal constraints there is a distinction between 
soldiers in uniform and those soldiers that operated undercover. 540 The belief 
seems to be that soldiers involved in covert operations were more difficult to 
control and more likely to disregard the law. This seems to be a view held both 
inside and outside the military. Hughes states that, ‘regular military officers can 
also be suspicious of plain-clothes ‘cowboys’, regarding them as an undisciplined 
liability’.541 Evelegh states in relation to military plain-clothes operations, ‘there 
were doubts about their control’.542 Mark Urban quotes SAS soldiers summing up 
their attitude to lethal force as ‘‘big boys’ games, ‘big boys’ rules’ and using this 
                                                        
539 The Security Forces were made up of the British Army including the Ulster Defence Regiment, 
and the Royal Ulster Constabulary. However, the primary focus in this chapter is the military. 
540 Mark Urban, Big Boy’s Rules: The SAS and the Secret Struggle against the IRA (Faber and 
Faber 1992) 73. 
541 Geraint Hughes, ‘The use of undercover military units in counter-terrorist operations: A 
historical analysis with reference to contemporary anti-terrorism’ (2010) 21(4) Small Wars and 
Insurgencies 561, 571. 
542 Robin Evelegh, Peace Keeping in a Democratic Society: The Lessons from Northern Ireland (C. 
Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd. 1978) 30. 
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as a ‘justification for killing people’. 543 However, the focus here is soldiers in 
uniform carrying out routine tasks like patrolling the streets, conducting house-to-
house searches and manning checkpoints.544  
 
5.6 The only real way to assess the effectiveness of the law in relation to the three 
functions of law as outlined above is to ask those involved for their opinions. That 
is ask soldiers who served in Northern Ireland the extent of the impact that the law 
had on them, and to structure the questions in terms of the three functions of law 
outlined. Short of doing this however some analysis is still possible.   
 
5.7 In order to assess the extent to which the law constrained the actions of the 
soldiers patrolling the streets, it would be useful to look specifically at whether 
the investigation process was independent and transparent and try to gauge the 
impact, if any, of the erosion of powers of the coroner. This will involve looking 
at whether the decision to prosecute was politically manipulated, and whether the 
formulation of the legislation itself worked against securing prosecutions against 
members of the Security Forces who used lethal force in contested circumstances. 
Before looking at these aspects of the legal framework under which the Security 
Forces operated, it is perhaps worth looking at the available statistics that relate to 
the use of lethal force and the use of less than lethal force by members of the 




5.8 ‘A substantial proportion of the deaths due to ‘terrorism’ in Northern Ireland have 
been the result of Army or police shootings.’ 546 Figures quoted by Greer and 
others indicate that ‘a total of 2,304 people were killed up to 1983 and 264 (or 
11.5%) were of this kind’. 547  Many of these have taken place in disputed 
                                                        
543 Urban (n540) 73. 
544 Covert operations are dealt with in chapter five. 
545 The statistics do not always separate out the figures for the Army and the RUC.  
546 Steven Greer, Tom Hadden, Martin O’Hagan, ‘Civil Liberties in Northern Ireland: From Special 
Powers to Supergrasses’ Fortnight 214 (Belfast, 18 February 1985) 5 
<www.jstor.org/stable/i25547694> accessed 24 December 2017. 
547 ibid.  
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circumstances but yet only a handful of these soldiers and policemen had been 
prosecuted by 1985. Giving evidence to the Defence Select Committee on the 7 
March 2017 Professor Kieran McEvoy stated that of the total number of deaths 
directly attributable to the Security Forces, 63% of the victims were undisputedly 
unarmed and only 12% of victims were confirmed to have been in possession of a 
weapon.548 Despite these statistics relating to killings Huw Bennett claims that 
‘fewer that ten per cent of killings and assaults committed by soldiers were 
prosecuted’.549  
 
5.9 ‘Relatives for Justice’ dispute the figure of 11.5% claiming it is a clear under-
estimate of the real figure and as such is just a ‘propaganda myth’.550 ‘Relatives 
for Justice’ claim that the figure of 11.5% is based only on Army and police 
shootings and fails to factor in deaths caused as a direct consequence of State 
collusion. If statistics relating to collusion are included in the figures then 
‘Relatives for Justice’ claim that the more accurate figure would be 33% of all 
killings and assaults were perpetrated by the State.551  
 
Fatal Shootings by the RUC 
 
5.10 The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) Statistics Branch recorded the 
number of security related deaths. 552 Records began in July 1969 and between 
                                                        
548 Professor Kieran McEvoy, Evidence to the Defence Select Committee of the UK Parliament, 7 
March 2017 citing research by Professor Fionnuala Ni Aolain 
<http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/defence-
committee/investigations-into-fatalities-in-northern-ireland-involving-british-military-
personnel/written/48436.html> accessed 17 June 2017. 
549 Huw Bennett, ‘Smoke Without Fire? Allegations Against the British Army in Northern Ireland, 
1972-5’ (2013) 24(2) Twentieth Century History 275, 303. 
550 Committee on the Administration of Justice ‘The Apparatus of Impunity? Human Rights 
Violations and the Northern Ireland Conflict: a narrative of official limitations on post-Agreement 
investigative mechanisms’ Committee on the Administration of Justice [CAJ 2015] 4. <http://s3-
eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/caj.org.uk/2017/03/15131009/No.-66-The-Apparatus-of-Impunity-
Human-rights-violations-and-the-Northern-Ireland-conflict-Jan-2015.pdf> accessed on 17 March 
2017. (CAJ The Apparatus of Impunity) 
551 ibid 4. 
552 The definition of a security related death is ‘a death which is considered at the time of the 
incident to be directly attributed to terrorism, where the cause has a direct and proximate link to 
subversive/sectarian strife or where the death is attributable to security force activity.’ This 
definition was provided in the response to FOI Request F-2016-00321 from the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland.  
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that date and December 1998 ‘there were 47 security related deaths in which the 
attribution was recorded as RUC or RUC reserve where the officer was on-
duty’.553 Attribution is as perceived by the Police based on information available 
at the time of the incident.554  Of these 47 deaths, the Discipline Branch of the 
Police Service of Northern Ireland have ‘confirmed that there is no record of any 
officer being convicted of murder or manslaughter while acting in the line of duty 
between 1970 and 1998’.555  
 
Fatal Shootings by the British Army 
 
5.11 The number of fatal shootings by British soldiers during the Troubles is 293.556 
‘The Historical Enquiries Team (HET) was set up in 2005 as a specialist police 
unit in order to re-examine 3,268 deaths that were categorised as conflict-related 
deaths that occurred between the year 1968 and 1998 that did not involve the 
police as perpetrator.’ 557  Part of the HET’s brief was to investigate the 154 
killings involving the soldiers of the British Army between 1970 and 1973.558 
Many of those killed were not members of any paramilitary organisation and 
therefore these fatal shootings claimed the lives of innocent people.  For example, 
Urban points out that ‘The IRA ‘Roll of Honour’ for fallen volunteers shows that 
during 1979 to 1980, only one IRA member was killed by the entire Army in 
Northern Ireland.’559 However, the number of fatal shootings by soldiers for that 
period was nine.560  
                                                        
553 Response to FOI Request F-2016-00321 from the Police Service of Northern Ireland. 
554 ibid.  
555 ibid. There are no figures available for 1968 and 1969. The investigation of historic killings 
involving the police is currently the responsibility of the Ombudsman.  
556 The total number of deaths by British soldiers is 297 between 1969 and 2001 but four of these 
are not shootings -two were stabbings and two were killed by Army vehicles. These figures are 
from The Sutton Index of Deaths. Malcolm Sutton, Bear in Mind these Dead… An Index of Deaths 
from the Conflict 1969-1993 (Beyond the Pale 1994) reproduced in CAIN 
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557 Patricia Lundy, Bill Rolston, ‘Redress for Past Harms? Official apologies in Northern Ireland’ 
(2016) 20(1) The International Journal of Human Rights 104, 110.  
558 ibid.  
559 Urban (n540) 81. 
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Conviction Rates for Members of the RUC and the British Army 
 
5.12 It seems to be generally accepted that the conviction rates in relation to 
contentious fatal shootings and other less serious crimes alleged to have been 
committed by British soldiers and the RUC were very low. Bennett states that, 
‘under 100 soldiers were convicted of offences against civilians between 1972 and 
1975’.561 Professor Anthony Jennings has worked out that between 1969 and 1985 
members of the Security Forces in Northern Ireland killed 270 people.562 Of those 
killed 155 were deemed to be unaffiliated with any paramilitary groups, the 
Security Forces or prison personnel.563 In relation to those killings, twenty-one 
members of the Security Forces were prosecuted and two were convicted.564 Of 
the two soldiers that were convicted during this period, one was convicted of 
manslaughter and given a suspended sentence and the other was convicted of 
murder and served two years and three months.565 Jennings was quoting statistics 
for successful prosecutions prior to 1988. However, the figures are now available 
for the entire conflict.  
 
5.13 In relation to fatal shootings, the British Army’s official report of its operations in 
Northern Ireland (known as Operation Banner) cites that there were only four 
convictions in the whole of the conflict, (one of those was subsequently 
overturned on retrial).566  
 
5.14 Referring to the figures relating to 1969-1988 Jennings claimed that that the 
figures were evidence that to a large degree the Security Forces have been 
                                                        
561 Bennett (n549) 279.  
562 Anthony Jennings, ‘Shoot to Kill: The Final Courts of Justice’ in A Jennings (ed), Justice under 
Fire: The Abuse of Civil Liberties in Northern Ireland (Pluto 1988) 104. 
563 ibid.  
564 Carol Daugherty Rasnic, Northern Ireland: Can Sean and John Live in Peace? An American 
Legal Perspective (Brandy Lane Publishers Inc. 2003) 23 
565 Raymond Murray, State Violence: Northern Ireland 1969-1997 (Mercier Press 1998) 
<www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/murray.htm> accessed 17 July 2017 
566 Committee on the Administration of Justice Submission from the Committee on the 
Administration of Justice (CAJ) [2017] to the United Nations Human Rights Committee in 
response to the Concluding Observations on the 7th Periodic Report on the UK under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 5 
<https://www.caj.org.uk/2017/06/30/s465-united-nations-human-rights-committee-response-
concluding-observations-7th-periodic-report-uk-international-covenant-civil-political-rights-
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‘granted by the courts the unilateral authority to determine whether those 
suspected of unlawful paramilitary activity are guilty or not’.567 His comments, 
are arguably, equally relevant to the figures relating to the entire conflict.  
 
5.15 Four soldiers were convicted of unlawful killing during the entire conflict. In the 
17 years between 1969 and 1991 two soldiers were convicted of unlawful killing 
in Northern Ireland and in less than four years, between 1991 and 1995, a further 
two soldiers were convicted. This led Julian Barnes, MP for Canterbury, to 
speculate that the increase in the number of convictions could be just serendipity, 
or it could be due to a sudden breakdown in discipline across four British Army 
regiments or it might be due to a hardening of attitudes within the criminal justice 
system towards British Army soldiers serving in Northern Ireland.568 What he 
seems to be implying is that at the beginning of the conflict, when the violence 
was much more unpredictable and the British State was in ‘shock’ and trying to 
come to terms with the conflict, the entire criminal justice system worked to 
protect State actors from being convicted of any offences. However, as the 
conflict dragged on and the violence became more predictable, the criminal justice 
system was less sympathetic towards the British soldiers. A hardening of attitudes 
by the justice system towards the State and its agents would not be surprising in 
these circumstances. However, the fact that there are so few cases makes drawing 
conclusions difficult.  
 
5.16 As well as shootings by the military there were other less serious allegations of 
crimes committed by soldiers while they were dealing with civilians. These 
include assaults and offences when undertaking house-to-house searches. In terms 
of assaults, there was a stream of complaints relating to ill-treatment of detainees. 
Between August 1971 and June 1972 3,276 prisoners were processed at police 
holding centres.569 Between April 1971 and June 1972 1,105 complaints alleging 
ill-treatment or assault by the RUC had been received by the investigations 
                                                        
567 Jennings (n562) 104. 
568 Julian Barnes MP House of Commons 1 February 1995 
<https://www.hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1995/feb/01/northern.ireland-rules-of-
engagement> accessed 17 July 2017. 
569 Council of Europe, Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights 1976 (Martinus 
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department set up under the Police Act (NI) 1970 to investigate complaints 
against officers.570 The results of these complaints were that 23 police officers 
were charged and 6 were convicted. The sentences ranged from a fine to a 
conditional discharge.571 
 
5.17 In relation to allegations of offences committed during house-to-house searches 
these included ‘the destruction of homes, and sacred objects, and acts of abuse 
and intimidation’.572 The number of house-to-house searches undertaken was very 
large. The official figures are as follows: 1971: 17,262, 1972: 36,617, 1973: 
74,556, 1974: 71,914, 1975: 30,094, 1976: 34,939, 1977: 20,724, 1978: 15,462, 
1979: 6,280.573 Paddy Hillyard estimated that one in four Roman Catholic men 
between the ages of 16 and 44 had been arrested at least once between 1972 and 
1977. 574  On average every Catholic household in Northern Ireland had been 
searched twice, but since some homes were not under suspicion then other houses 
would have been searched ‘perhaps as many as ten times’.575  
 
 
5.18 Various reasons for conducting house-to-house searches in mainly Republican 
areas have been put forward. These reasons include building up files on the 
occupants of all the houses. Another reason for conducting house-to-house 
searches was to do ‘head checks’ and search for weapons and explosives. 576  
Interestingly, the use of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Powers) Act 1973 s13 
as the basis of authority to conduct house-to-house searches remains a contested 
issue. Boyle and others state that ‘it has always been doubtful whether the Army’s 
powers to search houses for explosives or firearms (s15) [of the 1978 Act]577 can 
                                                        
570 ibid. 
571 ibid. 
572 William Beattie Smith, The British State and Northern Ireland Crisis 1969-1973: From 
Violence to Power Sharing (United States Institute for Peace 2011) 151. 
573 Kevin Boyle, Tom Hadden and Paddy Hillyard ‘Emergency Powers Ten Years On’ Fortnight 
174 (Belfast, January 1980) 4, 6 <www.jstor.org/stable/i25546753> accessed 24 December 2017. 
574 Paddy Hillyard, ‘Political and Social Dimensions of Emergency Law in Northern Ireland’ in 
Anthony Jennings (ed), Justice Under Fire (Pluto 1988) 197. 
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576 Evelegh (n542) 29. 
577 Northern Ireland (Emergency Powers) Act 1978 replaced the Northern Ireland (Emergency 
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properly be used on a house-to–house basis’. 578  In addition, Mr. Justice 
McGonical in Regina v Riley and Rimmer on 21 January 1975 questioned whether 
the legislation gave authority to the military to conduct ‘head checking’.579  
 
5.19 The small number of soldiers being prosecuted for murder and other serious 
crimes may, at least in part, be also explained by the attitude of the Director of 
Public Prosecutions (DPP). In 1972, the DPP announced that it was his general 
intention to refuse to prosecute members of the Security Forces who killed or 
wounded civilians while on duty.580 Huw Bennett suggests that this attitude may 
have stemmed from the fact that the ‘DPP and his senior personnel had all served 
in the army themselves and wanted to help the army in its task of beating the 
IRA’.581 Nevertheless, some soldiers were prosecuted but those facing criminal 
proceedings were rarely convicted. Robin Evelegh states that many ‘soldiers are 
charged, although few are convicted with civil offences582 ranging from murder to 
minor assault’.583 After interviewing many officers, Mark Urban commented that 
‘Officers know it is highly unlikely that the juryless courts in Northern Ireland 
will convict a soldier for murder, since they are bound to make allowances for the 
person who has killed in the line of duty’.584 Bennett makes the same point stating 
that ‘soldiers knew their chances of getting away with it were reasonably 
good’.585  
 
5.20 This attitude suggests a lack of respect for the law and the entire justice system. 
Mark Urban made the point that ‘Many officers are cynical about the legal 
process, often as a result of seeing men and women whom they believe to be 
guilty of terrorist crimes walk free or receive light sentences.’586 In 1972 at a 
                                                        
578 Boyle, Hadden, Hillyard (n570) 4, 5. 
579 Regina v Riley and Rimmer [1975] Belfast City Commission quoted in Robin Evelegh, Peace 
Keeping in a Democratic Society: The Lessons from Northern Ireland (C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) 
Ltd. 1978).  
580 Huw Bennett, ‘Detention and Interrogation in Northern Ireland, 1969-75’ in Sibylle Scheipers 
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meeting with Michael Havers, the then Solicitor–General, forty officers from the 
3rd Royal Green Jackets went further and complained that some IRA members 
were not even prosecuted for political reasons.587 The views of individual soldiers 
towards the law and the extent to which they felt constrained by the law requires 
further research.  However, the slim evidence available tends to suggest that the 
law was less than fully effective in relation to the level of control the law exerted 
on individual soldiers.  
 
5.21 The belief held by soldiers that their chances of ‘getting away with it’ were good 
is backed up by statistics. Although the figures are fragmented, they still throw 
some light on the extent to which the Security Forces were held to account. For 
example, during the period between March 1972 and September 1974, there were 
502 criminal investigations involving the British Army and the RUC. 588 Only 
fifty-six of those investigations, a shade over 10%, led to prosecutions and of 
those prosecutions there were seventeen convictions most of which were for 
minor offences. 589  However, according to Huw Bennett once convicted the 
soldiers could expect to receive similar sentences as civilians convicted of like 
offences in the rest of Britain.590 In other words, an equivalent to the ‘mere-gook’ 
rule, which is said to have operated during the Vietnam War to devalue the lives 
and property of the Vietnamese people by providing them with less than full legal 
protection, was never in operation in Northern Ireland. The ‘mere-gook’ rule was 
never a policy endorsed by any American administration but was simply used to 
hint that no American would ever be punished for killing any Vietnamese.  
 
5.22 However, Bennett then appears to contradict himself by stating that ‘soldiers who 
were unfortunate enough to be caught abusing civilians, and they were few, 
suffered light punishments’. 591 During the Troubles only four members of the 
                                                        
587 See Rosie Cowan, ‘Cosy conspiracy between the cardinal and the cabinet minister that let an 
IRA priest go free’ The Guardian (London: 21 December 2002) at 
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(Blackstaff Press Ltd 2000) 96. 
590 Bennett (n549) 289.  
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Security Forces were convicted of murder while on duty. 592  Following 
government intervention all three served less than four years of a life sentence 
before being released under an Executive Order and resuming a career in the 
Army.593 The forth man was acquitted in a retrial. Perhaps the point that Bennett 
was making was that although the figures tend to suggest that even if the sentence 
was unremarkable, the length of time actually served was relatively short. 
However, there are no statistics available in relation to lesser offences in terms of 
sentences received. Consequently, the question of whether or not the soldiers 
received comparable sentences to other United Kingdom citizens has not been 
fully resolved and requires further investigation.  
 
5.23 The low conviction rates in these cases may also have been down to the 
reluctance of the Roman Catholic communities to contact the RUC. The British 
government directed complaints to be made directly to the RUC, but the RUC 
were distrusted among the Roman Catholic community. At the same time, Huw 
Bennett concludes that there is some evidence that senior officers may have been 
reluctant to investigate or punish men under their command for transgressions of 
both the British Army standard operating procedures and or the law.594 Edward 
Burke also makes similar claims, namely that some British Army officers turned a 
blind eye to reprisal tactics undertaken by the men under their command.595 Burke 
goes on to suggest that this may have been because the entire Roman Catholic 
community had come to be viewed as ‘complicit in the deaths of British 
soldiers’.596  In other words, as the number British soldiers killed in the Troubles 
mounted, some British soldiers came to define the word ‘guilt’ so widely that it 
included members of the general Roman Catholic community.597 If this was the 
case then such attitudes may have allowed the presumption of innocence to be 
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swept away and allowed a punitive approach or what would be classed as 
essentially reprisal tactics to be tolerated at senior levels.  
 
5.24 Bennett states that ‘by March 1972, the Army largely believed that the Catholics 
in the Province were troublemakers’.598 Burke interviewed British Army officers 
who seem to confirm that the Army did on occasions take a punitive approach in 
certain areas. Major Martin Smith of 2nd Battalion, Grenadier Guards admitted 
that he did systematically ‘tear up’ houses that had been used by the IRA as sniper 
positions. By ‘tear up’ he meant that ‘walls were knocked in, floor boards were 
removed and the garden dug up using Royal Engineer mechanical diggers’.599 
Another officer from the 2nd Battalion, Scotts Guards admitted that he had 
allowed his men to take punitive action against the population of the Brandywell. 
He recounted that his men had written offensive slogans on pieces of corrugated 
iron and then tied them to their patrol vehicles to ‘piss-off’ the locals. 600  An 
alternative explanation for the damage done is that officers were unable to control 
their own men.  Of course, the extent of the damage caused and the level of 
intimidation felt, remains unknown.  
 
5.25 Despite these admissions, on the face of it, the statistics would suggest that, by 
and large, the British Army did operate within the law. After all, as of July 1972 
there were over 22,000 soldiers deployed in Northern Ireland and there were less 
than 100 convictions by 1975. However, in addition to the reasons mentioned 
above there might be another reason why these statistics may not reveal the whole 
truth.  
 
5.26 If a member of the Security Forces opened fire and was accused of doing so 
unjustifiably, then he was charged and prosecuted under the ordinary criminal 
law. The reason for this is that the soldier is also a citizen and as such is subject to 
civil law as well as military law. It follows that an action that constitutes an 
offence, if committed by a civilian, will also be an offence if committed by a 
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soldier.  The soldier can therefore be tried and punished for such an offence in a 
civil court.601  
 
5.27 During the Troubles the ordinary criminal law governing the use of force was 
contained in s3 of the Criminal Law (Northern Ireland) Act 1967.602 This piece of 
legislation set out the limits to permissible force.603 Using ordinary law to govern 
a situation that is far from ordinary is problematic because the legislation draws 
no distinction between members of the public, members of the Security Forces or 
a suspected terrorist using force. Kader Asmel claims that: 
 
The attempt to apply the same principles of criminal liability to ordinary 
members of the public and the Security Forces is defeated when the latter 
are equipped with deadly weapons and placed in circumstances where they 
may be under a duty to use them.604  
 
This argument becomes all the more powerful if it is accepted that the Yellow 
Card provided little guidance to soldiers making the decision whether or not to 
open fire.605 In addition to the Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967, the 
common law also allows for the use of force in the defence of oneself and to act in 
the defence of others, so long as the degree of force used is reasonable in the 
circumstances.606  
 
                                                        
601 Military courts are not allowed to try the most serious offences – treason, murder, manslaughter, 
treason-felony, or rape, if the offences can with reasonable convenience be tried by a civil court 
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602 Criminal Law (Northern Ireland) Act 1967. 
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reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime or in effecting or assisting in the lawful 
arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.’ Criminal Law Act 
(Northern Ireland) 1967 s3(2) states that subsection (1) shall replace the rules of the common law 
as to the matters dealt with by that subsection.  
604 Kader Asmal, Shoot to Kill? International Lawyers’ Inquiry into Lethal Use of Firearms by the 
Security Forces in Northern Ireland (The Mercier Press Ltd 1985) para 134. 
605 See chapter 4 para 5.41-5.49 for a more detailed discussion of the Yellow Card. 
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5.28 The interrelationship between s3 of the 1967 Act and the common law defence of 
self–defence and the defence of others remains contentious among academics607 
but the courts have settled on preserving the common law defences as separate 
and discrete from s3.608 In addition, the courts have held that both s3 and the 
common law defences are open to the Security Forces when lethal force has been 
applied. In other words, the courts have accepted that the Security Forces when 
applying lethal force could be defending themselves or others, rather than acting 
in the prevention of crime.609  
 
5.29 In the case of R v Robinson, a specifically trained police unit was sent to 
apprehend a known terrorist believed to have arrived in Northern Ireland to kill 
members of the Security Forces. It was believed that he would be travelling in a 
car with one other person who was also thought to be a dangerous terrorist. Both 
occupants of the car were ordered to stop as the car was being reversed. The 
police officer saw the occupants in the car move in such a way as to make him 
think that the passenger had a gun and was about to open fire on him. The police 
officer shot at the car and then the passenger door opened and he fired again. The 
police officer was charged with murder. The court held that if the defendant 
honestly believed that his life was in danger then he was entitled to rely on self-
defence as a defence and be acquitted.   
 
5.30 This decision is problematic because self-defence is essentially a civilian concept 
that assumes both a reluctance to initiate aggression and a mental state of defence 
against a threat. It is difficult to judge a soldier in a ‘war’ situation fighting and 
attacking an enemy by the standards used to judge an ordinary citizen who has 
been attacked. Both the common law and s3 are formulated around the concept of 
‘reasonableness’ and explaining the phrase ‘reasonable in the circumstances’ has 
been the focus of most of the debate since s3 and the common law provide no 
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guidance as to what the limits of permissible force are.610 Academics have tended 
to address the issue of what is reasonable force by asking two questions. First 
‘was the force necessary (or reasonably believed to be)’611 and secondly was the 
force used ‘proportionate to the evil to be avoided?’612 In other words, the concept 
of reasonableness contains two distinct elements, necessity and justification. Both 
have to be met before any of the defences can be raised successfully.  
 
5.31 The questions of necessity and justification can be formulated as follows. The 
question of necessity involves asking whether the defendant could have achieved 
his objective613 in another way without using the degree of force actually used. 
The question of justification is more complicated and requires a balancing act. On 
the one hand, there is an assumption that the threat posed by the victim could not 
have been eliminated using a lesser force, and on the other hand there is the 
question of whether the level of force is proportionate to the identified threat. 
There is an additional element to the law established in Beckford, and that is the 
defendant should be judged on the facts as he genuinely believed them to be.614 
This is referred to as the rule in Beckford and it establishes that the defendant’s 
use of force must be judged on the basis of the facts as he honestly believed them 
to be, and not on the basis of whether force was objectively necessary. In other 
words, if a soldier genuinely believes a set of facts, which if they were true would 
justify the level of force used, then his honestly held belief removes any intent to 
act unlawfully and this in turn means that he is entitled to be acquitted.  
 
5.32 What this means is that if the defendant is mistaken as to the facts he can rely on 
his mistake. If, on the other hand, the defendant has full knowledge of the facts 
but genuinely mistakes the level of force permitted by law to deal with the 
                                                        
610 The Home Office, The Criminal Law Revision Committee Seventh Report, Felonies and 
Misdemeanors (Cmnd 2659, 1965) para 23 proposed that a judge might assist a jury as to the 
meaning of reasonable force by drawing their attention to: 
• the nature and degree of force used 
• the seriousness of the evil to be prevented 
• and the possibility of preventing it by other means 
However, this was not included in the legislation and so cannot help with any interpretation. 
611 Doran (n538) 294. 
612 ibid.  
613 This could be a private defence, that is the prevention of a crime or affecting an arrest.  
614 Beckford v Queen, The [1987] 3 ALL ER 425. [Beckford] 
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perceived threat, then the defendant will not be able to rely on his mistake and 
will therefore have no defence to murder.  
 
5.33 The principle in Beckford, on the face of it, gives members of the Security Forces 
operating in Northern Ireland near ‘carte blanche’. However, there are a number 
of limitations on its scope. First, the principle in Beckford applies exclusively to 
criminal law. So, a member of the Security Forces who uses lethal force in a 
situation he honestly believes justifies its use, will not be subject to any criminal 
sanction. However, even if acquitted following a trial in the Crown Court, the rule 
in Beckford does not prevent him being liable in tort. Second, the principle in 
Beckford only leads to an acquittal for the defendant if the defendant believed the 
facts justified the level of force used. In other words, the principle in Beckford 
will not provide a defence to murder for a defendant who uses force in a situation 
where even the facts the defendant believed existed would not justify the level of 
force used. Thirdly, commentators have suggested that the rule in Beckford will 
not apply where the defendant’s mistake in relation to the facts is grossly 
negligent or reckless.615  
 
5.34 The courts have provided some guidance as to the meaning of the term reasonable 
force, but arguably not enough for the average soldier on foot-patrol or manning a 
checkpoint. The decision in Attorney General of Northern Ireland’s Reference 
(No.1 of 1975) provides an explanation of the meaning of reasonable force.616   
 
5.35 The 1975 case involved a soldier who shot dead Patrick McElhorne, an unarmed 
man with no paramilitary connections, when he tried to run away. The defendant, 
Sergeant MacNaughton, said that he had shot Patrick McElhorne in the belief that 
he was a member of the Provisional IRA and that he might reveal his position to 
another member of his organisation. The House of Lords said that the soldier had 
been right to open fire if he thought the person was a terrorist evading arrest and 
might subsequently reveal the positions of soldiers lying in ambush putting their 
                                                        
615 John Stannard, ‘Excessive Defence in Northern Ireland’ (1993) 43 Northern Ireland Legal 
Quarterly 147, 157. 
616 Attorney General of Northern Ireland’s Reference (No. 1 of 1975) [1976] 2 ALL ER 937. 
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lives in danger. 617  The soldier was acquitted in what has been described as 
‘possibly the most baneful of all the domestic decisions relating to the conflict’.618  
 
5.36 Nevertheless the Attorney General sought further guidance from the Northern 
Ireland Court of Appeal on the right of members of the Security Forces to open 
fire, by making reference to s48A of the Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 
1968. 619  The Attorney General wanted guidance on whether or not a soldier 
commits a crime if he opens fire and kills someone, honestly and reasonably 
believing that the victim is a member of a proscribed organisation, and if it is a 
crime, is it murder or manslaughter? The House of Lords said the question was 
not appropriate for an Attorney General’s Reference because the issue was 
hypothetical. Nevertheless, Lord Diplock concluded that in order to decide 
whether reasonable force had been used or not then the jury would have to ask 
themselves:  
Are we satisfied that no reasonable man: 
 
a) with knowledge of such facts as were known to the accused or reasonably620 
believed by him to exist; 
b) in the circumstances and time available to him for reflection; 
c) could be of the opinion that the prevention of the risk of harm to which 
others might be exposed if the suspect were allowed to escape, justified 
exposing the suspect to the risk of harm that might result from the kind of force 
the accused contemplated using?621 
 
5.37 In other words, the answer to the question of whether reasonable force had been 
used in the circumstances, is a matter of fact for the jury to decide.622 So in every 
                                                        
617 Attorney General of Northern Ireland’s Reference [1977] AC 105,138F. 
618 Brice Dickson, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Conflict in Northern 
Ireland (Oxford University Press 2010) 251. 
619 Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1968 s48A. The question asked was as follows: 
‘Whether a crime is committed when a member of the security forces shoots to kill or seriously 
wound a person believed to be a member of a proscribed organisation in the course of his attempted 
escape.’ 
620 This was prior to Beckford (n614) and the need for the belief to be honestly held.  
621 Attorney General of Northern Ireland’s Reference [1976] NI 169, 207. [Attorney General of 
Northern Ireland’s Reference Case] 
622 Or Diplock Judge. 
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case the focus is to judge, after the fact, whether the defendant used reasonable 
force in the circumstances and if he did then to acquit him. 
 
5.38 The most obvious criticism of the ordinary criminal law is that it is too vague and 
gives insufficient clear guidance to the Security Forces as to when they may open 
fire. An ordinary soldier or policeman on the ground would need more detailed 
guidance when asking himself the question; in what circumstances can I open 
fire? In fact, in terms of providing guidance on future conduct it has been 
described as ‘totally useless’.623 The message provided by the House of Lords in 
the Attorney General of Northern Ireland’s Reference case624 seems to be that 
soldiers can open fire in any situation where they can subsequently convince the 
court that their actions were reasonable. In other words, the House of Lords 
refused ‘to set any standard whatever as to when lethal force may be justified’.625 
 
5.39 Guidance is required in various situations. The first is what level of harm must the 
victim threaten before lethal force can be used against him. So, for example, does 
the threat need to involve a risk to life or could it be a risk to property? The 
second is does the threat posed by the victim need to be an imminent threat? 
Interestingly Lord Diplock considered whether or not the threat needed to be 
imminent and concluded that:  
 
The defendant was entitled to take into account not only the short-term threat 
but (…) the killing or wounding of members of the patrol by terrorist in 
ambush, and the effect of this success by members of the Provisional IRA in 
encouraging the continuance of the armed insurrection and all the misery and 
destruction of life and property that terrorist activity in Northern Ireland 
entailed.626  
 
5.40 If this were taken to its logical conclusion it would provide a large amount of 
protection for those who shot terrorists on sight from facing criminal 
                                                        
623 Stannard (n615) 160.  
624 Attorney General of Northern Ireland’s Reference Case (n620)  
625 Stannard (n615) 159.  
626 Attorney General of Northern Ireland’s Reference (No.1 of 1975) [1976] 2 ALL ER 937, 947. 
[Attorney General of Northern Ireland’s Reference Case ALL ER] 
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prosecutions. A third situation where further guidance is required is in relation to 
the probability of the perceived threat. Does the threat need to be a near certainty 
before lethal force can be used or is it good enough that the threat perceived is 
probable or even just likely? 
 
5.41 Not surprisingly s3 of the Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967 was judged 
to be too vague to provide effective guidance to members of the Security Forces 
on the use of force. The British Army therefore issued the Yellow Card 627 to all 
soldiers deployed in Northern Ireland. The Yellow Card was supposed to provide 
more detailed guidance and was issued for soldier’s protection. The Yellow Card 
was a set of standing instructions issued to and carried by each soldier in Northern 
Ireland to give him guidance on when he could open fire.  
 
5.42 The Yellow Card gave instructions to soldiers ‘operating collectively’, a term not 
defined, not to open fire without an order from the Commander on the spot. The 
Yellow Card also gave instructions to soldiers ‘acting individually’, again a term 
not defined, that they are generally required to give warning before opening fire 
and are subject to other general rules which provide inter alia: 
 
Never use more force than the minimum necessary to enable you to carry out 
your duties. 
 
Always first try to handle the situation by other means than opening fire. If you 
have to fire: 
(a) Fire only aimed shots. 
(b) Do not fire more rounds than are absolutely necessary to achieve your aim. 
 
5.43 In addition, the Yellow Card also contemplated a situation in which it is not 
practicable to give a warning. It provided: 
 
You may fire without warning: 
                                                        
627 Ministry of Defence, Instructions by the Director of Operations for Opening Fire in Northern 
Ireland Army Code No 70771 (London: HMSO 1980). Formally called the Instructions by the 
Director of Operations for Opening Fire in Northern Ireland. It was known as the Yellow Card 
because of the colour of the paper it was printed on.  
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Either when hostile firing is taking place in your area, and a warning is 
impracticable, or when any delay could lead to death or serious injury to 
people whom it is your duty to protect or to yourself; and then only: 
(a) against a person using a firearm against members of the security forces or 
people whom it is your duty to protect; or 
(b) against a person carrying a firearm if you have reason to think he is about 
to use it for offensive purposes. 
 
5.44 Lord Lowry, C.J. commented on the status of the Yellow Card in R v 
MacNaughton628 and noted that the overriding duty of a soldier is to obey the civil 
rather the military law and he commented that: 
 
There was, of course, at the same time in existence what is called the yellow 
card; something the contents of which, it seems are largely dictated by policy 
and are intended to lay down guidelines for the security forces but which do 
not define the legal rights and obligations of members of the forces under 
statute or common law.629   
 
5.45 Desmond Hamill has suggested that the idea behind issuing the Yellow Card ‘was 
to draw the top line of what [a soldier] could do well below the top line of what 
the law said he could do’.630 However, it is unfortunate that the Yellow Card was 
not much clearer than the law. Evelegh describes it as a ‘complex document that 
required amendment from time to time and at one time contained 23 fairly 
elaborate paragraphs’. 631  Hamill describes it as a ‘cumbersome set of 
instructions’.632 The Widgery Report tends to confirm this analysis stating ‘that it 
would be optimistic to suppose that every soldier could be trained to understand 
them in detail and apply them rigidly’.633  
                                                        
628R v MacNaughton [1976] N.I. 203. 
629 ibid 206. 
630 Desmond Hamill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984 (Methuen 1985) 
49.  
631 Evelegh (n542)163. 
632 Hamill (n630) 50. 
633 Report of the Tribunal Appointed to Inquire in the Events on Sunday, 30 January 1972, which 
led to the loss of life in Connection with the Procession in Londonderry on that day (HL 101, HC 




5.46 The instructions detailed on the Yellow Card, according to the Widgery Report, 
‘leave certain questions unanswered and, perhaps, unanswerable’.634 The Report 
identified various ways in which the Yellow Card instructions were vague. Firstly, 
the report stated that:  
 
The Yellow Card instructions failed to make it clear that if a soldier opens 
fire defensively and restricts fire to that which is necessary whether that 
means the soldier should fire until the attacker desists and withdraws or 
whether the soldier should treat the attacker as an enemy in battle and 
continue to fire until he surrenders or he is killed.635 
 
5.47 Secondly, the Report pointed out that the Yellow Card instructions are vague in 
relation to when opening fire is to be withheld on account of risk to others in the 
vicinity who are not themselves carrying or using firearms. The Report gives the 
example of a soldier facing a crowd of youths throwing stones where only one in 
the crowd is identified as holding a nail bomb. ‘Is the soldier facing the crowd to 
hold his fire because of risk to those who are only throwing stones?’636 
 
5.48 Thirdly, the Report stated that the Yellow Card instructions ‘are vague in 
situations where soldiers are facing hostile fire and unsure whether a firearm is 
being used’.637 How sure does a soldier need to be before he opens fire? ‘Faced 
with such a situation does the soldier wait or does he give himself the benefit of 
the doubt and fire?’638 
 
5.49 Like the British Army, the RUC also operated under the normal law and under 
Force Instructions. The Force Instructions given to members of the RUC were the 
equivalent of the Yellow Card given to British Army soldiers. The Force 
Instructions were not made public during the Troubles but they have now been 
                                                        
634 ibid.  
635 ibid.  
636 ibid.  
637 ibid.  
638 ibid.  
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made available.639 The Force Instructions are very similar to the Yellow Card and 
have the same legal status. They can be understood as written orders or a policy 
document. The Force Instructions normally require a warning to be given before 
shots are fired just like the Yellow Card. The Force Instructions also deal with 
situations where a warning is not possible.  
 
5.50 The Force Instructions640 include the following sections: 
 
Section 2 
The application of the law by the Courts 
 
1. The question whether the amount of force used to effect an arrest or prevent 
the commission of a crime is reasonable in the circumstances is a question of 
fact not of law. The test to be applied is whether the conduct fell short of the 
standard to be expected of the reasonable man having regard to all the 
circumstances of the case. 
2. The use of force by an officer is subject to ALL of the following conditions: 
a) it is necessary, i.e. the objective cannot be achieved in any other way; and  
b) the amount of force used will be reasonable in the circumstances; 
c) only the minimum amount of force necessary to achieve the objective will 
be used; and  
d) the amount of force used will be in proportion to the seriousness of the   
case.  
3. As a guide, it is only in exceptional circumstances that the use of a firearm 
against a person will meet all four conditions set out at 2 (2). 
4. Warning before firing.  
4(1) In general a warning must be given before firing and should be as loud as 
possible. 
5. You may fire without warning. 
5(1) When hostile firing is taking place in your area, and a warning is 
impracticable: 
                                                        
639 FOI Request Reference F-2016-00347. Force Instructions reprinted in 1988 Section 34 entitled 





a) against a person using a firearm in circumstances which endanger life; or 
b) against a person carrying what you can positively identify as a firearm if he 
is clearly about to use it in circumstances which will endanger life or cause 
serious injury; or 
c) at a vehicle if the occupants open fire or throw a bomb at you or those 
whom it is your duty to protect, or are clearly about to do so; or 
d) where a warning would increase the risk of death or serious injury to you or 
any other person; or 
e) you or some other person has already come under armed attack; and there is 
no other way to protect yourself or others from the danger of being killed or 
seriously injured. 
 
5.51 One difference between the Yellow Card and the Force Instructions is that the 
Force Instructions allow the RUC to fire warning shots in situations where a 
verbal warning would not be heard. The Parker Report commented on the fact that 
soldiers were not allowed to fire warning shots stating that ‘the justification put 
forward for this somewhat surprising provision is that hooligans would rapidly 
note and take advantage of the regular firing of shots meant to pass harmlessly by; 
the carrying of firearms would cease to deter’.641 The RUC clearly did not find 
this argument persuasive. Presumably all the criticisms made in the Widgery 
Report of the Yellow Card are equally applicable to the Force Instructions. They 
failed to provide an answer to the question, ‘When can I open fire?’ 
 
5.52 Another difference between the Force Instructions and the Yellow Card is that the 
Force Instructions identify when firearms are not to be used. 
 
Section 6 Firearms not to be used. 
 
6(1) Firearms will not be used against: 
                                                        
641 Report of the committee of Privy Counsellors appointed to consider authorised procedures for 
the interrogation of persons suspected of terrorism (Cmd 4901, 1972) London: HMSO para 93. 
(The Parker Report) 
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a) any person or vehicle if all the conditions for the use of such extreme force 
are not met; or 
b) any person who is merely suspected of a crime; or 
c) a vehicle merely because it has failed to stop for a signal at a road check. 
 
5.53 If the legislation on the use of force necessitated the creation of the Yellow Card 
and Force Instructions then clearly the law was failing in its function to provide 
guidance. In addition to being too vague, another criticism levelled at the ordinary 
criminal law is that it failed to deal adequately with situations where members of 
the Security Forces used excessive force.642 The suggestion is that the legislation 
itself was weighted against getting a conviction in circumstances where lethal 
force was used but where a lesser degree of force was the appropriate response. 
This is because the ordinary criminal law allowed for only two possible verdicts.  
If a soldier honestly believed that lethal force was necessary then he should be 
judged on the facts as he believed them to be and he must be acquitted whether or 
not his belief was reasonable.643 If he is not believed, then he must be convicted 
of murder. The reasonableness of the defendant’s belief is relevant to the question 
whether the defendant held that belief at all.  Since the more unreasonable the 
facts believed by the defendant are, the more likely it is that the defendant will not 
be believed. 
 
5.54 The problem is that there is no lesser crime for which he can be convicted and this 
was confirmed in the case of Beckford.644 So in the situation where a member of 
the Security Forces overreacts and uses lethal force unjustifiably he must either be 
convicted of murder and be given a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment or 
acquitted and allowed to go free.645 The problem is that the court may find a life 
sentence too harsh in the circumstances and freedom too lenient.  
 
                                                        
642 Sean Doran, ‘The Doctrine of Excessive Force’ (1985) 36 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 
314. 
643 R v Williams (Gladstone) [1987] 3 All ER 411. 
644 Beckford (n614). 
645 R v McInnes (Walter) [1971] 3 All ER 295. 
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5.55 In order to avoid this situation, certain common law jurisdictions 646  have 
developed the doctrine of excessive defence. The doctrine of excessive defence 
states that if a soldier has used excessive force and killed his victim in 
circumstances where some force would have been justified, but not lethal force, 
then the member of the Security Forces should be convicted of manslaughter and 
not murder. However, ‘excessive defence clearly forms no part of the law in 
Northern Ireland’.647  
 
5.56 In a situation where a soldier is accused of murder it is almost inevitable that a 
court is going to give the benefit of any doubt to a soldier doing what is 
undeniably a very tough job involving great personal risk. It is also the case that 
judges at the time came almost entirely from the Protestant community. In 1976 
Protestants held 68 of the 74 senior court appointments648 and were consequently 
likely to be naturally sympathetic towards members of the Security Forces who 
they viewed as fighting terrorism.649 Huw Bennett states that ‘those cases that did 
make it to the court were treated sympathetically’. 650 Lord Guthrie summed up 
the position more recently saying, ‘Frightened, tired young men in dangerous 
situations don’t always react as wisely as someone sitting in an armchair in 
London thinks they should. But provided they acted in good faith. We should do 
all we can to back them up.’651  
 
5.57 It is therefore possible to argue that the legislation itself worked against successful 
prosecutions by not allowing a verdict of something less than murder but more 
than a complete acquittal. In doing so the legislation made the chance of a soldier 
being convicted of murder much less likely. This in turn may have undermined 
the effectiveness of the law in controlling decisions made by soldiers.  
                                                        
646 India, Canada, Australia and Ireland.  
647 Stannard (n615) 150.  
648 Laura Donahue, ‘Terrorism and Trial by Jury, the Vices and Virtues of British and American 
Criminal Law’ (2007) 59 Stanford Law Review 1321, 1338. 
649 This is not to say that the judges were biased and acted on the basis of those biases but rather 
they had in-built sympathy towards the Security Forces. 
650 Bennett (n549) 288.  
651 Thomas Harding, Toby Helm, Joshua Rozenberg, ‘Blair and Goldsmith accused over court 
martial of Col. Mendonca’ The Daily Telegraph (London, 21 July 2006). 
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The Investigation Process 
 
5.58 In relation to the third function of law, that is the provision of transparent 
processes in the justice system, the first question is, did the law provide those 
working within the justice system, both investigating and prosecuting, with a 
clearly understood process? The second question is, did it provide those in the 
court system a clear framework by which actions can be assessed and appropriate 
sentences handed down? 
 
5.59 The outcome of a trial is dependent on a string of separate decisions not just the 
final verdict by the Diplock Judge or a jury. It is dependent on the collection of 
evidence, the selection of charges, through to the plea-bargaining process in 
which the defendant may offer to plead guilty to some charges in return for a 
withdrawal of others or an indication of likely sentence. It may be that the 
procedures used to investigate deaths involving the British Army in Northern 
Ireland may also go some way to explain the low conviction rates in relation to 
the use of lethal force by soldiers.  
 
5.60 It is claimed that ‘the initial police investigation of killings was often 
inadequate’.652 This is partly due to the sheer numbers of killings that the RUC 
were dealing with but more importantly it may be, at least in part, due to the 
informal arrangement that existed between 1970 and 1973 between the British 
Army and the police. These informal arrangements, referred to sometimes as the 
‘Tea and Sandwiches Inquiries’ 653  involved splitting responsibility for any 
investigation into the use of lethal force by soldiers between the British Army and 
the Police.  The British Army, specifically the Special Investigations Branch of 
the Royal Military Police,654 was given responsibility for interviewing the soldiers 
while the police retained responsibility for interviewing the civilian witnesses and 
conducting all other aspects of the investigation. In other words, the Chief 
Constable delegated the responsibility for interviewing the principle suspects to 
the Royal Military Police and by doing so removed an opportunity for 
                                                        
652 Lundy, Rolston (n557) 110.  
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independent scrutiny. The 154 investigations involving the Royal Military Police 
resulted in no convictions. 655 But perhaps more disturbing is the fact that ‘in at 
least two cases soldiers gave false statements to the police, including an instance 
when soldiers bent the facts to fit the Yellow Card rules - on the advice of SIB 
police interviewers’.656 
 
5.61 This informal arrangement presents various issues.657 In 2003 these arrangements 
were judicially reviewed and in the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland, 
Queens Bench Division, Sir Brian Kerr decided that the death of Mrs. Kathleen 
Thompson had not be effectively investigated and found it questionable as to 
whether a Chief Constable could delegate responsibility for part of the 
investigation in this way.658 
 
5.62 Some light was shed on the arrangement in the Bloody Sunday Inquiry.659 In the 
Bloody Sunday Inquiry soldiers giving evidence were referred to by a code to 
ensure their anonymity. The former member of the Royal Military Police referred 
to as INQ 3 stated that soldiers were not interviewed under caution and were 
treated as eye–witnesses rather that suspects. He went on to say that ‘it was not a 
very formal procedure; we usually discussed the incident over sandwiches and 
tea’.660 
 
5.63 If this informal arrangement weighted the investigation in favour of an acquittal, 
then the extent that it did so is clearly problematic. However, there is an 
alternative interpretation of the process. Evelegh states that under s28 (1) of the 
                                                        
655 Lundy, Rolston (n557) 120.  
656 The National Archive (TNA): Public Record Office (PRO), DEFE 70/13 Lm from R. C. Kent 
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Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973661 all members of the military 
police were also constables under the command of the RUC.662 Members of the 
Royal Military Police, who undertook investigations into incidents involving 
lethal force, did so in their role as constables and took their orders from members 
of the RUC who were in charge of the investigation. 663  Soldiers being 
investigated for using lethal force were immediately ordered to give statements to 
the Special Investigation Branch of the Military Police in their role as 
constables. 664  These statements formed part of the evidence chain and were 
handed over to the RUC who in turn handed them over to the DPP. The 
statements could then be used in a court of law. Only when a soldier became a 
suspect, was he cautioned665 but by that time it was too late. The soldier had been 
denied his right to silence and denied any legal advice, two of his basic legal 
rights.666 This would suggest the process is weighted in favour of a conviction. 
However, the fact remains that conviction rates in relation to the use of lethal 
force were very low.  
 
The Prosecution Process 
 
5.64 Once the police had concluded their investigation then they made 
recommendations as to the actual charges laid and then handed the file over to the 
DPP to determine if charges were to be brought and if so which ones. 667 The 
decision to charge and what to charge was very much dependent on what evidence 
had been presented in the file. The DPP could ask for further evidence to be 
collected but routinely the decision was made based on the evidence contained in 
                                                        
661 s28(1) states that ‘in this Act except so far as the context otherwise requires ‘constable’ includes 
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662 Evelegh (n542) 87. 
663 ibid. 
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the file as the DPP received it. 668  In some cases, ‘those cases of ‘extreme 
difficulty’ where the public interest was involved, the DPP could refer to the 
Attorney General’.669  
 
5.65 So, the process looks quite straightforward on the face of it. The joint military-
police investigation handed the evidence they had collected over to an 
independent DPP for a charging decision and in difficult cases the DPP invited 
guidance from the Attorney General. However, Huw Bennett claims that the 
system was not as transparent as it might first appear. Firstly, the Attorney 
General intervened in June 1972 at the request of the DPP because the DPP 
believed that the police were not sending him all the files relating to offences 
committed by the Security Forces.670 Secondly, a belief in the independence of the 
DPP is perhaps misplaced since in June 1972 the DPP announced a general 
intention to refuse charges against members of the Security Forces who injure or 
kill civilians when on duty.671 The independence of the Attorney General has also 
been called into question. Recounting his conversation with the Attorney General 
in a letter to General Sir Cecil Blacker in January 1974, General Frank King said 
that the DPP and the Attorney General had been Army officers themselves and 
knew first-hand the difficulties and dangers faced by soldiers and as a 
consequence were ‘by no means unsympathetic or lacking understanding in their 
approach to soldier prosecutions in Northern Ireland’.672 
 
5.66 In addition, the letter from General Frank King to General Sir Cecil Blacker 
throws some light on the involvement of senior officers in the decision to 
prosecute. In the letter, General Frank King recounted a conversation he had had 
with the Attorney General in 1974. In the conversation, the Attorney General had 
told General King that in fact ‘directions not to prosecute had been given in more 
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than a few cases where the evidence, to say the least, had been borderline’.673 This 
looks like a clear admission that the Attorney General was prepared to ‘bend’ the 
law.  
 
5.67 There is also some evidence that the senior British Army officers attempted to 
interfere with the legal process by ‘leaning’ on the DPP and the Attorney General 
in order to prevent prosecutions.674 For example, General Frank King (GOC) is 
known to have raised his concerns over using the ordinary law to prosecute 
soldiers with the Conservative Attorney General Sir Peter Rawlinson in 1974.675 
He claimed that his men might become disinclined to act aggressively for fear of 
facing prosecution and imprisonment. The Attorney General tried to reassure 
General King that he reviewed all these cases personally and that less than 10% of 
them proceeded to trial. In his conversation with the Attorney General, General 
King also raised concerns in two individual cases attempting to dissuade the 
Attorney General from prosecuting in both cases. In the case of Sergeant 
Crossland the Attorney General agreed to discontinue proceedings but refused to 
bow to pressure in the other case relating to Private Ross. The reasoning in the 
case of Sergeant Crossland seems to be that Sergeant Crossland was accused of 
assaulting a civilian and although he ought to have been brought before a civil 
court, he had in fact been dealt with under military law. The fact that he had been 
dealt with under military law precluded a civil prosecution. It is hardly surprising 
that it is claimed ‘that at times during the conflict immunity was afforded to 
soldiers … who would otherwise have faced prosecution’.676 
 
5.68 At a later meeting the DPP, the Attorney General and the Director of Army Legal 
Services agreed to put in place a series of other measures giving the Army an 
opportunity to influence any decisions made in relation to soldiers facing possible 
prosecutions. These measures included providing background reports to the DPP, 
allowing a three-way consultation between the Army Legal Services, the DPP and 
Attorney General, and giving the GOC NI a right to make representations to the 
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Attorney General when the British Army believed a prosecution was not in the 
public interest. In addition, the DPP could ask the Attorney General to obtain 
further information from the British Army to help in making a decision as to 
whether a prosecution was in the public interest.677  
 
5.69 Despite these not insignificant concessions, General King still believed that 
military jurisdiction was the real solution. 678 How these measures worked in 
practice requires further research. How often did the pressure brought by the 
Army using these measures succeed in stopping a prosecution? Were these 
arrangements ever formalised in a policy document outlining guidelines for their 
use? At the very least, it seems clear that soldiers were not treated like other 
citizens accused of violent crimes. In other words, there was one law for the 
Security Forces and another law for everyone else. At worst the arrangements 
were illegal since they have no legal basis and even if not illegal, then these 
measures indicate a willingness at the top of the justice system to bend the law 
when required.  
 
5.70 In relation to the European Convention 679  there is ‘clear authority from the 
domestic courts the RMP investigations, when judged by the standards of 1971-72 
did not meet legal requirements under Article 2’.680 Pablo de Grieff, the United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and 
guarantees of non-recurrence stated that the ‘impunity gap in Northern Ireland 
does not come so much from early release as from apparent selectivity in the 
deployment of prosecutorial resources’.681  
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5.71 The investigation and the prosecution process were far from either ‘normal’ or 
transparent. For the soldiers on the street, the fact that they knew they were 
unlikely to be convicted of a crime must have undermined the legal constraints on 
their behaviour.  
 
The Role of the Coroners Courts 
 
5.72 The influence of an independent-minded coroner in Northern Ireland, which could 
have provided some balance in the system, had been gradually eroded. The 
process began more than ten years before British troops arrived on the streets of 
Northern Ireland when Coroners Courts lost their ability to deliver a verdict of 
unlawful killing at inquests. Further limits were placed on the Coroner in 1980 
following the recommendations of the Broderick Report. 682  These amended 
procedures for coroners were introduced in Northern Ireland but nowhere else in 
the United Kingdom.  They removed the possibility of the coroner returning an 
open verdict. An open verdict is given when the coroner believes that the victim 
did not kill himself but does not know who did. Instead the new procedures meant 
that the coroner could only return a ‘finding’ saying ‘when, where and how that 
person had died’.683  
 
5.73 In addition, the 1980 amendments also removed the obligation from coroners in 
Northern Ireland to call everybody considered ‘expedient’ to the death. This 
change in the law meant that soldiers involved in fatal shootings could no longer 
be compelled to appear before the coroner at an inquest. Instead they could 
provide a written statement to the court. Mark Urban also claims that before 
officers from the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) interviewed any 
soldiers, the soldiers went into consultation with Army Legal Officer who 
remained with the soldiers throughout the interview with CID.684 Urban claims 
that the soldiers statements were prepared under the guidance of the Army Legal 
Officer who knew how to write a statement which would persuade the coroner’s 
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jury that the amount of force used had been reasonable in the circumstance.685 
This he claims is why so many soldier’s statements mentioned seeing the victim 
making ‘turning and reaching movements, assumed to be attempts to grab either a 
gun or a remote control device for a bomb’.686 
 
5.74 The significance of these various amendments to the legislation was that the 
decision to prosecute a member of the Security Forces would be made by the DPP 
that in turn would be based on a police investigation. ‘The possibility of an 
independent-minded coroner influencing such a decision was removed.’ 687 The 
suspicion is that the decision was yet again loaded against prosecuting soldiers.  
 
The Use of Civil Actions for Damages  
 
5.75 One way of trying to assess the extent to which the criminal law exercised 
restraint on soldiers is to look at civil actions for damages and compare the 
outcomes in both jurisdictions. In other words, assuming that the low conviction 
rates for soldiers was the result of a failure of the criminal justice system to 
properly hold soldiers to account, then a better measure of criminal behaviour by 
soldiers may be the number of awards made in civil cases.   
 
5.76 The unjustified use of force may result in a criminal prosecution against an 
individual soldier but alternatively it may result in an action for damages against 
the MOD in which a soldier’s alleged tort will be the basis of the action. So even 
if there is no criminal prosecution or the defendant is acquitted in a criminal trial, 
the defendant may still be held liable in tort.688 Huw Bennett claims that civil 
litigation is ‘a better proxy measure for assessing military misbehaviour’.689 One 
of the reasons for this is that in a civil action it is for the victim or his family to 
decide whether to bring proceedings. Whereas in criminal proceedings, the 
decision to prosecute is made behind closed-doors and very rarely involves the 
victim or his family’s wishes.  
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5.77 However, using awards made in civil cases as a measure of criminal behaviour 
requires caution. There is an evidentiary difference between criminal and civil 
law. In criminal cases the bar is set much higher. The defendant can only be 
convicted where the evidence proves guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In civil cases 
the standard is lowered to the balance of probabilities. In addition, out-of-court 
settlements, with no acceptance of liability, may be attractive to the MOD because 
they are cheaper than running a trial and produce less adverse publicity. So, 
equating such payments with guilt could be misleading.  
 
5.78 That said, during the Troubles a substantial number of civil proceedings were 
issued against the MOD for alleged abuses committed by members of the Security 
Forces.  It was described as ‘A Full–scale Campaign of Harassment by Claims.’690 
Settlements were usually made without any admission as to liability. During the 
period up to 1975, the MOD had settled 410 cases out of the 6,000 claims it had 
received. The figure of 410 settlements compared to the figure of less than 100 
convictions provides a very different picture of the level of offending within the 
military.  
 
5.79 The distinction between the civil and the criminal proceedings is brought into 
sharp relief in the case of Patrick McElhone.691 In this case a soldier was acquitted 
of shooting Patrick McElhorne, who had no connections with any paramilitary 
group, when he attempted to escape from a British Army patrol in County Tyrone 
in August 1974. By contrast, in August 1975 the Secretary of State for Defence 
agreed to pay compensation to the family of Patrick McElhorne. This was because 
‘Crown Counsel advised that a civil court would find for the plaintiff on the 
balance of probabilities, and recommended settling out of court.’692  
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5.80 It has been suggested actions for damages ‘appear to have replaced criminal 
prosecutions as the usual means of holding the user of weapons accountable’.693  
The use of actions for damages may have been a method of getting compensation 
for the victim’s family and hurting the MOD through negative publicity and costs 
but it is more difficult to claim that it held the individual soldier to account or that 
the possibility of such action could influence the behaviour of a soldiers patrolling 
the streets or manning a checkpoint.  
 
5.81 Looking at the civil awards made does tend to undermine the government’s 
position that soldiers acted within the law. It also adds weight to the contention 
that the ordinary criminal law was inadequate when dealing with soldiers standing 
accused of crimes committed while on duty. The reasons for its inadequacy are 
not just the way the law was formulated but also includes the fact that the 
investigation process lacked independence and transparency, as did the decision to 
prosecute. In addition, the courts were sympathetic to the soldier’s position when 
soldiers opened fire. Overall it does seem clear that the ordinary criminal law did 
fall short of the ideal model – in exercising control, providing guidance and 
giving the prosecuting authorities a clear framework in which to produce 
satisfactory outcomes in each case. 
 
5.82 This chapter examined the extent to which the law held individual uniformed 
soldiers patrolling the streets of Northern Ireland to account.  There is evidence to 
suggest that the legal framework and the entire process from investigation to 
prosecution before a Diplock Judge, made successful prosecutions of soldiers 
accused of serious offences more difficult than they ought to have been. Huw 
Bennett argues that this was well understood by the soldiers ‘who knew that their 
chances of getting away with it were reasonably good’.694 The suggestion is that 
because soldiers understood this to be the case, they were less likely to be 
constrained by the law. The next chapter will look at the extent to which the law 
regulated covert operations undertaken by the Security Forces.  
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Chapter 5: The Legal Basis of Covert Operations in Northern Ireland 
during The Troubles 
 
6.1 In addition to overt operations the British Army and the RUC were also involved 
in covert operations. From the earliest days of the Troubles the British authorities 
were keen to penetrate the IRA’s network. 695  Initially the British Army, in 
collaboration with the RUC, gathered intelligence to forestall terrorist activities 
and carry out arrests, but after the introduction of internment in August 1971 the 
RUC left these tasks to the British Army. In August 1971, each of the three 
brigades stationed in Northern Ireland set up a Military Reaction Force (MRF) to 
take over clandestine intelligence gathering. In late 1972, the undercover activity 
was centralised and the 14th Intelligence Company was established under the 
direct control of General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland (GOC NI). Its 
role involved surveillance and undercover patrols. It originally had 120 personnel 
but this number grew to around 250 by the late 1980s.696 The 22nd Special Air 
Service (SAS) were sent into Northern Ireland (South Armagh only) on the 6 
January 1976.697 Later that year the SAS were deployed across Northern Ireland. 
The SAS operated mainly in uniform undertaking close observation patrols or 
were deployed as ‘snatch squads’ to arrest terrorist suspects.698  
 
6.2 The numbers involved in clandestine operations in the British Army were 
relatively small compared to the number of soldiers and policemen in uniform. 
Evelegh claims that in 1974 the Metropolitan Police had 18 per cent of its strength 
operating in plain clothes and makes the point that if the British Army was 
expected to take on the role of the police then a similar percentage would be 
needed for the Security Forces to be effective. 699 This was not achieved. He 
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suggests the numbers were low principally because there was legal uncertainty 
about the use of soldiers operating in civilian clothes within the United Kingdom. 
Evelegh claims that the confusion arose because soldiers prosecuting a war 
against an external enemy are required to be in uniform and that requirement was 
wrongly extended to soldiers dealing with domestic terrorism. He suggests that 
had the question of legality been put before a court then the court would have 
certainly determined that the practice was lawful and the British Army could have 
better utilised this ‘highly effective mode of operation’.700 The point he is making 
here is that the legal framework failed to provide effective access to the courts. 
The British Army believed that it was operating in a ‘legal grey zone’ and chose 
to be cautious.  By doing so it could be argued that the British Army displayed an 
uncharacteristic respect for the law.  
 
6.3 Overt operations involve foot-patrols, vehicle checkpoints, aerial surveillance, and 
sentries in public places. Covert operations, on the other hand, involve clandestine 
intelligence-gathering missions.701  The Pattern Report describes covert policing 
as governing interception, surveillance, informants and undercover operations. 
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 governs the interception of 
communications, surveillance, as well as the use of agents and informants. These 
clandestine activities were undertaken within the British Army by undercover 
units, 702  principally the Force Research Unit (FRU) and the 14th Intelligence 
Company,703 alongside uniformed members of the SAS and Close Observation 
Platoons (COP) that operated within each battalion stationed in Northern Ireland. 
In addition, after 1976 the Royal Ulster Constabulary Special Branch (RUC SB) 
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also undertook undercover operations. In fact, RUC SB had the largest network of 
informers in Ulster after 1976.704 
 
6.4 The aim of intelligence-gathering operations is to collect human intelligence 
(HUMINT) and this is done in three ways. The first is through reconnaissance and 
surveillance missions.  Individuals, their homes, vehicles and weapons caches are 
placed under secret observation. This could involve electronic surveillance such 
as phone tapping or cameras, static surveillance from observation posts or by 
mobile surveillance teams tracking targets either on foot or in vehicles. In addition 
to surveillance missions, HUMINT can be gathered by undercover members of 
the Security Forces either infiltrating the terrorist organisation or by recruiting 
informants from within terrorist organisations.  
 
6.5 These legitimate activities are not to be confused with ‘deniable’ operations such 
as ‘false-flag’705 missions and assassinations, both of which are clearly illegal. 
But this distinction between legitimate and illegitimate operations is difficult to 
draw if the covert operations are not conducted under a clear legal framework.  
 
6.6 In Northern Ireland, there was also a pervasive view that undercover units were 
less professional and less disciplined than soldiers in uniform and were 
consequently viewed with suspicion. The consensus seems to be that the use of 
clandestine units ‘pose[d] problems of command, control, and accountability’.706 
The argument is that lines of administrative responsibility for these covert units 
become blurred and consequently there was often no clear chain of command. 
Given the covert nature of the activities, without a clear chain of command and a 
defined legal framework it has been suggested that ‘there is an increased risk of 
Security Forces units “going rogue” with grave consequences for the stability of a 
democracy’. 707  Nevertheless, Evelegh states that ‘Most of the vital arrests, 
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identifications and locations of terrorists were largely due to the tiny numbers of 
soldiers permitted to operate, under heavy restrictions, in plain clothes.’708  
 
6.7 Daniel Holder describes two approaches to agent running.709 The first is the ‘law 
enforcement’ approach and the second he describes as the ‘counter-insurgency’ 
approach. In the law enforcement approach agents are used by the State to gather 
information that is then used to save people’s lives and in time bring those 
involved in criminal activity before a court. Informants are prohibited from 
involvement in serious crime, the intelligence they gather is used to protect and 
warn people under threat, and all investigations are carried out to ensure the law is 
enforced. In addition, there is independent oversight and a complaints process in 
place.  
 
6.8 This approach is distinguished from the ‘counter-insurgency’ approach where one 
life is worth more than another and some people are protected and others are not. 
‘Informants are either, permitted, facilitated or directed to be involved in crimes 
including murder.’710 This is done on the understanding that those crimes will not 
be fully investigated by the State, allowing the informants to operate with 
impunity. The informants are in effect operating above the law. This approach 
could involve strengthening those paramilitary organisations with objectives that 
align with the States objectives, as well as trying to defeat paramilitary 
organisations with a different agenda.  
 
6.9 The kind of intelligence that is being sought through clandestine operations falls 
into three broad categories. The first is ‘political intelligence’ which includes 
identifying the political aims of the relevant organisation. The second is 
‘operational intelligence’ which includes most importantly intelligence on 
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planned terrorist attacks. The third is ‘criminal intelligence’ which includes 
evidence that can be used to support a successful prosecution.711 
 
6.10 Covert operations present the State with an effective method of fighting terrorists. 
‘The British counter-insurgency experience has demonstrated that at the heart of 
every eventual campaign ‘success’ lay an efficient, decentralised and well-
integrated intelligence network.’ 712  It has been variously described as the 
‘lifeblood of anti-terrorism operations’713 and ‘a potent weapon for the state in 
countering terrorism of the kind that prevailed during the Troubles.’ 714  The 
Army’s Manual of Land Operations Volume III – Counter-Revolutionary 
Operations (Northern Ireland is defined as a counter-revolutionary conflict) was 
published in 1977 and it states that ‘intelligence is the key to success’.715 
 
6.11 Using intelligence gathered covertly can paralyse a terrorist organisation. The 
Security Forces can frustrate planned attacks by discovering weapons caches and 
arresting ringleaders, in addition to making communications between terrorists 
difficult. What is also true is that even a hint of treachery within a terrorist 
organisation can cause the terrorists to turn on one another. Mark Urban makes 
the point that ‘young volunteers joining the IRA in the 1980s were almost as 
likely to die at the hands of their own comrades through accusations of informing 
as they were to be killed by the SAS’.716 Urban quotes some statistics relating to 
deaths of IRA volunteers by other members of the IRA. He claims that between 
1979 and 1981 the IRA killed eight informers whereas between them the RUC 
and the Army killed just five IRA members.717 He goes on to say that between 
‘1978 and 1987 at least 24 informers or members suspected of informing were 
killed by the Provisionals which is almost the same number [that] were killed by 
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the SAS in the same period’. 718  Of course, the Security Forces ran covert 
operations against both Republican and Loyalist paramilitary organisations, but 
the IRA was the primary focus of British Army covert operations.719 The IRA 
understood the threat posed by informers and agents. Sinn Fein published an 
article in 1974 entitled ‘Loose Talk can be Fatal’ in its monthly newspaper ‘An 
Phoblacht’ or Republican News. In the article it was conceded that, ‘The greatest 
weapon England has is that of the informer. Without [them] it is possible that the 
people of Ireland would have had full control over their country a long time 
ago.’720 
 
6.12 Geraint Hughes makes the point that because of the small size of PIRA even small 
successes in relation to recruitment of informers translated into ‘disproportionate 
rates of attrition’. 721  The numbers of volunteers in the IRA (and its splinter 
groups) did not remain static over the duration of the Troubles and in any case the 
numbers involved are disputed. Moloney claims that ‘In 1969 the entire 
movement would have been hard pressed to mobilise more than 50 volunteers.’722  
However, after that date the figures seem to hover in the low hundreds. The figure 
of two hundred and fifty to three hundred and fifty members has been suggested 
by Urban,723 whereas Geraint Hughes quotes a slightly higher figure of three to 
four hundred members.724 In 1972 during Operation Motorman, Tom Siegriste 
claims that in West Belfast just 50 IRA ‘regulars’ faced more than 8,000 British 
troops. 725  Martin McGuiness on the other hand is quoted as saying that 
‘throughout the Troubles ‘10,000 people had been through the ranks of the IRA 
over the years’.726  
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6.13 The problem with handling informants is that it will inevitably involve unenviable 
ethical dilemmas. Each stage of the process presents different dilemmas. The first 
stage involves dilemmas relating to the recruitment of informers. The second 
stage involves ethical issues relating to both the extent to which ‘handlers’ can 
ignore the criminal activity of their informants, and also what measures can be 
taken by ‘handlers’ to protect their agents from discovery. The third stage of the 
process involves dilemmas relating to the way in which intelligence is acted on to 
effect the arrest of suspects without compromising the agent.  
 
Recruitment of Informants 
 
6.14 In Northern Ireland informants were generally recruited following their arrest.727 
Once in police or British Army custody, the Security Forces offered those they 
believed were able to provide valuable information on the IRA their freedom, in 
return for becoming an informer. If the offer was declined, the Security Forces 
might then turn to other forms of blackmail as a method of persuasion.728 The 
blackmail might come in the form of the Security Forces threatening to let it be 
known that the detainee was working as an informer, alternatively the detainee 
could be blackmailed using information gained through covert surveillance. 
 
6.15 The Kincora Boys’ Home Scandal has been cited as an example of where 
blackmail gained through covert surveillance was used to persuade individuals to 
become informants. 729  The scandal broke on the 3 April 1980 when three 
members of staff were charged with acts of gross indecency on the boys at the 
home. William McGrath was one of those charged (and later convicted). It 
emerged that he was the leader of a loyalist paramilitary group called TARA.730 
TARA was an evangelical Protestant paramilitary organisation. The suspicion is 
that the abuse at the home was allowed to continue in order to protect a valuable 
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source of intelligence, namely McGrath. Mark Urban claims that the ‘Security 
Service (MI5) blocked moves to stop the abuse because it provided them with 
valuable blackmail material to be used against a member of a loyalist terrorist 
group who worked there and was one of the alleged abusers’.731 He also claims 
that the Army ‘had knowledge of homosexual abuse of youths at the Kincora 
boys’ home’732 and surmises that the British government knew about the abuse at 
this home and ‘misled Parliament about just how much the authorities knew about 
the abuse at the home’.733 This would mean that the Security Forces used general 
criminal activity, in addition to terrorist related activity, as leverage to persuade 
individuals to become informants. Attempting to recruit someone to act as an 
informant in not against the law per se but it would be if it puts someone’s life at 
risk or if the attempted recruitment involved blackmail.  
 
 
6.16 On the 15 January 1982 James Prior, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 
announced the setting up of a Committee of Inquiry into the sexual abuse scandal 
of children who lived in the Kincora Boys’ Home in Belfast. That Inquiry 
collapsed after one day due to a lack of adequate powers to investigate. Rumours 
about Kincora persisted and in 2015 there were further revelations that two 
military intelligence officers, Collin Wallace and Brian Gemmell ‘tried to expose 
the scandal but were warned off by a named officer in MI5’.734  
 
6.17 It was announced on the 31 May 2016 that there would be another inquiry by the 
Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry (HIA) chaired by Sir Anthony Hart into the 
abuse scandal and the emerging allegations of a cover up by elements of the 
British State. However, in 2017 the report by Sir Anthony Hart found no credible 
evidence that the intelligence services and the British Army were aware of a 
pedophile ring at the home, or that members of the intelligence community were 
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blackmailing abusers to spy on fellow Ulster Loyalists. However, Henry 
McDonald claims that this is unlikely to be the end of the matter.735  
Handling of Informants 
 
6.18 It is also clear that informants, if they are to provide useful information on 
planned attacks, need to be part of those planned operations. In terms of handling 
agents, the de Silva Report acknowledged that: 
 
In order to maintain cover, it follows that agents would be required of 
necessity to engage in criminal conspiracies with their terrorist associates 
(whilst in theory, seeking to help the security forces to frustrate the 
realisation of these plans).736  
 
In the de Silva Report it also states that ‘All former intelligence officers stressed 
that an agent could only provide the most valuable, and potentially life-saving 
intelligence if they were infiltrated into the heart of the terrorist group.’737 Daniel 
Holder quotes from meeting minutes taken on the 13 March 1987 between the RUC 
and the Northern Irish Office explaining the modus operandi of informant handling. 
The practice was of ‘placing/using informants in the middle ranks of terrorist 
groups. This meant they would have to become involved in terrorist activity and 
operate with a degree of immunity from prosecution’. 738  In other words, the 
informant would need to be allowed to continue his terrorist activities in order to 
maintain his cover. Other commentators have gone further and suggested that in 
order to be successful, the informant ‘must commit a wide range of criminal 
activities from robberies to murder’ which may or may not be linked to 
terrorism.739 
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6.19 The next issue is that once the informant is in place and providing useful 
intelligence, what measures can the Security Forces take to protect their source. 
There are many claims that the Security Forces turned a blind-eye to serious 
crimes and even pointed suspicion towards others, in order to protect valuable 
informants. For example, Rosie Cowan makes the claim that an informant in the 
IRA, Alfredo ‘Scap’ Scappaticci, codenamed ‘stakeknife’, was involved in the 
murders of up to 40 loyalists, republicans, police officers and civilians and that 
dozens of people died to keep him alive.740 In addition, it has been claimed that 
the Force Research Unit became aware that a Loyalist group planned to 
assassinate a leading member of PIRA who was said to be of Italian descent. 
Fearing Scappaticci was in danger, the Force Research Unit ‘directed the killers 
away from Scappaticci towards an ex-Republican terrorist called Francisco 
Notarantonio’.741 These do not appear to be isolated incidents. O’ Conner points 
out that a key finding of the de Silva Inquiry was that Brian Nelson was an agent 
and UDA member who was directly involved in 4 murders and 10 attempted 
murders but was protected by RUC Special Branch.742 
 
6.20 The Home Office produced guidelines for the police on the use of informers. 
According to Mark Urban, the Home Office guidelines stated that if an informer 
revealed plans to commit a serious offence then the police should not allow the 
plan to go ahead nor should police officers ever mislead a court in order to protect 
an informer.743 In addition, the guidelines made it clear that there should be no 
blanket immunity for informers.744 Although these guidelines were in place it was 
felt that it would be inappropriate for the RUC to be bound by them. 745 However, 
the guidelines were not replaced with more suitable guidelines. Instead, there was 
no regulation at all. In other words, a ‘legal black hole’ emerged. Hillyard claims 
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that because of this there was ‘in effect there was no rule of law in Northern 
Ireland’.746 
 
6.21 The de Silva Review stated that it had ‘established that there was no adequate 
framework in Northern Ireland in the late 1980s in relation to agent running’.747 
The Review went on to explain that the three agencies running agents, the RUC 
SB, the Force Research Unit and the Security Service, all operated under their 
own separate regimes. It concluded that: 
  
RUC SB had no workable guidelines; the FRU were subject to Directives and 
Instructions that were contradictory; the Security Service received no effective 
guidance to make clear the extent to which their agents could be permitted to 
engage in criminality in order to gather intelligence.748  
 
6.22 The de Silva Review points out that successive British governments knew that 
agents were being run by the intelligence agencies in Northern Ireland without a 
legal framework being in place ‘despite repeated calls from senior RUC, Security 
Service and (latterly) Army officers to address this issue’.749 
 
6.23 The overall conclusion was that ‘There was a willful and abject failure by 
successive British governments to provide the clear policy and legal framework 
necessary for agent-handling to take place effectively and within the law.’750 In 
terms of domestic law, until the introduction of the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) there was no legislation governing the use of 
informants. However, human rights laws outline a range of provisions that are 
relevant to covert operations.751  
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747 The de Silva Report (n714) para 23.  
748 ibid.  
749 ibid para 24.  
750 ibid para 23.  
751 These are detailed later in this chapter at para 6.63-6.64 
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Undercover Military and Police Units 
 
6.24 In addition to gathering intelligence using informers, undercover military units, 
acting on the intelligence provided by agents, were also tasked with making 
arrests. It was the use of lethal force by covert units when attempting to make an 
arrest that has proved to be very controversial.  
 
6.25 The dilemma faced by these undercover units when tasked with making an arrest, 
was when was it appropriate to use lethal force. Democratic norms demand that 
once identified, terrorist suspects should be arrested and charged and subsequently 
brought before a court.  But attempts to arrest suspects can, and frequently did, 
end in death in Northern Ireland - either because the suspects resisted arrest or 
because the soldiers were following orders to kill them.  The allegations of a 
shoot-to-kill policy in Northern Ireland still persist in some quarters. But what 
does a shoot-to-kill policy entail? 
 
6.26 What is clear is that a shoot–to-kill policy does not mean that once the decision to 
open fire has been taken then there is a further decision about where to aim the 
bullets – that is whether to aim for vital organs or aim to hit arms or legs. The 
British Army firearms training stresses the need to use the weapon to fire at vital 
organs and continue firing until the target is no longer a threat.  
 
6.27 Instead, the discussion about a shoot-to-kill policy usually has two elements. The 
first concerns the reason why the soldiers were at the scene in the first place. 
Were they at the scene because they had forewarning of terrorist activity, in which 
case lethal force might not have been the only option or did they come across the 
terrorists whilst out on routine patrol? The second concerns the necessity to use 
firearms once a confrontation between the Security Forces and the terrorists was 
in progress, and this generally comes down to whether the terrorists were armed.   
 
6.28 The Army Manual ‘Land Operations Volume III – Counter Revolutionary 
Operations describes an ambush as a surprise attack by a force lying in wait upon 
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a moving or temporary halted enemy’.752  The Army Manual goes on to explain 
that an ambush should be executed by positioning the main body of soldiers so 
that they have clear view of the ‘killing area’ and positioning a smaller body of 
soldiers to cut-off any enemy attempting to escape.753 An ambush of this type 
would clearly be illegal.  
 
6.29 Mark Urban found only one published example of an SAS order made in Northern 
Ireland which included the word ambush. 754 Urban claims that such an order 
would have been interpreted ‘one way and only one way by a soldier in the British 
Army’.755 Urban then goes on to detail various arrest attempts that ended in dead 
PIRA members and raises the question whether or not those PIRA members died 
in unlawful ambushes. Urban points out that ‘a small cadre of SAS and 
surveillance operators were responsible for the great majority of IRA deaths in 
recent years’. 756  However, even if some terrorists were killed in unlawful 
circumstances, there is no evidence that these incidents formed part of a wider 
policy. There is no suggestion that every IRA volunteer was at risk of being killed 
in an unlawful ambush. One former soldier, quoted by Andrew Sanders, claims 
that members of the Security Forces ‘knew who the ‘names’ were and where to 
get them’.757 Campbell and Connolly quote from an account given by a member 
of the IRA, ‘in ’72 it was not a secret Army (…) everybody in the district knew 
who was in the IRA’.758 If this were case it would lend weight to the theory that 
there was no ambush policy in Northern Ireland, at least in the early years, given 
the small numbers of IRA members that died in this way.759  
 
6.30 However, the role of undercover units in the British Army remains contentious. 
Hughes, for example, claims that the Military Reaction Force (MRF) not only 
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murdered suspects involved in terrorist activities but also killed unarmed Roman 
Catholics who had no terrorist involvement at all, in a campaign of sectarian 
violence.760  Tom Siegriste, a former member of the MRF, confirms that the MRF 
were involved in assassinations.761 He claims that the MRF operated what was 
known as a ‘shoot and scoot’ policy in Northern Ireland.762 He claims that the 
‘MRF even wrote their own Standard Operating Procedures so that they could 
virtually make it up as they went along’.763 The ‘shoot and scoot’ policy appears 
not to have presented him with any personal moral dilemmas but he does state 
that one of the problems with the policy was that shooting unarmed men tended to 
look rather ‘unfair’.764 He also claims that MI6 ordered him to assassinate Gerry 
Adams on the 23 June 1973.765 Brice Dickson has also suggested that the British 
Army’s Force Research Unit, based at Thiepval Barracks in Lisburn, might ‘have 
been involved in the killing of at least 14 Catholics between 1987 and 1991’.766 
 
Allegations of Collusion 
 
6.31 In addition to relying on intelligence gathered from informers, the Security Forces 
were also involved in collusion. The term collusion is not defined legally. In 
general, it is used to describe collaboration between the State and paramilitary 
groups. It involves any or all of the following activities, 'supply of information, 
resources and weapons to paramilitaries, failing to investigate activities or enforce 
the law against paramilitaries, or the directing or facilitating of killings and or 
other activities or paramilitaries’.767 In the Stephens Inquiry the term collusion 
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was understood to mean a wide range of behaviour from 'willful failure to keep 
records, the absence of accountability, the withholding of intelligence and 
evidence, through to the extremes of agents being involved in murder’.768 
 
6.32 In the Cory Inquiry, Judge Cory developed the concept further and stated that 
collusion involved connivance and the definition of the verb to connive is ‘to 
pretend ignorance or unawareness of something one ought morally, or officially 
or legally oppose; to fail to take action against a known wrongdoing or 
misbehaviour - usually used with connive at the violation of law’.769  Judge Cory 
claimed that ‘any lesser definition would have the effect of condoning, or even 
encouraging, state involvement in crimes, thereby shattering all public confidence 
in these important agencies’.770  
 
6.33 This broad definition of the term collusion was resisted in the Billy Wright 
Inquiry and instead a much narrower definition was adopted.771 The Inquiry stated 
that: 
We consider that the essence of collusion is an agreement or arrangement 
between individuals or organisations, including government departments to 
achieve an unlawful or improper purpose. The purpose must be fraudulent 
or underhand.772  
 
6.34 These inquiries along with the de Silva inquiry confirmed that the Security Forces 
were guilty of collusion. 773  Following on from that in June 2016 the Police 
Ombudsman issued a report into the 1994 Loughinisland massacre. In the report 
the Ombudsman concluded that Security Force collusion was a ‘significant 
feature’ in the massacre of civilians in a pub by the Loyalist UVF paramilitary 
group.774  
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6.35 A classified draft document entitled ‘Subversion in the Ulster Defence Regiment 
(UDR)’, written by British military intelligence in 1973, 775 and understood to 
have been circulated at the highest levels of the British government776 reveals that 
the British had suspicions about the activities of the UDR by 1973 just three years 
after the UDR came into being on 1 April 1970.  
 
6.36 The UDR was formed following recommendations made in the Hunt Report 
(1969).  The UDR was created as a non-denominational part-time force under the 
GOC NI. However, by 1973 the percentage of Roman Catholic members was 
4%.777 There were a number of senior full-time posts but the rest of the roles were 
part-time. The main tasks of the UDR were to guard strategic points through 
patrolling, surveillance, and manning Vehicle Check Points. The UDR were not 
deployed in ‘hard’ areas and were ‘not permitted to become involved in crowd 
confrontation anywhere’. 778 The 7910 strong Regiment were armed with self-
loading rifles and sub-machine guns.779 The UDR were recruited locally and each 
applicant was security vetted.  
 
6.37 However, the imposition of direct rule in 1972 mobilised support for the UDA. 
‘The UDA was formed in 1971 as an umbrella group for a variety of loyalist 
groups.’ 780 ‘The UDAs stated aim was to protect Unionist communities from 
attacks by Republican paramilitaries.’781 It remained a legal organisation until 10 
August 1992. At the height of its power the UDA had thousands of members and 
was the largest of the loyalist paramilitary organisations. ‘Given an hour or two’s 
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notice it could call 20,000 men onto the streets of Belfast.’782 In the draft paper it 
is stated that joint membership of the UDA and the UDR became widespread after 
1972 and the loss of UDR weapons greatly increased.783 There were policies in 
place to discharge men from the UDR for membership of the UDA but identifying 
men with joint membership proved difficult.784 
 
6.38 The draft paper defines subversion in the following way: 
 
a. Strong support, or membership of, organisations whose aims are 
incompatible with those of the UDR 
b. Attempts by UDR members to use their UDR knowledge, skills or 
equipment to further the aims of such organisations. 785 
 
6.39 The draft paper comes to the following conclusions in relation to subversion. The 
first is that subversion added significantly to the weapons and ammunition of 
Protestant extremist groups. The draft paper states that within the UDR significant 
numbers of men perhaps 5-15% who are, or have been, members of Protestant 
extremist organisations. The second is that there was no substantial leakage of 
documents to protestant extremist groups.786 
 
6.40 What the paper goes on to state in relation to the UDR is that despite the fact that 
the ‘first loyalties of many of its members is to a concept of ‘Ulster’ rather than 
HMG’,787 the UDR is still operationally reliable. ‘Except in limited circumstances 
subversion in the UDR has not compromised its ability to carry out its duties.’788 
It goes further and states that any attempt now to weed out soldiers that may 
operate against the UDR ‘would result in a very small regiment indeed’.789 The 
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level of toleration that is expressed in the draft paper is remarkable. The 
prevailing attitude seems to be that despite high weapons and ammunition losses 
to Protestant extremists, this Regiment should not be disbanded.  
 
6.41 The controversy relating to clandestine units and the use of lethal force is not 
limited to those in the Army. The activities of the RUC Special Branch (RUC SB) 
and the Security Service also remain tainted by controversy. On 11 November 
1982 three members of the IRA790 were shot dead in a car being chased by an 
unmarked car. As the car came to a stop one of the men managed to get out but 
was then fatally wounded. All three men were unarmed at the time.791 Just weeks 
later on the 24 November 1982 two more people were killed near Lurgan at a 
hayshed that was under surveillance.792 This incident was closely followed by 
another incident on the 12 December 1982 in which two IRA men were shot dead 
as they sat in their car at a checkpoint. Neither of the men was armed. 793 
 
6.42 These incidents became known as the shoot-to-kill cases and prompted a public 
inquiry into the six deaths. John Stalker, the Deputy Chief Constable of Greater 
Manchester, was tasked with heading up the inquiry but resigned before 
concluding his investigations. However, he did reveal in an interview with the 
Times in February 1988 that he there was no tangible shoot-to-kill policy in place 
but that the men involved understood what was expected of them and that was to 
pull the trigger.794 John Stalker was replaced by Colin Sampson, but neither the 
Stalker nor the Sampson Reports have ever been published. The inquests into 
these six deaths were undertaken in 2014 and are ongoing. 
 
The Walker Report 
 
6.43 The suggestion is that one of the reasons that the RUC SB and the Security 
Service were able to act beyond the law was that in the early 1980s the basis of 
policing changed in Northern Ireland. The basis of policing went from the 
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maintenance of law and order and prevention and detection of crime to the 
collection and collation of intelligence. This fundamental change to the basis of 
policing came about as a consequence of the Walker Report of 1981 that provided 
a blueprint for the reforms. The Walker Report, drawn up by Sir Patrick Walker, 
remains classified but its existence was revealed in a UTV program, ‘Policing and 
the Police’ aired in April 2001.795 The Home Office has confirmed the existence 
of the Walker Report.796 However, although this fundamental change to policing 
had no legal basis, it has been claimed by Hillyard that ‘all Prime Ministers and 
Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland would have been aware of this 
fundamental change in policing’.797 If this was true it suggests a high degree of 
contempt for the rule of law by successive British governments. It also has 
implications for those police officers and intelligence officers involved and their 
relationship with the rule of law.  
 
6.44 As a consequence of the Walker Report all planned arrests were to be cleared by 
RUC SB and the decision to arrest was to be taken, by both RUC SB and CID, 
after the ‘balance of advantage has been weighed’. 798  After arrest, charging 
decisions were to be delayed to allow further gathering of intelligence.799 The 
Sunday Times 28 January 2007 published snippets of the Report in an article 
entitled ‘MI5 pays for murder in Northern Ireland’ which revealed that the new 
approach to policing included provisions to destroy records after operations had 
concluded and that RUC Special Branch should not disseminate all information to 
CID. 800   Additionally, CID required permission from Special Branch before 
making any arrests, or carrying out house searches, in case agents were 
endangered.801 A confidential memorandum from Assistant Chief Constable John 
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Whiteside surfaced in February 1981. 802 The Whiteside memorandum ordered 
that all informers be handled by Special Branch where possible and more 
importantly members of paramilitary groups who had been recruited as 
informants were not to be arrested no matter what crimes they had committed 
without consultation with Special Branch.803  
 
6.45 This change gave supremacy to RUC Special Branch. It gave Special Branch the 
power to decide who saw the intelligence provided by informers which in turn 
gave Special Branch control over who was to be arrested and who was to be 
protected.  And at the center of the new intelligence-led policing policy were 
informers. Hillyard argues that, ‘They became the backbone of the new policing 
strategy, whatever they did, from murder to exhortation, they were to be protected 
at any cost.’804  
 
6.46 The change to the basis of policing, following the implementation of the 
recommendations made in the Walker Report, looks like a very clever, yet 
cynical, plan to allow the Security Forces to continue using and protecting 
informants no matter what offences they committed. It was designed to leave no 
paper trail and as one senior officer in the Billy Wright Enquiry explained, it had 
‘plausible deniability’ built in from the beginning.805 It has led some to comment 
that ‘it was a system specifically devised to permit State agents to murder with 
impunity’.806 Some have gone further and suggested that the Security Forces used 
loyalist gunmen to target and murder IRA members.807 Davies claims that MI5 
and RUC SB worked together to direct both Loyalist and IRA terrorists to kill one 
another.808 Ed Moloney makes the point that intelligence-led policing also had the 
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objective of manipulating the leaders of paramilitary groups and consequently 
their policies and ideological aims.809  
 
6.47 The Walker Report recommended that the Security Forces develop a system that 
operated outside of the rule of law, leaving no paper trails, with no oversight 
mechanism in place and, of course, no complaints process. These changes 
subverted the normal democratic process and gave the central role to reforming 
the police to the Security Service, at a time when the existence of the Security 
Service was denied by successive British governments.  
 
6.48 Referring to the RUC SB, the Force Research Unit and MI5, Hillyard and Urwin 
paint a scandalous picture. They state that: 
 
These agencies all acted beyond the law, lying to their political masters, 
running propaganda campaigns, leaking massive amounts of sensitive 
information to loyalists including putting in place FRU’s own intelligence 
officer at the heart of the UDA, ignoring threats to the lives of those they were 
tasked to protect, telling falsehoods in criminal trials, steadfastly refusing to 
arrest and prosecute known murderers but instead recruiting them as agents, 
and refusing to co-operate with investigations into their nefarious behaviour.810  
 
6.49 Over the years there have been many public inquiries into different aspects of the 
security strategy used in Northern Ireland. 811 Using only evidence from these 
inquiries it is possible to substantiate all of the claims made by Hillyard and 
Urwin.812 The Stevens Inquiry concluded:  
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There was collusion in both murders and the circumstances surrounding them. 
Collusion is evidenced in many ways. This ranges from the willful failure to 
keep records, the absence of accountability, the withholding of intelligence and 
evidence, through to extreme agents being involved in murder.813  
 
6.50 The de Silva Report concludes that RUC officers were involved in inciting 
loyalist paramilitaries to target Patrick Funucane814 and provided ‘intelligence to 
facilitate his murder’.815 The Report concluded that there had been ‘a series of 
positive actions by employees of the State actively furthering and facilitating his 
murder and that in the aftermath of the murder, there was a relentless attempt to 
defeat the ends of justice’. 816  The Cory Collusion Inquiry Report quotes one 
document stating that ‘The CC (Chief Constable) had decided that the Stevens 
Enquiry would have no access to intelligence documents or information, nor the 
units supplying them’.817 Cory commented that:  
 
The willful concealment of pertinent evidence, and the failure to cooperate 
with the Stevens Inquiry, can be seen as further evidence of the unfortunate 
attitude that then persisted within RUC SB and FRU. Namely that there were 
not bound by the law and were above and beyond its reach.818  
 
6.51 The Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland’s Office was set up in 1998 and had 
powers to investigate complaints against the police and carry out investigations. 
Referring to the previous public enquiries and reviews stated that ‘the various 
reports had very little impact on the policies and practices within Special 
Branch’.819 
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6.52 The problems identified by Stevens, Cory, the first Police Ombudsman, Nuala 
O’Loan, and the post-Cory public inquiries including the de Silva Report provide 
evidence of the enormous challenges to any reforms that sought to bring covert 
policing practice within international standards and the rule of law.  
 
6.53 The reliance on informer intelligence led to the growth of so called supergrass 
trials. The term supergrass refers to someone ‘who has participated in a number of 
criminal enterprises, who not only gives information to the police about them, but 
also agrees to give evidence in court against significant number of persons alleged 
to be his accomplices in crime’.820 In return he is given immunity for those crimes 
for which he has provided a full confession. In other words, a supergrass is an 
‘accomplice who turns Queen's evidence on a grand scale’.821  
 
6.54 Between 1981 and 1988, twenty-seven supergrasses emerged to give evidence 
against their former associates.822 Approximately 500 people had been charged 
with terrorist related offences on the word of those twenty-seven supergrasses.823 
The evidence from a supergrass is: 
 
Evidence from an insider in the group who is in a position to know who 
does what, and in particular, pin-point key men in the hierarchy of terrorist 
organisations and operatives in such a way as to enable them to be 
convicted of crimes for which they would otherwise escape justice.824 
 
6.55 There are clear advantages in using this evidence but relying only or mainly on 
supergrass evidence also presents dangers. There is the obvious moral issue of 
someone being granted immunity from prosecution for serious crimes, potentially 
more serious crimes than the crimes of those being accused on the evidence of the 
supergrass. A much bigger issue is that placing reliance on accomplice evidence is 
fraught with risk. The accomplice is a criminal and may have previous 
                                                        
820 David Bonner, 'Combating terrorism: Supergrass Trials in Northern Ireland' (1988) 51(1) The 
Modern Law Review 23. 
821 ibid.  
822 ibid 29.  
823 ibid.  
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convictions for offences involving dishonesty. Even if not dishonest, heavy 
reliance on the evidence of one just one person whose memory over the years may 
have become less reliable comes with risks. There is also the possibility that the 
supergrass will take to opportunity to settle old scores and name innocent 
individuals for personal reasons. David Bonner has suggested that on top of these 
inherent risks there is also the possibility that the RUC will coach the supergrass 
with his evidence, rehearsing the delivery of the evidence and iron out any 
inconsistencies in the story, in order to enhance his credibility.825  
 
6.56 There are potential short-term gains to be made by using supergrass evidence but 
there are also dangers and the supergrass system suffered a number of blows to its 
credibility. In addition to the fact that a number of high-profile supergrasses 
changed their mind at the last minute and retracted their statements, there were a 
number of successful appeals made by people that were convicted mainly on 
supergrass evidence. ‘Of the 120 people convicted on the evidence of the ten 
principle supergrasses, 67 were released after subsequent appeals. 65 had been 
convicted solely on informer evidence and in two cases there had been 
corroborating evidence.’826 Another ‘criticism of the strategy contends that it’s 
longer term effects in terms of loss of public confidence in the fair administration 
of justice (…) far out weight the short terms gains’.827 However, although the 
word of informers had been discredited in the courts, the RUC continued to gather 
intelligence from informers in covert operations and treat the evidence gathered in 
that way as credible evidence.  
 
6.57 It is difficult to assess the exact contribution made by undercover units to the 
conflict but the 14th Intelligence Company and the FRU did manage to penetrate 
PIRA and recruit senior figures. It is claimed that these included Frank Hagerty, a 
PIRA Quartermaster, and Alfredo Scappaticci who was head of the PIRAs 
Internal Security Unit. Mark Urban estimates that about 50 active Provisionals 
had been informers between 1976 and 1987.828 ‘This represents a very significant 
level of penetration - perhaps one in thirty or one in forty of the organisations 
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frontline membership during these years.’ 829 Christopher Tuck claims that the 
‘progressively more effective intelligence war fought by the security forces had a 
significant effect on PIRA’.830 Martyn Frampton claims that the ‘security services 
had won the intelligence war’ by 1994.831  Ed Moloney echoes this claim stating 
that ‘it is difficult to see how the IRA could have been more thoroughly 
compromised’ in the 1990s.832 Thomas Hennessey goes further and suggests that 
informers and agents contributed to a ‘strategic defeat of the IRA by the 
1990s’.833 It has been claimed that by 1992 five out of every six planned attacks 
was compromised by the Security Forces and that this has been confirmed by 
Brendan Hughes, a former commander of PIRAs Belfast Brigade, who explained 
that the Security Forces were ‘able to effectively stop and contain the IRA’. 834  
While generally agreeing with the high levels of infiltration of the IRA overall, 
Thomas Leahy claims that the IRA cells in rural areas were not compromised to 
the same extent that they were in the cities.835 He claims that ‘rural units fought a 
continuing battle with security forces, and appeared to lack damaging 
infiltration’. 836  This would at least provide some explanation of why the 
successful recruitment of informers and high levels of penetration did not stop the 
violence.  
 
6.58 This better understanding of the level of IRA infiltration by informers has caused 
some commentators to reassess how the peace process came about. Many 
academics and commentators had understood the peace process to be a result of a 
                                                        
829 ibid.  
830 Christopher Tuck, ‘Northern Ireland and the British Approach to Counter–Insurgency’ (2007) 
23(2) Defence & Security Analysis 165, 176. 
831 Martyn Frampton, ‘Agents and Ambushes: Britain’s “Dirty War” in Northern Ireland’ in Samy 
Cohen (ed), Democracies at War against Terrorism: A Comparative Perspective (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2008) 93-94.  
832 Moloney (n726) 336. 
833 Thomas Hennessey, ‘The Dirty War: MI5 and the Troubles’ in Thomas Hennessey, Claire 
Thomas (ed), Spooks: The Unofficial History of MI5 from the First Atom Spy to 7/7 1945-2009 
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stalemate. 837  The stalemate argument is that both the IRA and the British 
government came to realise that neither side could win the conflict at either a 
military or political level. This realisation forced both sides to the negotiating 
table and made substantial compromises all round inevitable. In other words, ‘the 
conflict was not brought to an end as a result of excellent intelligence being 
acquired’.838  
 
6.59 The extent to which the IRA had been compromised by informers and agents has 
led some to question the stalemate analysis. Leahy has suggested that the IRA 
understood that it had become effectively crippled by informants and therefore 
made the decision to end their military campaign and seek a political solution. In 
other words, it was the informers and agents that created a trajectory of decline for 
the IRAs campaign of violence. Arguably justifying the British government’s 
decision to prioritise covert operations and focus on the penetration of agents into 
the heart of the IRA. 839  The British government’s decision to place a ‘high 
priority on pursuing an intelligence–led approach’ was confirmed in the de Silva 
Report.840 
 
Informants and ECHR Obligations  
 
6.60 Although no domestic legislation existed governing the use of informants during 
the Troubles, the European Convention841 does establish rights and duties relating 
to the recruitment and use of informants now referred to as ‘covert human 
intelligence sources’. The most important is the right to life found in Article 2.842  
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6.61 Article 2 prohibits killing except in self-defence where there is an imminent risk 
of loss of life.  This applies equally to informants as it does to any other citizen. 
Under Article 2 the State has a duty to take reasonable steps to protect life. Under 
this obligation, the State is not permitted to play one life off against another. In 
other words, the State must not protect one life because it is valuable to the State 
and fail to protect another life on the basis that it has no value to the State. This 
means that the State has a duty to take reasonable steps to protect the life of its 
agents but at the same time it has an obligation to take reasonable steps to protect 
the lives of those it is aware are under threat, and these duties may conflict. For 
example, the State may decide to act on information provided by the informant in 
order to save lives, but in doing so risk revealing the identity of the informant. 
Being revealed or even suspected of being an informant puts that informant’s life 
in danger.  Another obligation on the State is to take all reasonable steps to 
investigate promptly and effectively all those involved in killings. In instances 
where State actors may be directly or indirectly implicated in a death there is an 
obligation that the investigation be impartial and duly independent from those 
involved. There is no exemption for an informant who is suspected of being 
involved in killing. Article 2 also requires that there is provision within the law 
allowing for the possibility of criminal prosecution of those State actors who are 
suspected of having acted unlawfully.  
 
6.62 The activities of the Security Forces in Northern Ireland in relation to informants 
were never brought before the European Court of Human Rights. International 
law has the potential to constrain State action but in this case the reach of 
international law was limited. The United Kingdom benefited from a failure by 
civil society to bring forward cases and the failure of third-party States to engage 
with the European Court of Human Rights. It seems quite clear that the use of 
informants by the Security Forces was not constrained by domestic or 
international law.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
applied discriminately. In relation to covert operations it would conflict with Article 14 if the State 
sought to infiltrate a paramilitary group in order to make that group less of a threat to the State, 
while protecting the identities of agents who continue to be involved in violence.  
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6.63 However, there are attempts now to bring those responsible to account. Civil 
proceedings were issued in April 2015 against the MOD and Frank Kitson on 
behalf of the relatives of Patrick Heenan. Mr. Heenan was killed in February 1973 
when loyalist paramilitaries threw a British Army-issue grenade into a minibus 
carrying him and 14 others. At the time of Heenan’s murder, it is claimed that 
Kitson was a Brigadier commanding 39 Infantry. 843  He later rose to become 
Commander-in-Chief of UK Land Forces between 1982-1985. Kitson has been 
specifically named in the writ, the first of this kind whereby senior military 
figures have been included in relation to murders in Northern Ireland.  
 
6.64 Frank Kitson became ‘the best-known soldier in the British Army in Northern 
Ireland’.844 But his experience and expertise was gained in the emergencies in 
Kenya, Cyprus, Malaysia and Oman. In Kenya, he had been involved with 
‘counter-gangs’,845 and after his appointment in Northern Ireland in 1970 Kitson 
set up an undercover unit called the Military Reaction Force (MRF) and put into 
practice his doctrine of counter-insurgency warfare that was key during British 
Army operations throughout the Troubles.  
 
6.65 Kitson has been named as a co-defendant on the grounds that he and others used 
agents embedded in paramilitary organisations, and that they did know or that 
they should have known that it was reasonably foreseeable that the criminal 
activity could include murder. The court papers claim that Kitson is ‘liable 
personally for negligence and malfeasance in public office’ because in creating 
his doctrine of counter-insurgency he was ‘reckless as to whether state agents 
would be involved in murder’.846 
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6.66 In addition, there are a number of other current cases relating to covert operations. 
The first case was a civil claim by Margaret Keeley who is suing the Police 
Service of Northern Ireland, the MOD and Freddie Scapaticci.847 It is alleged that 
Scapaticci was a British agent codenamed ‘Stakeknife’. He was also head of what 
is sometimes referred to as the ‘nutting squad’, the IRAs internal security unit, 
and in that role, he has been linked to as many as 40 murders.848 Margaret Keeley 
claims she was wrongfully arrested and falsely imprisoned in order to protect her 
husband who was a British agent. On her release both Mrs. Keeley and her 
husband were ‘interviewed’ by Scapaticci. The second case involves another 
British informant, Martin McGartland, who claims that the British failed in its 
duty of care towards him once it was discovered he was an informer working for 
the British. He was subsequently shot multiple times by the IRA but survived.849  
 
6.67 In April 2015, Northern Ireland’s Police Ombudsman also announced an 
investigation into a number of ‘preventable murders’. It is alleged that these 
murders were perpetrated by Republican paramilitaries on individuals suspected 
of having acted as informants for the RUC. The allegations received by the Police 
Ombudsman include claims that some murders could have been prevented and 
that people were subsequently protected from investigation and prosecution.  
 
6.68 What these latest developments show is that the legal system is now being used to 
challenge State behaviour some 40 years after the events. However, at the time 
there was a clear lack of legislative guidance in relation to covert operations and 
both the domestic and international courts failed to constrain the activities of the 
British government in dealing with informants. The next chapter will examine the 
contingency plans developed to deal with the conflict in Northern Ireland should 
the violence in the Province get worse. 
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Chapter 6: Contingency Planning during The Troubles: The Tuzo Plan 
and Operation Folklore  
 
7.1 In attempting to understand the commitment of the British Army and the MOD to 
acting within the law it might be helpful to look at the British Army’s contingency 
plans initially developed by Lieutenant General Sir Harry Tuzo. These plans were 
drawn up, initially by the British Army, but then contributed to by other Whitehall 
departments, to deal with the emergency in Northern Ireland if the 1972 cease-fire 
broke down and the violence escalated beyond the levels experienced prior to the 
cease-fire.  
 
7.2 The contingency plans were revised many times and although originally known as 
the Tuzo Plan, later these plans were given the codename Operation Folklore. 
Operation Folklore was never implemented but the contingency plans continued 
to be revised throughout the early years of the conflict. The plans shed light on 
how the military understood its role in the conflict, and how well it adjusted to its 
new role as a police force, as well as revealing the commitment of senior officers 
and senior civil servants to operating within the law. 
 
7.3 The academic literature seems to describe a State’s response to terrorism as either 
following the ‘war’ model in which terrorists are treated as the enemy needing to 
be destroyed. In this model, the conflict is understood to be a small war. The 
alternative model is the ‘criminal justice’ model in which terrorists are treated as 
criminals and the State relies on the criminal justice system to bring terrorists to 
trial. In this model terrorism is understood to be a large crime.  
 
7.4 It has been suggested that the ‘war’ model permeated British Army thinking and 
heavily influenced the rhetoric employed by senior officers during the conflict.850 
The suggestion is that the British Army understood the situation in Northern 
Ireland in terms of enemies and battle lines and this attitude translated into the use 
of repressive techniques. In other words, it would appear that ‘dealing with 
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internal civil disorder was not a natural extension of the Army’s normal role’.851 
Maintaining law and order and investigating crimes through the collection of 
evidence required a very different skill-set to those that the average soldier had 
acquired during training.  
 
The Tuzo Plan 
 
7.5 British Army thinking and the extent of the influence of the ‘war’ model can be 
seen in a letter sent by Lieutenant General Sir Harry Tuzo (GOC NI) to The Rt. 
Hon. William Whitelaw on the 9 July 1972. Enclosed with the letter was a draft 
plan, entitled ‘Military Operations in the Event of a Renewed IRA campaign of 
Violence’.852 The draft plan, which became known as the Tuzo Plan, outlined the 
British Army’s analysis of the options available to it, should the current cease-fire 
break down and IRA renew their campaign of violence.853 Two strategies were 
considered in the draft plan but the option involving the more offensive measures 
was preferred. Interestingly, the draft plan makes the point on the first page that 
the proposed new powers were not envisaged to deal with a civil war situation or 
Doomsday scenario, but just increased levels of violence. This is obviously the 
case since if the situation descended into civil war the British Army would not 
require additional legal powers.  
 
7.6 The Tuzo Plan revealed what many in the Roman Catholic community had 
suspected all along and that was that the British Army did not view the UDA in 
the same way as it viewed the IRA, despite the UDA being involved in killing 
Roman Catholics. The Tuzo Plan suggested that it might be necessary to turn a 
blind-eye to UDA members carrying weapons in areas that they controlled. The 
Tuzo Plan goes on to suggest that HM Forces should develop a tacit 
understanding with the UDA that they have a role to play in protecting Protestant 
areas. In other words, the UDA were to be treated in effect as allies in the conflict. 
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The implication is that the laws relating to the possession of weapons were to be 
ignored when it suited the British Army.  
 
7.7 In addition to these unlawful measures, the draft plan also looked at legal 
measures that would need to be put in place before the Tuzo Plan could be 
implemented. These measures involved extending the powers under the Special 
Powers Act (SPA)854 and creating new legislation to allow greater freedom of 
action by the Security Forces.  
 
7.8 The draft plan proposed extending SPA powers in the following ways. It 
suggested the Regulation 7 be extended to allow soldiers to stop and search 
people in the street and ask questions but in addition allow soldiers to take people 
to detention centres for further questioning. HM Forces were to be given the 
authority to arrest and detain suspects for 5 days rather than 48 hours and given 
the power to directly authorise a curfew under Regulation 19 if ordered by an 
officer of the rank of Brigadier Commander or above.855 
 
7.9 The draft plan also suggested that the Tribunal dealing with internment appeals 
should have powers to make internment orders and the power to release those 
interned rather than recommend release, as under the current legislation. The draft 
plan refers to increased numbers of Tribunals. This would suggest that the British 
Army anticipated that the numbers of people interned would be large.  
 
7.10 The draft plan also introduced the idea of Special Courts, where the rules of 
evidence were amended to allow for more convictions. Again, the draft plan states 
that there would be a need for more judges and more magistrates, presumably 
again to cope with increased numbers of people being charged. In the draft plan, it 
was also proposed that the right to bail from police and court would be curtailed 
and the restrictions on holding juveniles removed. Another suggestion was to 
bring those detained for minor offences before the magistrates immediately after 
arrest.  
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7.11 Importantly, the draft plan also outlined the need for powers of a quite different 
nature. The draft plan recommended that the concept of minimum or reasonable 
force would need to be suspended. It was explained that the Yellow Card Rules of 
Engagement were inappropriate in an offensive operation and suggested soldiers 
be given the legal right to shoot armed men on sight, to use suppressive force856 
and to use heavy weapons such as a Carl Gustav.857 The draft plan proposed that 
an indemnity act should also be enacted providing indemnity for all soldiers 
acting in good faith in the line of duty.  
 
7.12 It is clear from the draft plan that there has been a paradigm shift in thinking in 
relation to the role of the British Army. The British Army is no longer understood 
to be providing support for the police or acting as ‘military aid to the civil power’. 
Under the Tuzo Plan the British Army would be prosecuting an offensive 
operation. It would appear that the British Army would continue to operate within 
the normal law during this period of renewed violence, which would explain the 
need for an indemnity act. What all of this means is that soldiers were to be given 
the right to shoot armed men in situations where their own lives were not at risk 
and nor was anyone else’s life at risk. They were to be given the right to use 
heavy weapons, and the right to aim their weapons other than at the target. The 
soldiers would then be provided with immunity from prosecution - and all this in 
the United Kingdom in the late twentieth century in a situation short of civil war.  
This aggressive plan seems to have been devised to ‘combat and annihilate the 
Provisional IRA with maximum force and minimum fuss’.858 
 
7.13 The Tuzo Plan was sent to the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 
William Whitelaw on the 9 July 1972 but there is no evidence of a response from 
him and so it is not known whether Ministerial approval was given but it seems 
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unlikely. 859  In February 1971 Harry Tuzo was promoted to General Officer 
Commanding in Northern Ireland and it seems safe to assume that he devised his 
plan while he was in that position given the date of the letter sent to the Secretary 
of State for Northern Ireland. Whether or not that is true, the draft plan assumes a 
greater significance because of Tuzo’s position as GOC NI. The Tuzo Plan 
supports the theory that the British Army very much retained a military mindset 
and understood the conflict in terms of a small war rather than a large crime.  
 
7.14 The Tuzo Plan identified various problems that would need to be managed.860 
However, interestingly the list of problems did not include any potential legal 
issues, suggesting that the need to act within the law was not a top priority. 
Despite not being identified, the draft plan would have had various potential legal 
implications, had it ever been implemented. The draft plan would have had 
implications for constitutional law, for international law and for the continued use 
of ordinary criminal law.  
 
7.15 Soldiers operating to suppress an insurrection are obliged under the common law 
to use no more force than is necessary. The Yellow Card reinforced this 
obligation requiring first and foremost the use of minimum force. The Tuzo Plan 
includes a provision to suspend the obligation to use minimum force or reasonable 
force.  In law ‘reasonable force’ means using the least force that the situation 
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requires. Suspending the common-law obligation to use minimum force or 
reasonable force is problematic.  
 
7.16 Suspending the provisions of the Yellow Card would mean that soldiers could 
open fire without instruction from a commanding officer, fire without warning, 
fire other than at a target and continue firing rounds when not absolutely 
necessary. To suspend the operation of the common law would require legislation 
but legislative provisions have not been included in the draft plan. In addition, 
these provisions would have resulted in the United Kingdom being in breach of 
Article 2, the right to life, of the European Convention. 861  The idea of an 
indemnity act also raises issues in relation to Article 2 and Article 13.862  
 
7.17 The draft plan also suggests that the British Army should work with the UDA to 
protect Protestant communities and this aspect of the draft plan would require the 
UDA to be allowed to openly carry weapons on the streets. To be a member of the 
UDA in the 1970s was not against the law but arguably it should have been. This 
is because the UDA was already understood to be a paramilitary organisation 
involved in a wide range of criminal activities including murder. Under the Tuzo 
Plan, the British Army would have had to operate alongside this organisation, 
allowing them to break the law by openly carrying guns on the street and 
presumably also allowing their other criminal activities to continue. At the same 
time the British Army would be enforcing the law against Roman Catholic 
paramilitaries. Giving the British Army discretion as to who can and who cannot 
break the law clearly has serious implications for the rule of law. This aspect of 
the plan lends weight to the idea that the British Army had little commitment to 
operating within the law, little respect for the rule of law and that it was not even 
a priority to maintain the appearance of operating within the law.  
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7.18 In relation to international law, the conflict was generally understood to fall short 
of a non-international armed conflict and therefore the conflict was outside the 
reach of international humanitarian law. However, if the intensity of the violence 
increased then that understanding of the conflict could potentially have come 
under pressure. In other words, the very fact that the British Army would be 
prosecuting an offensive operation might be used to re-categorise the conflict as a 
non-international armed conflict.  Article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions863 and the two 1977 Protocols864 require certain criteria to be met for 
there to be a non-international armed conflict.865  
 
7.19 At the time the Tuzo Plan was being drawn up it was understood that the level of 
violence that would trigger Article 3 protection is measured against firstly, the 
sustained and concerted nature of violence, secondly, the degree of organisation 
of the terrorist group and thirdly, the control of territory. The following indicators 
are used to gauge the level of intensity of the violence: the duration and gravity of 
the armed clashes, the type of government forces involved, the number of fighters 
and troops involved, the types of weapons used, the number of casualties and the 
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of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b37f40.html [accessed 29 December 2017]. The two 1977 
Additional Protocols had not been ratified by the United Kingdom at this point and so were not 
relevant to the conflict in Northern Ireland. 
865 See the introduction at para 1.57-1.66 for more details.  
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extent of the damage caused by the fighting. The Tuzo Plan, which involved large 
numbers of soldiers, using heavy weapons and contemplating heavy casualties 
may have certainly raised questions about the nature of the conflict. However, the 
Tuzo Plan was never implemented and in fact went through various revisions and 
emerged as Operation Folklore. Operation Folklore was a much more restrained 
and less ambitious plan.866  
Operation Folklore 
 
7.20 Andrew Sanders states that ‘little has been written about Folklore’867 even though 
its existence has been known about since 2004 when government documents 
relating to the operation were declassified. Operation Folklore, in terms of the 
legality of the planned operation, has received even less attention.  
 
7.21 The most violent year of the conflict was 1972. By the end of that year there had 
been ‘10,000 shooting incidents and almost 2000 bombings, leaving an enormous 
list of casualties: nearly 500 dead and 5000 injured’.868 The 472 people killed 
represents 14% of all those killed in the thirty-year conflict.869  The violence in 
the Province had escalated considerably since August 1969 when the British 
Army had been deployed. At the time the British government feared that this 
deterioration in the conflict might continue and therefore officials in Whitehall 
began developing the existing contingency plans to cope with the increased levels 
of violence and devised Operation Folklore. Operation Folklore was a plan to 
prevent the outbreak of civil war. Sanders claims that ‘had it been implemented 
then it would have changed the entire context of the security operation’.870 
 
7.22 The contingency planning involved various government departments including 
the MOD, the Home Office, the FCO, The Northern Ireland Office and the 
                                                        
866 The National Archive (TNA): Public Records Office (PRO), CAB 164/110 Northern Ireland 
Contingency Planning ‘Operation Folklore’ 1972 Folio 16. 
867 Andrew Sanders, ‘Operation Motorman (1972) and the search for a coherent British 
counterinsurgency strategy in Northern Ireland’ (2013) 24(3) Small Wars and Insurgencies 465, 
474.  
868 ibid 473.  
869 Bill Rolston, Unfinished Business: State Killings and the Quest for the Truth (Beyond the Pale 
Publishing 2000) reproduced in CAIN at 
<http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issue/violence/docs/rolston00.html> accessed on 17 March 2017 
870 Sanders (n867) 468.  
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Cabinet Office. However, like the Tuzo Plan before it, there is no evidence that 
Operation Folklore received ministerial approval and so cannot be considered 
government policy. Nevertheless, the files relating to Operation Folklore offer an 
insight into what civil servants were willing to contemplate in order to suppress 
the violence in Northern Ireland and further insight into the mindset of senior 
British Army officers.  
 
7.23 In the event of the violence spiraling out of control then the British response 
would be the introduction of a state of emergency coupled with ‘overwhelming’ 
military force.871 At the time that Operation Folklore was being drawn up the 
Security Force presence in Northern Ireland was at least 24,000 men (at least 
10,000 British Army personnel and a further 14,000 RUC and UDR) but at times 
this figure was higher. However, Operation Folklore planned to ‘saturate all the 
main areas of conflict throughout the Province’ 872  with men and military 
hardware in a two-phase strategy.  
 
7.24 The first phase was Operation Folklore and the second was Operation Raftsman. 
Sanders suggests that there would have been ‘approximately 40,000 troops, an 
increase of 22 battalions, in its initial urban phase before a further 7 battalions 
would be deployed to consolidate rural areas’. 873  Operation Folklore also 
provided for:  
Nine Royal Armored Corps squadrons, a further nine field squadrons, and 
four aviation squadrons as well as putting a further 20 units on short notice 
for deployment (…) this would make it the largest British operation since 
World War II.874   
On the assumption that a battalion has 1,000 men and a squadron has 250 men, 
this would have brought the number of soldiers in Northern Ireland to over 
50,000. In a very approximate calculation this would have meant that one in every 
thirty of the population would have been a British soldier.  
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7.25 The levels of violence envisaged however would not amount to a state of civil 
war. This can be assumed because if the level of violence amounted to a state of 
civil war then the Security Forces, presumably heavily reinforced in the case of 
the British Army, would employ extreme force to suppress the violence. In a civil 
war situation, there would be no requirement to consider whether or not there was 
adequate legal powers to cover each and every measure that had to be taken; 
instead the Army would rely of the common law right to deal with insurrection by 
meeting force with force.  
 
7.26 Instead the draft plans describe the situation in which these contingency plans 
might be implemented as a ‘great emergency’ or a ‘grave emergency’.875 This 
terminology conveys the idea that the situation envisaged is a crisis but the terms 
are not legal terms found in domestic or international law.  Clearly the situation 
envisaged was one where stronger measures, (more legal powers and/or more 
powerful weapons and/or more men) would be needed to prevent control of the 
situation passing into the hands of the IRA.  
 
7.27 The draft plans state that a ‘great’ or ‘grave’ emergency would trigger Operation 
Folklore and this ‘great’ or ‘grave’ emergency would have three features. First, 
any breakdown in the ceasefire would have been shown to be irreparable. Second, 
the IRA campaign of terrorism would have developed into an armed insurrection 
clearly beyond control under the present policy or with the force levels presently 
available. Third, there would be increasing inter-sectarian violence with 
considerable UDA involvement. What is clear is that the situation would need to 
be much worse that it was in 1972, commonly understood to be the worst year of 
the conflict for the plans to become a reality.  
 
7.28 Operation Folklore gave overall command of the Province to the GOC NI. The 
level of violence that would trigger Operation Folklore was not defined and 
instead the decision would be at the discretion of the GOC NI as Director of 
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Operations. 876  This would sit comfortably with the constitutional role of the 
military but unless done after consultation with the government it would raise 
questions about the assumptions made in a democratic State about the supremacy 
of parliament.  
 
7.29 Operation Folklore consisted of military measures that could be taken to re-
establish control and civil measures that would be needed to support the military 
The Military Measures 
 
7.30 The contingency plans made the basic assumption that the British government’s 
aim remained the restoration of a stable society in Northern Ireland, which would 
remain part of the United Kingdom. The intervention would be directed at both 
communities and aimed at removing arms and explosives by means of massive 
reinforcement of troops, accompanied by searches and interrogation and probably 
internment. It would aim to put an end to inter-sectarian violence and to 
administer a shock in the hope of forcing both factions to realise the necessity of 
an agreed political solution. What was not being contemplated in Operation 
Folklore was a ‘direct military assault upon extremist-dominated Roman Catholic 
areas of the Province with the aim of securing total military victory over the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA)’.877 The reason given was that such a strategy would 
completely alienate the Roman Catholic community from the British government 
and destroy any remaining prospect of re-establishing a stable society within the 
United Kingdom for many years. 878  
 
7.31 Throughout the development of Operation Folklore various ideas were 
considered. One of those was the establishment of both a ‘prohibitive fire’ and 
‘free fire’ zones in Northern Ireland. In the released government files neither of 
these terms are defined. 
 
7.32 However, General Robert Gard talking about free fire-zones in Vietnam explained 
that:  
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The words themselves imply that you could shoot anything that moved in the 
area. I would certainly concede that the term itself is unfortunate and should 
never have been used. …’Free Fire Zone’ really meant only that the military 
was excused from obtaining clearance from the political authority; all other 
rules of engagement applied.879 
 
7.33 It is not clear what the term free fire-zone would mean in the context of Northern 
Ireland. One possible interpretation of the term is that tactics on the ground in 
certain designated areas would be the responsibility of the British Army, but this 
simply reiterates the existing position under the constitution. Politicians in 
Westminster would be removed from the decision-making process and only 
informed after the fact. Maybe the British Army felt this needed to be spelled out 
because it feared interference from Ministers. The meaning of the term 
‘prohibitive fire-zone’ requires further research but one possible meaning of the 
term is that it refers to designated areas in which the British Army would require 
prior authority from their political masters before entering. 
 
7.34 Operation Folklore envisaged a complete closure of the border with the Republic 
and a total ban on marches, public meetings demonstrations and strikes. It also 
included a provision for the removal of existing restrictions relating to detaining 
young persons on remand. This provision was included, presumably, in order to 
deal with the continuous low-level sectarian street disorder, which involved many 
young people, rather than to help with deal with the terrorist activities of the IRA.  
 
7.35 The plans for Operation Folklore make it clear that the plan was militarily 
possible but that ministers would have to accept a number of serious implications 
and the gravity of those implications were to some extent unknown and 
unknowable before the Operation was implemented. In the documentation relating 
to Operation Folklore it states that the serious implications would fall broadly into 
the following categories: 
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• disruption of the life of Northern Ireland; 
• physical destruction of life and property; 
• further alienation of both communities from each other and from the British 
Government; 
• legislation, some of it controversial in character likely to require a 
significant allotment of Parliamentary time and possibly the recall of 
Parliament from recess; 
• temporary redeployment of a portion of the British Army on the Rhine and 
temporary inability to meet other military contingencies; 
• political and public reaction from some quarters in Great Britain to a policy 
of harsher measures or to a political solution involving cession of territory 
from the United Kingdom;  
• international opinion, with particular reference to the Irish Republic, the 
United States, our other NATO allies, and the United Nations.880 
 
7.36 At least during the planning stages of Operation Folklore, the legal implications of 
the plans were recognised unlike in the earlier Tuzo Plan. However, the Tuzo Plan 
and Operation Folklore do have a lot in common. 
The Civil Measures 
 
7.37 The civil measures involve granting the military greater powers under both the 
Special Powers (Northern Ireland) Act 881 and under the emergency legislation.882 
The powers contemplated included internment, and if internment was not 
politically feasible then the ‘creation of courts with special procedure rules for the 
protection of witnesses against identification and hence intimidation, and with 
special rules of evidence to ensure admissibility of statements obtained in the 
course of interrogation’.883   
 
7.38 The civil measures relating to the Special Powers (Northern Ireland) Act (SPA) 
included the power to transfer convicted prisoners from Northern Ireland to 
                                                        
880 TNA (PRO) DEFE 25/282 (n857).  
881 The Civil Authority (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922. 
882 The Emergency Powers Act 1964. 
883 TNA (PRO) DEFE 25/282 (n857).  
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prisons in Britain, amendments to Regulation 7 (the power for the military to stop 
and search), 884 amendments to Regulation 10 (authority to authorise detention 
without a warrant),885 and amendments to Regulation 19 (the authority to order a 
curfew).886  
 
7.39 Operation Folklore was designed to allow the ‘execution of operations necessary 
to counter action, whether covert or overt, aimed at subverting the security of the 
state (…) the action necessary for the protection of life and property in case of 
actual or apprehended civil commotion’.887 It envisaged the military being given 
even wider powers than they already had under the existing emergency 
legislation. These sweeping new powers would include the powers to stop and 
question civilians, 888  search premises for munitions, 889  search premises for 
persons,890 search premises for articles or documents,891 arrest,892 detain,893 and 
                                                        
884 The Civil Authority (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922. 
Regulation 7 empowers members of the armed forces to stop people and require them to answer 
reasonable questions addressed to them in the place where they are stopped. The amended version 
of regulation 7 would allow members of the armed forces to tale people elsewhere to be questioned 
without having to formally arrest them first.  
885 Regulation 10 empowers a RUC officer of rank Superintendent or above to authorise arrest 
without warrant and detention for not more than 48 hours for the purpose of interrogation. An 
amendment of Regulation 10 would need to allow members of the armed forces the same powers to 
arrest without warrant and detain suspects. The period of 48 hours should be extended to five days. 
886 Under Regulation 19 the Civil Authority has the authority to order a curfew but in Operation 
Folklore floated the desirability of extending the power to military commanders of the rank of 
Brigadier or above.  
887 The National Archive (TNA): Public Records Office (PRO) DEFE 25/283 Directive for the 
General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland, as Director of Operations COS 13/73, 16 March 
1973, quoted in Sanders (n867) 475.  
888 The proposal was to extend Clause 16 of the EP Act to require:  
a. persons to answer questions on any subject concerning the emergency situation or concerning the 
commission of an offence.  
b. the person being questioned to move to a reasonably near (and more convenient) place.  
889 The proposal was to extend Clause 13 of the EP Act to allow search of dwelling house without 
suspicion and without authority from a commanding officer. 
890 The proposal was to extend Clause 15 of the EP Act to allow search of dwelling houses without 
authority from a commanding officer.  
891 The proposal was to ‘[p]rovide power to allow any member of Her Majesty’s forces on duty or 
any RUC Constable or officer to enter and search premises or other places including dwelling-
houses, in which it is suspected that there are articles or documents connected with terrorism or 
with the commission of an offence, and to seize the said objects.  
892 The proposal was to extend Clause 12 of the EP Act as follows:  
as to grounds: suspicion of having information about past, present or future offences. 
as to time: extend time limit of soldiers’ arrest power to 12 hours. And allow re-arrest under Clause 
11 and 12 by a commissioned officer (as well as by a constable) for 12 hours (as opposed to 72 
hours under Clause 10). 
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also the power of entry and interference with right of property.894 In addition, it 
was proposed to extend the admissibility of written statements895 and shift the 
onus of proof on to the accused for possession of prescribed articles in open 
places as well as in premises. There is a tendency for emergency legislation to 
empower the lower echelons of the security forces with sweeping discretionary 
powers such as the power to stop and search people and to search houses. The 
legislation envisaged by the British Army clearly followed this pattern.  
 
7.40 However, what was also contemplated in Operation Folklore was a ‘power of a 
different sort’ 896 and this related to situations where soldiers could use lethal 
force. The kind of power contemplated is essentially the same kind of power 
proposed in the Tuzo Plan discussed above. The MOD thought it was ‘essential 
for a soldier to be able to open fire without fear of legal penalty in certain 
circumstances where under the present law a court would consider that he had 





                                                                                                                                                                       
Power for commissioned officer to authorise soldiers to finger-print and photograph, by use of 
reasonable force if necessary. 
Entry of premises for purpose of arrest to be permissible on suspicion only for all offences not only 
for offences involving terrorism and munitions. 
893 The proposal envisaged alterations to Schedule 1 (Part II) to allow ICOs to be issued 
against persons suspected of committing any of the scheduled offences: and add larceny to the list 
of scheduled offences and delete Note 4 (the aim being to catch looters). 
Extend max. period before ICO is referred to the commissioners from 28 days to 90 days. 
894 Extend the powers of entry in Clause 17(1) (a) of EP Act by deleting ‘in the course of 
operations’. 
Extend the powers of taking possession of and interfering with property in Clause 17(2)(a) to (d) of 
EP Act by empowering Brigade Commanders (and Deputy Commissioners acting as Commanders) 
– as opposed to the Secretary of State- to authorise those activities by HM Forces, constables or 
persons authorised by S of S.  
895 Extend Clause 5 of the EP Act to admit as evidence in all circumstances written statements by 
members of HM Forces or constables.  
896 Letter from Mr. A.W. Stephens Head of the Defence Secretariat to Mr. V.H.S Benham of the 
Northern Irish Office dated 16 November 1973 reference D/DS10/44/17/6 
<http://www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/publicrecords/1973/fco87_248_special_1.jpg> accessed on 17April 
2017. 
897 ibid.  
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7.41 The following clauses were proposed but it was conceded that this was not a 
comprehensive list.  
 
a. opening fire without warning on a person merely for carrying firearms (i.e. 
without having to be satisfied that they were about to use them etc.); 
b. opening fire on persons breaking a curfew who failed to halt when 
challenged; and 
c. opening fire in certain other situations, e.g. at persons who failed to halt 
when challenged, in areas designated by the S of S or, perhaps, the GOC as 
“special areas”, which would, typically, be exceptionally “hard” areas and 
which might or might not correspond with areas under curfew.898 
 
7.42 Firstly, soldiers could use lethal force if they saw someone carrying a weapon 
even if there was no suspicion that the weapon was about to be fired. Secondly, 
soldiers could aim and fire at someone who failed to stop when asked to do so 
during a curfew. In other words, soldiers could open fire when there is no risk to 
life or property but the target was breaking a curfew order and failed to stop. 
Thirdly, soldiers could take aim and fire if a person who failed to stop when asked 
to do so and the area was a designated ‘special area’. The Operation plans explain 
that ‘special areas’ would be exceptionally ‘hard’ areas. The term ‘hard’ area is 
not defined but presumably these ‘hard’ areas would be Roman Catholic areas 
where support for the IRA was strong. The legal implications of these kinds of 
clauses have already been discussed in relation to the Tuzo Plan earlier in this 
chapter.  
 
7.43 Operation Folklore was never implemented but it shows just how aggressive 
British Army thinking was at the time, how seriously the threat from the IRA was 
taken, and reveals a willingness to contemplate heavy civilian casualties in both 
the British Army and Whitehall. Hamill quotes a conversation between Major-
General Ford and the Prime Minister Edward Heath in 1972 that suggests that 
heavy civilian casualties were also willing to be contemplated at the highest levels 
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of government.899 Major–General Ford briefed Edward Heath, Harry Tuzo and Sir 
Michael Carver on the details of Operation Motorman. Operation Motorman was 
the Operation that was implemented in place of Operation Folklore in July and 
August of 1972. Operation Motorman was a much less aggressive plan that aimed 
simply to get rid of the ‘no-go’ areas ‘and establish a continuing presence in all 
hard areas’.900  
 
7.44 The Prime Minister, Edward Heath, asked about the number of casualties the 
British Army anticipated if Operation Motorman was implemented. Edward 
Heath asked if it would be as many as a thousand casualties. Major–General Ford 
replied that he thought the number of casualties would be no more than a hundred. 
This he speculated could potentially include ten dead with ninety injured. 901 
Edward Heath responded saying ‘I think up to 100 casualties is politically 
acceptable’. 902  The conversation reveals that the Prime Minister was clearly 
willing to contemplate heavy civilian casualties even after Bloody Sunday. It also 
suggests the Operation Folklore, a much more aggressive plan, would have 
involved for more than a hundred civilian casualties although no estimates are 
given in the Operation plans.  
 
7.45 Operation Folklore may not have been implemented because the number of 
casualties and scale of devastation was politically unacceptable, or because the 
levels of violence never reached the threshold to warrant its implementation. 
Another explanation is that there was a change in British strategy. Operation 
Folklore is arguably underpinned by the belief that defeating PIRA is a pre-
condition to beginning peace talks but after direct rule was imposed the British 
came to understand that ‘political and military aims were (…) crucially 
interdependent’. 903  For this reason, it has been suggested that Operation 
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Motorman [that was implemented in 1972] represented the subordination of the 
military desire to destroy PIRA to the political need for negotiation.904  
 
7.46 Operation Folklore clearly envisaged that the British Army would continue to 
operate under the ordinary criminal law but that a ‘blanket immunity’ from 
prosecution would be granted to soldiers. Operation Folklore proposed to widen 
the emergency powers to allow the British Army a much freer reign. On the one 
hand this could be understood as just that. The plans for Operation Folklore 
merely extended existing powers. On the other hand, it could be argued that the 
extensions contemplated changed the very nature of the powers involved. Even if 
this was not necessarily the case when looking at individual powers, when taken 
collectively, the widening of these powers to the extent that was contemplated, in 
conjunction with the sheer numbers of soldiers involved in the Operation, 
changed the nature of those powers. With the huge numbers involved in the 
Operation, and the focus of the Operation on Roman Catholic areas, it seems 
likely that every Roman Catholic family would have been affected.  
 
7.47 It is also clear that the military equated having more powers, with ability to deal 
more effectively with the conflict. In other words, there was an assumption 
underpinning military thinking at the time, that loosening restrictions on the 
Security Forces would translate into anti-terrorist benefits. There was no 
recognition that giving sweeping powers to the British Army might produce a 
‘backlash’. 905 So there was no thought given to the idea that more repressive 
legislation operating in an ambiguous or legally undetermined way might provide 
the IRA with an opportunity to mobilise more support for its cause.  
 
7.48 Extending the emergency powers in this way raises some obvious legal issues at a 
domestic level and also at an international level. In terms of international law, like 
the Tuzo Plan before it, Operation Folklore might have been used to re-categorise 
the conflict as an international humanitarian conflict and as such, engage 
international humanitarian law. If there had been no re-categorisation of the 
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conflict then the relevant international legal framework would have remained the 
European Convention.906  
 
 
Contingency Planning and ECHR Obligations 
 
7.49 Article 2907 of the European Convention requires the British government to take 
steps to safeguard the lives of everyone in the United Kingdom. The State is 
expressly forbidden to take life. Article 2 is one of the four exceptions from the 
power to derogate in Article 15 of the European Convention. However, there is no 
breach of Article 2 if death results from the use of force that is no more than 
absolutely necessary: 
 
• In self-defence or the defence of another from unlawful violence 
• To lawfully arrest someone or prevent them escaping lawful detention  
• To take action lawfully to quell a riot or insurrection. 
 
7.50 The key test is that the force used must absolutely or ‘strictly necessary’.908 In 
other words, the force used must be essential and proportionate to address the 
problem concerned and no other action, short of using lethal force, could have 
achieved that purpose.  
 
7.51 The powers suggested in Operation Folklore in relation to the use of lethal force 
in situations where no life is threatened, no-one is being arrested or trying to 
escape lawful custody, and the force is not used to quell a riot or insurrection 
would certainly have put the United Kingdom in breach of its treaty obligations.  
 
7.52 Article 2 also requires that there is an official investigation into all deaths arising 
out of the States use of force and that the investigation is ‘independent, prompt 
and transparent.’ 909 The duty to investigate a death under Article 2 is closely 
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linked to Article 13 and the right to an effective remedy. An investigation into a 
suspicious death must be designed to lead to criminal proceedings.910 All these 
cases came before the Court after 1972 when Operation Folklore was being 
planned. However, the blanket provision of immunity from prosecution as 
contemplated in Operation Folklore would still have been problematic because of 
the link between Article 2 and Article 13.  
 
7.53 In recently declassified files, the Tactical Doctrine Working Party Study of 
Counter-Revolutionary Operations post 1975 reveals that the MOD was aware 
that the powers proposed under Operation Folklore ‘could conflict to a greater or 
lesser extent with the European Convention on Human Rights’.911 However, the 
study concludes that ‘these powers are so essential for military efficiency, that 
they are recommended notwithstanding the terms of the Convention’.912 There is a 
suggestion that the powers be used in a ‘reasonable way and in such a manner as 
to minimise potential conflict with the Convention’ 913  but it is clear that the 
Tactical Doctrine Working Party Study did not recommend that Britain’s legal 
obligations under the European Convention could be allowed to take priority over 
military efficiency.  
 
7.54 Both the Tuzo Plan and Operation Folklore do not appear to have been shown to 
any government lawyers before being presented to ministers. This oversight may 
of course have been rectified had the plans ever been implemented, but the fact 
that legal advice was not sought as the plans were being developed, suggests that 
the legality of the plans was not a priority to those senior British Army officers 
and Whitehall officials involved in their development.  
 
7.55 Operation Folklore was never implemented but is interesting because it provides 
an insight into what civil servants and senior military officers were willing to 
contemplate in relation to domestic and international law. The next chapter will 
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look at policies that were implemented, specifically Operation Demetrius and the 




Chapter 7: Internment and the use of in-depth interrogation914 and how 
the British dealt with allegations of abuse relating to these two policies 
 
8.1 In trying to assess whether successive British governments were committed to 
operating within the law this chapter will focus on the policy of internment and 
the introduction of what was termed ‘interrogations in-depth’. It will then look at 
how allegations of abuse in relation to these two policies were dealt with by the 
British government.  
 
8.2 Internment and in-depth interrogation are arguably the most contentious policies 
introduced during the recent Troubles. The idea is that if the British government’s 
commitment to operating within the law was less than it might have been in 
relation to these two policies, despite the inevitable public and media scrutiny 
they would attract, then the implications is that commitment to the rule of law 
would be even more lacking for less controversial policies. In other words, 
commitment to operating within the law in relation to the introduction of the most 
contentious policies is being used as a bell-weather to make assumptions about 
the British government’s commitment to operating within the law in relation to 
less controversial policies.  
 
8.3 There are two competing theories that attempt to explain the impact on the 
conflict of increasing the legal powers of the Security Forces.  The first theory and 
the prevailing theory at the time, is that increased legal powers translated into 
anti-terrorist benefits. In other words, additional legal powers are understood to 
act as a ‘force multiplier’. That is the increased legal powers represent a 
capability, which when employed by the Security Forces, would significantly 
increase the potential of the Security Forces and the probability of success in 
military terms.915  
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8.4 The alternative theory is that the introduction of further legal powers, which tend 
to be repressive in nature, will generate both a sense of grievance in the ‘other’ 
community and it will increase the risk of creating genuine grievances. 
Grievances, whether genuine or perceived, undermine the States claim to 
legitimacy. This in turn presents terrorist organisations with opportunities to 
mobilise support. Increased support leads to increased levels of violence. This 
sequence of events is sometimes referred to as the ‘backlash’.916 Repressive legal 
powers create a violent backlash that leads to even more repressive legal powers, 
and so the downward cycle continues.  
 
8.5 On this understanding, the law is not standing outside the conflict, merely 
providing a set of rules that govern the fight. Instead, the law represents a 
dimension of the conflict. During the Troubles the introduction of new legislation 
potentially impacted the outcome of the conflict by providing another platform on 
which the two sides could do battle. This is in addition to the battlegrounds that 
individual cases provided. Whether or not the new legislation did affect the course 
of the conflict or, indeed the outcome, will be looked at in relation to the two 
policies of internment and in-depth interrogations.  
 
The Introduction of Internment  
 
8.6 Powers contained in the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (SPA) included 
the power to re-introduce internment917 and conferred extraordinary powers of 
arrest918 and detention.919 Internment had been introduced in the province on three 
previous occasions in 1921-1924, 1938-1945 and 1956-1961. It was re-introduced 
                                                        
916 Joao Ricardo Faria, Daniel Arce, ‘Counterterrorism and Its Impact on Terrorism Support and 
Recruitment: Accounting for Backlash’ (2012) 23(5) Defence and Peace Economics 431. 
917 Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Acts 1922-1943 (Northern Ireland) Regulations 12 (S.R.&O. 
(N.I.) No. 191 1956)  
918 Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Acts 1922-1943 (Northern Ireland) Regulations 10 (S.R.&O. 
(N.I.) No. 132 1957) regulation 11 (S.R. & O. (N.I.) No.191, 156) regulation 12 (S.R.&O. (N.I.) 
No. 191 1956). The Act also gave a power of arrest to any member of H.M. Forces on duty and 
police constables in respect of any crime under the regulations.  
919 Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Acts 1922-1943 (Northern Ireland) Regulations 10 (S.R.&O. 
(N.I.) No. 132 1957) regulation 11 (S.R. & O. (N.I.) No.191, 156). 
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on the 9 August 1971920 by Mr. Brian Faulkner, who was at the time both the 
Prime Minister and Home Affairs Minister of the Northern Ireland government. 
The move to re-introduce internment was made with the consent of 
Westminster921 and Edward Heath, the British Prime Minister at the time, had 
approved the introduction of internment on the 4 August 1971.922  
 
8.7 Andrew Mumford claims that Edward Heath, put the proposal for internment 
before the full Cabinet on the 3 of August 1971.923 Heath argued that although 
internment contravened the European Convention on Human Rights this was not a 
reason to put plans to introduce internment on hold. Instead, he argued that 
because Britain was not a full member of the European Community, the United 
Kingdom was not duty-bound by the European Convention.924 Heath’s argument 
was that the situation in Northern Ireland ‘was now too grave for us to be swayed 
by such considerations’925 ‘considerations such as human rights, civil liberties and 
habeas corpus’.926  
 
8.8 It is true that in August 1971 the United Kingdom was not a member of the 
European Economic Community (EEC). 927 However, it is not clear why non-
membership of the EEC would negate British obligations under the European 
Convention adopted in 1950 by the Council of Europe and ratified in 1951 by the 
United Kingdom. 928   The Heath Cabinet in 1971 consisted of 20 Cabinet 
                                                        
920 Operation Demetrius was due to be implemented on the 10th August 1971 but was brought 
forward by 24hours in order to retain an element of surprise.  
921 ‘[A] decision for internment is a decision taken by the Northern Ireland Government after 
consultation with the Government of the United Kingdom.’ Mr. Balniel, Minister of State for 
Defence, H.C. Deb. Vol. 823, Col. 212 (September 23, 1971). 
922 On condition that Faulkner banned parades in Northern Ireland for six months. 
923 Andrew Mumford, ‘Minimum Force meets Brutality: Detention, Interrogation and Torture in 
British Counter-Insurgency Campaigns’ (20120 11(1) Journal of Military Ethics 10, 15. 
924 ibid. 
925 Edward Heath, The Course of My Life (Hodder and Stoughton 1998) 428. 
926 Mumford (n923) 15.  
927 In 1967 Britain applied to join the European Economic Community. Negotiations started in 
1970 and the UK eventually signed on 22 January 1972 and our membership came into effect on 1 
January 1973. 
928 The Council of Europe was founded by the Statute of the Council of Europe sometimes referred 
to as the Treaty of London 1949. (Statute of the Council of Europe, 87 UNTS 103 ETS 1). It was 
signed by the ten original member States. In addition, the United Kingdom had moral, though not 
legal, obligations under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948. UN General 
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Ministers of which seven were lawyers.929 It is therefore difficult to believe that 
this line of argument went unchallenged. The argument, at best, can be described 
as the British government side-stepping its obligations on what it believed was a 
technicality and at worst it represents a total disregard for convention obligations. 
Either way it undermines any claim made by the British government to being 
committed to operating within the law.  
 
8.9 In the House of Commons debates that took place on the 22 September 1971 the 
Home Secretary, Reginald Maudling, justified internment on the basis that it was 
necessary in order to contain the violence. He stated that:  
 
The object of the internment policy is to hold in safety, where they can do 
no further harm, active members of the IRA and secondly, to obtain more 
information about their activities, their conspiracy and their organisation, to 
help the Security Forces in their job of protecting the public as a whole 
against their activities.930 
 
8.10 However, the pressure to introduce internment came from the Northern Irish 
Prime Minister, Brian Faulkner. The number of bombings in Northern Ireland was 
rising significantly. In April 1971 37 bombs exploded in Northern Ireland and that 
figure steadily rose to 94 bomb attacks in July 1971.931  In total there were 304 
explosions in the first 7 months of 1971932 and shootings at the Security Forces 
was on the rise. By 9 August 1971, 13 soldiers, 2 policemen and 16 civilians had 
died since the beginning of the year.933 In addition, serious and prolonged rioting 
occurred in both Roman Catholic and Protestant areas.934  
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights 10 December 1948, 217A(III), available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3712c.html accessed 12 October 2017. 
929 The Rt.Hon. Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone, The Rt. Hon. Anthony Barber, The Rt. Hon Sir 
Keith Joseph, The Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Rippon, The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, The Rt. Hon. Peter 
Thomas and the Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Howe. 
930 Mumford (n923) 16. 
931 Ireland v United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 25 para 32. [Ireland v United Kingdom] 
932 ibid.  
933 ibid.  
934 ibid.  
201 
 
8.11 According to Richard Clutterbuck, Brian Faulkner argued that if internment was 
not introduced ‘there was a serious risk of the Protestant population taking the law 
into their own hands’.935 In its judgment in Ireland v UK the European Court of 
Human Rights noted that there had been mounting pressure for its introduction 
and that ‘there had been demonstrations against the then Prime Minister because 
of his government’s failure to deal with the IRA threat’.936 Within the Northern 
Ireland Parliament there was also intense pressure on Brian Faulkner from Ian 
Paisley to introduce internment937 and eventually ‘Faulkner and Westminster - 
succumbed to extreme Unionist pressure’. 938  The British Army operational 
instructions for Operation Demetrius 939  refer explicitly to the operation as 
‘reassurance for the majority community’.940 
 
8.12 After the Cabinet meeting on the 3 August 1971 in which Edward Heath sought 
approval for the introduction of internment 941  there was another meeting in 
Downing Street a day later at which Brain Faulkner was present.942 Heath voiced 
‘doubts about whether internment could be militarily effective in the long run’,943 
reiterating the opinion of the Official Committee on Northern Ireland given on 15 
March 1971 that internment would not help the military position.944  
 
8.13 Nor was the British Army supportive of the policy to introduce internment. The 
GOC NI, General Sir Harry Tuzo ‘did not recommend internment on military 
grounds: he considered it militarily unnecessary’.945 At the meeting Tuzo said 
                                                        
935 Richard Clutterbuck, Guerillas and Terrorists (Ohio University Press 1980) 48 
936 Ireland v United Kingdom (n931) para 35.  
937 Desmond Hamill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984 (Methuen 1985) 
56. 
938 ibid 58.  
939 Operation Demetrius was the codename for the policy of internment. 
940 The National Archive (TNA): Public Records Office (PRO) WO 296/71 Army operational 
instructions 3/71. 
941 Aaron Edwards, ‘A Whipping Boy if Ever There Was One?’ The British Army and Politics of 
Civil-Military Relations in Northern Ireland 1969-79’ (2014) 28(2) Contemporary British History 
166, 173. 
942 Also present at the meeting were GOC Sir Harry Tuzo, RUC Chief Constable Graham 
Shillingham, Home Secretary Reginald Maudling, Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home, Defence 
Secretary Peter Carrington and Chief of General Staff Sir Michael Carver.  
943 Heath (n925) 428-429.  
944 The National Archives (TNA): Public Records Office (PRO) CAB 134/3012. 
945 The National Archives (TNA): Public Records Office (PRO) CJ 4/56. 
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firmly that ‘the disadvantages of internment outweighed the advantages’.946 Prior 
to the meeting on the 29 July 1971 Tuzo gave an interview to the Belfast 
Telegraph describing internment as ‘a distasteful weapon (…) but it could 
obviously have an important effect if employed at exactly the right moment in the 
right framework’.947  It was not, however, the ‘right thing to do at the moment and 
would create other problems’. 948 At the meeting in Downing Street on the 4 
August 1971 Sir Michael Carver, Chief of General Staff, took the view that 
‘internment should not at present be recommended on military grounds’. 949 
Hamill states, that Sir Michael Carver ‘did not feel that [internment] was a good 
idea, and in fact it was the last thing he wanted’.950 In Ireland v UK the Court in 
its judgment noted that ‘as an apparent last resort to avoid introducing internment, 
Security Forces had intensified operations against suspected terrorists, mounting 
searches and detaining for questioning what were believed to be key figures in the 
IRA’.951  
 
8.14 The justification of the policy of internment was made on grounds of security952 
but if the Security Forces did not support this policy and did not recommend its 
implementation at that time, then the implication is that internment was not a 
security measure but is perhaps better ‘interpreted as a political weapon [used]… 
to outmaneuver a political enemy’.953 If this is the case then the introduction of 
this policy and the scale of its implementation may not have been warranted in the 
circumstances and this may well have implications in relation to whether British 
obligations under the European Convention were met. It also raises questions at a 
domestic level about the British government’s commitment to the rule of law in 
                                                        
946 Hamill (n937) 57. 
947 ibid 56.  
948 ibid.   
949 Heath (n925) 428.  
950 Hamill (n937) 5. In order to avoid internment Hamill states that the GOC put forward an 
alternative plan to make 100 arrests.  
951 Ireland v United Kingdom (n931) para 35. 
952 There were three reasons given to justify internment in addition to the explosions and deaths: 
1. Normal procedures for investigation and criminal prosecution had become inadequate to deal 
with PIRA terrorists. 
2. The widespread intimidation of the Northern Irish population made the collection of sufficient 
evidence to secure a conviction impossible. The ‘no-go’ areas seriously hampered police enquiries.  
3.The escape routes into the Republic presented difficulties of control for the authorities. (See 
Ireland v UK (1978) application 5310/71, paragraph 36) 
953 Mumford (n923) 16.  
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the thick sense of the term. This is because it is difficult to defend the British 
government’s decision to authorise internment in terms of proportionality or 
reasonableness if it was not necessary on security grounds and the real reason for 
the introduction of internment was to shore up a Prime Minister and his 
government.  
 
8.15 The policy of internment, or Operation Demetrius at it was called, operated under 
three pieces of legislation between August 1971 and March 1975. From August 
1971 to November 1972 internment was authorised under the Special Powers 
Act.954 Between November 1972 and August 1973 the Detention of Terrorists 
Orders, in part replaced, and in part supplemented the Special Powers Act. From 
August 1973 to August 1975 internment was authorised under the Northern 
Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973.  
 
8.16 The first swoop took place at 4.30am on the 9 August 1971 and the British Army 
arrested 342 people and took them to three detention centres across Northern 
Ireland, Castlereagh, Strand Road and Gough955 with the exception of a small 
group of 12 people956 who had been selected for ‘in-depth’ interrogation.957 The 
arrests were undertaken by parties of soldiers on the basis of an original list 
provided by the RUC Special Branch.958  
 
8.17 The twelve men selected on the 9 August 1971 for in–depth interrogations or 
intensive interrogations were taken to a secret location now known to be 
Ballykelly Airfield in Country Londonderry. It was an old RAF airfield until the 
British Army took control of it in 1971 and renamed it Shackleton Barracks. They 
                                                        
954 The power to re-introduce internment was provided by the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) 
Act (Northern Ireland) 1922-43 Regulations (S. R. & O. (N.I.) 1956, No. 191) which was originally 
enacted in 1921. 
955 Mumford (n923) 16. There were other camps used for internment and these were Magilligan, 
the Crumlin Road and the temporary internment hold on-board the prison ship Maidstone anchored 
in Belfast Lough.  
956 Two other men were subjected to in-depth interrogation in October of the same year making a 
total of fourteen. 
957 Kieran McEvoy, Paramilitary Imprisonment in Northern Ireland: Resistance, Management and 
Release (Oxford University Press, 2001) 211. 
958 Ian Brownlie, ‘Interrogation in Depth: The Compton and Parker Reports’ (1972) 35(5) Modern 
Law Review 501; Mumford (n909) 16.  
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were subjected to in-depth interrogation techniques for between five and six 
days.959 
 
8.18 The in-depth interrogations involved the following five sensory-deprivation 
techniques: hooding,960 wall-standing, food-deprivation, sleep-deprivation and the 
use of ‘white noise’.961 ‘White noise has been likened to a train letting-off steam 
and is produced by an electronic noise generator.’962 ‘The Compton Inquiry was 
unable to reconcile evidence collected on the type of wall-standing applied in 
Ballykelly’.963 Brownlie states that the detainees involved claimed that ‘they were 
forced with batons to retain the posture until they collapsed. They were then put 
back in position’. 964 ‘In contrast supervising staff claimed that although wall-
standing was used for up to six hours, no excessive force was used to keep the 
detainees in the posture.’965 The Minority Report, Parker Report confirms ‘that 
‘partial records’ of the Compton Committee’s proceedings show that subject to 
breaks for bread and water and for toilet visits, some detainees were standing 
continuously at the wall for periods of up to 16 hours’.966 The Compton Report 
also refers to the length of time each detainee spent wall-standing and the times 
range from between nine hours to 43.5 hours.967 The detainees were hooded when 
they were in each other’s presence and they were subjected to continuous loud 
noise.968 In addition, they were placed on bread and water diets for indefinite 
periods (one pound of bread and one pint of water every six hours) and deprived 
of sleep.969  
                                                        
959 Some of the detainees were held for longer than others. 
960 Samantha Newbury, ‘Intelligence and Controversial British Interrogation Techniques: The 
Northern Ireland Case 1971-2’ (2009) 20 Irish Studies in International Affairs 103, 110. The hood 
was officially referred to as a black pillow slip. 
961 Report of the committee of Privy Counsellors appointed to consider authorised procedures for 
the interrogation of persons suspected of terrorism (Cmd 4901, 1971) para 7(b) (The Parker 
Report); Report of the enquiry into allegations against the Security Forces of physical brutality in 
Northern Ireland arising out of events on the 9th August 1971 (Cmnd 4823, 1971) paras 47-52, 
Chapter VIII (The Compton Report). 
962 Newbury (n960) 111.  
963 ibid.  
964 Brownlie (n958) 502.  
965 Newbury (n960) 111.  
966 The Parker Report (n961) para 7(b). 
967 The Compton Report (n961) para 64 
968 Newbury (n960) 111.  
969 Brownlie (n958) 502.  
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The Security Forces did advance some justifications for using these techniques in 
the Compton Inquiry. 
 
The wall standing was said to minimise the risk of violence towards guards or 
other detainees. Hooding was said to protect the identities of the detainees from 
each other. The restricted diet was said to form part of the atmosphere of 
discipline and the noise was to prevent the detainees hearing or being 
overheard by each other.970 
 
8.19 Lord Balniel, Minister of State for Defence, stated that ‘the use of the five 
techniques of interrogation had been authorised by the Northern Ireland 
government with the knowledge and concurrence of Her Majesties [sic] 
Government’. 971  McCleery makes the point that ‘the first 12 cases were not 
cleared individually with Ministers in Whitehall but instead Ministerial authority 
for the general use of interrogation was obtained in the wider context of the 
decision to involve internment’.972 
 
8.20 The five techniques were outlined in ‘The Joint Directive on Military 
Interrogation in Internal Security Operations Overseas’ a report by the Joint 
Intelligence Committee in 1965. 973  The report stated that a successful 
interrogation of a prisoner ‘calls for a psychological attack’. There are allegations 
that treatment of detainees in Northern Ireland went much further than permitted 
under the guidelines. Mumford claims that it is ‘widely understood that some 
internees were forced to run barefoot through ‘obstacle courses’ that were covered 
in broken glass, as well as receiving the infamous ‘helicopter treatment’.974 The 
helicopter treatment involved hooding the detainees and taking them up in a 
helicopter and then dangling them out over the side in an effort to encourage them 
to talk. In reality, the helicopter hovered just feet above the ground but the 
detainees were unaware of this and believed they were in mid-air. The helicopter 
                                                        
970 The Compton Report (n961) para 13, 15-16.  
971 Martin McCleery, Operation Demetrius and its Aftermath: A New History of The Use of 
Internment Without Trial in Northern Ireland 1971-1975 (Manchester University Press 2015) 62. 
972 ibid.  
973 Ministry of Defence, ‘Joint Directive on Military Interrogation in Internal Security Operations 
Overseas JIC (65) 15’ (Joint Intelligence Committee 17 February 1965) 
974 Mumford (n923) 18.  
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treatment was referred to in the Compton Report.975 It has also been alleged that 
the British Army administered ‘electric shock treatment on a regular basis since 
November 1971 and had given hallucinogenic drugs to prisoners in order to 
produce confessions’.976  
 
8.21 It is argued by some that internment contributed to the sharp rise in violence in the 
Province after the 9 August 1971.977 The statistics would tend to support this 
conclusion. After internment, there was an immediate rise in the level of violence. 
Seventeen people were killed in the following 48 hours.978 Between the 9 and 10 
of August 1971 Northern Ireland experienced the worst violence since 1969 and 
an estimated 7,000 people (mainly Roman Catholics) fled their homes.979 In the 
eight months prior to the introduction of internment there were 30 deaths relating 
to the Troubles. In the eight months following the introduction of internment there 
were 143 deaths.980 Other statistics take a longer view. In the first 17 months after 
internment there were 610 murders compared to 66 in the first two years leading 
up to internment.981 In the month prior to the introduction of internment there 
were 79 explosions.982 In the months following the introduction of internment the 
number of explosions increased dramatically. In August to December the number 
of explosions were 142, 186, 155, 117 and 123.983 The following year, 1972, was 
the most violent year of the conflict with ‘1,382 explosions and 10,628 shootings 
in Northern Ireland’.984 Four hundred and seventy-two people were killed, which 
represents 14% of the total number of people who died in the entire conflict.985 
                                                        
975 The Compton Report (n961) VIII 
976 John McGuffin, Internment (Anvil 1973) 124. 
977 Mumford (n923) 17.  
978 Martin Melaugh, ‘Chronology of the Conflict 1971’ CAIN web site 
<http://www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch71.htm> accessed 17 March 2017. 
979 ibid.  
980 Mumford (n923) 17.  
981 Paul Dixon and E O’ Keane, Northern Ireland since 1969 (Harlow Pearson 2011) 102. 
982 R Spjut, ‘Internment and Detention without Trial in Northern Ireland 1971-1975: Ministerial 
Policy and Practice’ (1986) 49(6) The Modern Law Review 712, 716. 
983 ibid.  
984 Michael O’Connor, Cilia Rumann, ‘Into the Fire: How to Avoid Getting Burned by the Same 
Mistakes made Fighting Terrorism in Northern Ireland’ (2003) 24(4) Cardozo Law Review 24(4) 
1657, 1680. 
985 Bill Rolston, Unfinished Business: State Killings and the Quest for the Truth (Beyond the Pale 
Publishing 2000) reproduced in CAIN at 
<http://cain.ulster.ac.uk/issues/violence/docs/rolston00.htm> accessed on 17 March 2017. 
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Most commentators see the increase in violence as being linked to the 
introduction of the emergency powers.986 Lord Gardiner in his Report noted that 
the emergency powers were counterproductive. 987  Brice Dickson, the Chief 
Commissioner of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (NIHRC) 
stated in his response to the Government White Paper Legislation against 
Terrorism 1999 ‘that internment without trial would serve as effective recruitment 
propaganda for paramilitary organisations’.988  
 
8.22 Much of the unrest is attributed to the fact that those interned came almost 
exclusively from the Roman Catholic community. In total 3,633 terrorist suspects 
were arrested during the period of internment, of which only 109 were Protestant 
Loyalists.989 It is also claimed that ‘the implementation of in-depth interrogation 
methods became one of the primary obstacles to building an effective ‘hearts and 
minds’ strategy across numerous British counter-insurgency campaigns as 
indigenous populations reacted against tales of torture in detention facilities’.990 
While both policies are linked to a hardening of the minority populations’ 
attitudes to the Security Forces, the two policies have also been linked to a boost 
in IRA numbers. 991  ‘Even Lieutenant General Sir Harry Tuzo, the General 




                                                        
986This view is not unanimously held. See Laura Donohue, Counter-terrorist Law and Emergency 
Powers in the United Kingdom 1922-2000 (Irish Academic Press, 2001) 323. Donohue concludes 
that it is most likely that the emergency powers did lead to a decrease in violence by the mid 1970s. 
987 Report of a Committee to Consider, In the Context of Civil Liberties and Human Rights, 
Measures to Deal with Terrorism in Northern Ireland (Cmnd 5847, 1975) para 7-8 (The Gardiner 
Report). 
988 NIHRC response, to the White Paper Legislation Against Terrorism, April 1999 para 7.2 
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990 Mumford (n923) 12.  
991 Newbury (n960) 104.  
992 Andrew Sanders, ‘Operation Motorman (1972) and the search for a coherent British 




The British Government Response to the Public Outcry at Internment  
 
8.23 Internment was authorised between August 1971 and March 1975 in Northern 
Ireland. The use of the five techniques was halted after the initial 14 men993 who 
underwent this form of interrogation were released after between five and seven 
days.994 None of these 14 men were charged with any offence but the objective of 
the in-depth interrogations was not to collect evidence in preparation for a 
criminal trial.995 The objective was to collect intelligence that could later be used 
as the basis of further investigations.  
 
8.24 In any case, it has been claimed that confession evidence obtained using in-depth 
interrogation techniques would have violated the Judges Rules in force at the 
time.996 Prior to the introduction of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
police interrogations were governed by Judges Rules which were directions issued 
by the Home Office as guidance for police officers interrogating suspects. 
Incriminating statements made by suspects would only be allowed into evidence if 
a judge found the confession to have been made voluntarily. Bishop claims that 
the ‘courts in Northern Ireland would not have found an incriminating statement 
made by a defendant subjected to [in-depth interrogation] to be voluntary’.997  
 
8.25 A summary of the intelligence obtained from the initial twelve men that 
underwent in-depth interrogation was described in the Parker Report. The 
intelligence included: 
 
• Details of possible IRA operations, arms caches, safe houses, communications, 
supply routes for arms and explosives, and the location of wanted persons; 
• Over 40 sheets of IRA order of Battle and details of approximately 500 IRA 
personalities; and 
                                                        
993 Twelve men were subjected to the five techniques initially and then two more men were 
subjected to the same techniques in the autumn of 1971. 
994 Newbury (n960) 115.  
995 Joseph Bishop, ‘Law in the Control of Terrorism and Insurrection: The British Laboratory 
Experience’ (1978) 42(2) Law and Contemporary Problems 140, 162. 
996 ibid 161.  
997 ibid 169.  
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• Over 40 outstanding major incidents were also cleared from Police records.998 
 
8.26 Information from the two men that underwent in-depth interrogation in October 
produced similar intelligence. Specifically, that information included: 
 
• Identification of over 180 members of both wings of the IRA and their position 
in the Order of Battle; 
• Allocation and description of approximately 80 weapons; 
• Details of morale, operational directives, propaganda techniques, relationships 
with other organisations and future plans; and 
• Clearance of a further 45 major incidents outstanding on Police records.999 
  
8.27 The documentation providing the summary of the intelligence obtained from the 
fourteen men does not make it clear whether or not this intelligence was already 
known to the Security Forces or whether it could have been obtained in another 
way. ‘Stepping over these issues helped the MOD construct its case for the 
indispensability of the five techniques as aids to gathering intelligence by 
interrogation in internal security operations.’1000  
 
8.28 Within a week, the Irish newspapers spelled out what the five sensory techniques 
used in in-depth interrogations involved. The response of the British government 
to the inevitable public outcry to what many understood to be torture and 
brutality, was to set up an inquiry chaired by the British Ombudsman, Sir Edmund 
Compton.  
 
8.29 The Compton Inquiry was set up even before the first month of internment had 
come to an end. The Compton Committee1001 was established to look into the 
treatment of the first batch of internees arrested during Operation Demetrius. The 
                                                        
998 TNA DEFE 13/958 Intelligence gained from Northern Ireland quoted in Newbury (n953) 115. 
This bullet point is made in the Parker Report and is included under the section about intelligence 
gathered but it clearly does not strictly relate to intelligence obtained by the implementation of in-
depth interrogations.  
999 TNA DEFE 13/958 Intelligence gained from Northern Ireland quoted in Newbury (n953) 116.  
1000 Newbury (n960) 116.  
1001 The Compton Report (n961) 
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Committee was made up of Sir Edward Compton, His Honour Edgar Fay, Q.C., 
and Dr. Ronald Gibson.1002 Its mandate was to investigate allegations of physical 
brutality by those arrested on the day. The focus of the inquiry concerned the 
interrogations in-depth. The Committee sat in secret and for those giving evidence 
legal representation was limited. The lawyers were never allowed to cross-
examine witnesses nor have transcripts of the evidence as of right. What is 
perhaps most surprising is that only one complainant appeared before the 
Committee.   
 
8.30 The Compton Report was according to Ian Brownlie ‘not concerned much with 
law’.1003 Instead the Report focused on the concept of physical brutality, a term 
contained in the inquiry’s terms of reference. The Report concluded that physical 
ill-treatment had taken place but that there had been no brutality. The Report 
stated that:  
 
We consider that brutality is an inhuman or savage form of cruelty, and that 
cruelty implies a disposition to inflict suffering, coupled with indifference 
to, or pleasure in, the victim’s pain. We do not think that happened here. 
1004 
 
8.31 The Report was criticised because it failed to look at the cumulative effects of the 
five techniques if used in combination on one individual, instead choosing to 
understand the five techniques as mutually exclusive. Another criticism was that 
the inquiry failed to take into account the psychological side-effects of 
interrogation, focusing instead on physical effects. According to Andrew 
Mumford the Commission was therefore able to ‘side–step[ing] one of the most 
long-term and disturbing effects of internment’. 1005  In addition, the Compton 
Report was also criticised because of the way the definition of the word ‘brutality’ 
was manipulated. McGuffin described the refinement of language as ‘emasculated 
semantics’. 1006 The Report appeared to be saying that the ill-treatment of suspects 
                                                        
1002 Sir Edmund Compton was a civil servant and Dr. Ronald Gibson was a physician.  
1003 Brownlie (n958) 502.  
1004 The Compton Report (n947) para 23 
1005 Mumford (n923) 18.  
1006 John McGuffin, Internment (Anvil 1973) 116. 
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did not amount to torture because the British interrogators did not harbor a 
‘disposition to inflict suffering, coupled with indifference to, or pleasure in, the 
victim’s pain’1007 – a view that would find little support in any criminal court in 
the United Kingdom.  
 
8.32 The Compton Report failed to satisfy the critics and a second commission under 
Lord Parker was established in 1972 to review once again British interrogation 
methods. This time the Committee was tasked with examining the authorised 
procedures themselves rather than the application of the authorised procedures. 
Following the publication of the Compton Report, Edward Heath made a 
statement referring to the ‘five techniques’. The statement attempted to justify the 
use of the ‘five techniques’ by focusing on the intelligence gathered and the lives 
saved as a result.1008 
 
8.33 The Parker Committee failed to come to an agreement.1009 Lord Parker and Mr. 
Boyd-Carpenter in their Majority Report stressed the necessity of interrogation in 
volatile situations similar to the one faced by the British in Northern Ireland, and 
reached the conclusion that the five techniques fell within the guidelines set out in 
the 1965 directive on interrogation.  
 
8.34 The Joint Directive on Military Interrogation in Internal Security Operations 
Overseas states:  
 
Under conditions of emergency, or near emergency, there is likely to be 
internal security legislation controlling the treatment of detainees and arrested 
persons. Legislation will vary from country to country and reflect prevailing 
conditions. Military personnel are to acquaint themselves with the laws of the 
country concerned, and will not act unlawfully under any circumstances 
whatever.1010 
 
                                                        
1007 The Compton Report (n961) para 23 
1008 Newbury (n960) 116.  
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The Directive had been reviewed in 1967 by a senior barrister who had tightened 
up the procedures to ‘ensure careful medical oversight of detainees’.1011  
 
8.35 The Majority Report noted that this section of the Directive was not observed1012 
and that the ‘application of some of the techniques may amount to criminal 
assaults’.1013 In other words, the Parker Committee concluded that the detainees 
had suffered illegal treatment. However, the Report appeared to be less troubled 
by this finding than it was about protecting those members of the Security Forces 
involved in committing those offences. The Report stated ‘it would be for the 
Minister concerned to take advice as to the legal position and if need be to take 
steps to ensure protection for those taking part in the operation’.1014 This would 
presumably be in the form of an indemnity act.  The alternative would be to 
obtain legal insurance in advance and that would leave the degree of ill-treatment 
without limits. In other words, it would allow the British interrogators to do 
whatever was necessary to obtain the information required.  
 
8.36 However, the Minority Report of Lord Gardiner disagreed with the Parker Report 
on the issue of legality. Lord Gardiner stressed the illegal nature of the five 
techniques. In the final paragraph of the Minority Report he wrote: 
 
The blame for this sorry story, if blame there be, must lie with those who, 
many years ago decided that in an emergency conditions in Colonial–type 
situations we should abandon our legal, well-tried and highly successful 
wartime interrogation methods and replace them by procedures which were 
secret, illegal, not morally justifiable and alien to the tradition of what I believe 
still to be the greatest democracy in the world.1015 
 
8.37 What he also mentioned in his conclusion was that those members of the military 
giving evidence to the Committee admitted that they had ‘never considered 
whether the procedures were legal or illegal’ and in addition there were no 
                                                        
1011 McCleery (n971) 62.  
1012 The Parker Report (n961) para 38 
1013 ibid.  
1014 ibid para 37.  
1015 ibid para 21.  
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guidelines as to how the techniques should be implemented.  The issue of 
guidelines was also addressed in the majority Report. Guidelines, it was 
suggested, would provide safeguards against abuse and ensure that the application 
of the techniques did not amount to assault in the future. The fact that the legality 
of using the five techniques had never been considered by the military is quite 
revealing. Such an admission certainly undermines the credibility of any claim by 
the British Army that it was determined to operate within the law.  
 
8.38 The MOD and members of the British intelligence community believed that the 
‘five techniques’ represented a very useful tool in the fight against terrorism.1016 
They were keen to ensure that the use of the five techniques continued to be 
permitted in the future. A meeting chaired by Dunnett in November 1971 was 
held to discuss how the submissions to the Parker Report ought to be worded.1017 
The issue was how to justify the use of hooding, wall-standing and white sound. 
The dilemma was whether it was best to admit that these three techniques had a 
dual purpose in that they served as security measures as well as ‘softening up’ 
detainees before interrogation or whether it was better to justify the techniques in 
terms of security alone. Sir Richard White1018 argued that the techniques should 
be justified on security grounds alone because using the techniques to soften up 
detainees would, he said, ‘lay us open to possible charges of physical assault’.1019 
This line of reasoning again undermines the credibility of the claim that the 
British Army was determined to operate within the law.  
 
8.39 On the day of the publication of the Parker Report, 2 March 1972, Edward Heath 
announced that the use of the five techniques was to be discontinued. He stated 
that the techniques ‘will not be used in future as an aid to interrogation’.1020 The 
British government then issued instructions to the Security Forces prohibiting the 
                                                        
1016 Newbury (n960) 117.  
1017 ibid. 113.  
1018 Former Director-General of both MI5 and MI6.  
1019 Newbury (n960) 113.  
1020 HC Deb 2 March 1972 vol 832 cols 743-9 Interrogation Techniques (Parker Committee 
Report) <www.handsard.millbanksystem.com/commons /1972/mar/02/interrogation-techniques-
parker> accessed on 17th March 2017.  
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use of the techniques, whether singly or in combination.1021 It is worth mentioning 
again that none of the 14 men were charged with a crime and the men received 
between £10,000 and £25,000 in out of court settlements.1022 
 
The Use of Public Enquiries  
 
8.40 Facing allegations of what amounted to very serious assaults, the British 
government’s response was not to initiate a criminal investigation but instead the 
British government’s response was to commission a public inquiry closely 
followed by another. This decision was taken despite the fact that the criminal 
justice system was perhaps a more obvious vehicle to deal with such serious 
allegations. It has been argued that the criminal justice system ‘is the best legal 
way to address such violations because the result will be a binding decision and 
help restore the rule of law that the abuses have undermined’.1023 The government 
decision to hold a public inquiry rather than deal with the allegations of abuse in 
the justice system may itself reveal a lack of determination on the part of the 
British government to see those members of the Security Forces involved held to 
account.1024  
 
8.41 A public inquiry is a legal mechanism to investigate, examine and report upon 
issues of grave public concern. Representatives of the State argue that public 
inquiries expose the facts and ‘offers the opportunity to satisfy public concern and 
ensure accountability’.1025 There were six public inquiries1026 set up in Northern 
                                                        
1021 Elihu Lauterpacht; Greenwood CJ, International Law Reports (Cambridge University Press 
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1026 Report of the Commission Appointed by the Northern Ireland Disturbances in Northern 
Ireland (Cmd 532, 1969) (The Cameron Report); Report of the enquiry into allegations against the 
Security Forces of physical brutality in Northern Ireland arising out of events on the 9th August 
1971 (Cmnd 4823, 1971) (The Compton Report); Report of the committee of Privy Counsellors 
appointed to consider authorised procedures for the interrogation of persons suspected of 
terrorism (Cmnd 4901, 1972)(The Parker Report); Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire into 
the events on Sunday, 30 January 1972, which led to the loss of life in connection with the 
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Ireland to address widespread public disquiet about various matters. Angela 
Hegarty argues that ‘their use has been significantly more limited in Northern 
Ireland’ than elsewhere in the United Kingdom.1027 However, that may be true if 
looked at over the 30 years of the Troubles but in terms of the early years of the 
conflict there were five public inquiries into the behaviour of the Security Forces 
in the first three years of the conflict. The British government was clearly quite 
heavily reliant on this mechanism of dealing with public disquiet rather than 
investigating suspected wrongdoing using the justice system.  
 
8.42 A public inquiry usually examines one particular event or occurrence. It does not 
result in a binding enforceable decision but instead results in advice or 
recommendations. The Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921 provides for an 
inquiry ‘when it appears to the government that a matter of vital public 
importance requires clarification’.1028 Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921 
states that a Tribunal of Inquiry ‘is for inquiring into a definite matter described 
(…) as of urgent public importance’.1029 
 
8.43 There are two types of public inquiry in the United Kingdom, statutory and non-
statutory. 1030 Public inquiries under the 1921 Act must sit in public, but non-
statutory tribunals may sit in private if considering sensitive intelligence. Both 
                                                                                                                                                                       
procession in Londonderry on that day (HL 101, HC 220, 1972) (The Widgery Report); Report of 
Tribunal of Inquiry Violence and Civil Disturbances in Northern Ireland in 1969 (Cmnd 566, 
1972) (The Scarman Report); Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry (HC 30, 2010-11) (The Saville 
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The Report of the Advisory Committee on Police in Northern Ireland (Cmnd 535, 1969) (The Hunt 
Report); Report of the Commission to Consider Legal Procedures to Deal with Terrorist Activities 
in Northern Ireland (Cmnd 5185, 1972) (The Diplock Report); Report of a Committee to Consider, 
In the Context of Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Measures to deal with Terrorism In Northern 
Ireland 1975, (Cmnd 5847, 1975)(The Gardiner Report); Report of the Committee of Inquiry into 
Police Interrogation Procedures in Northern Ireland (Cmnd 7497, 1979) (The Bennett Report).  
1027 Hegarty (n1022) 1157.  
1028 Jack Beatson, ‘Should Judges Conduct Public Inquiries?’ (2004) 37(2) Israel Law Review 238, 
239. 
1029 Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921 s1. 
1030 At common law, the Crown has the power to set up a public inquiry. The inquiry can be held in 
private or in public. However, public inquires set up under the Crown’s common law powers do 
not have any rights with respect to compulsion of evidence. Under the Tribunals of Inquiry 
(Evidence) Act 1921 the inquiry may be set up with powers to compel evidence. This can be done 
if a motion is passed by both Houses of Parliament.  
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types have been used in Northern Ireland. 1031  The House of Lords Select 
Committee stated that ‘inquiries are a major feature of our unwritten constitution 
and play an important part in the way the executive deals with major crises’.1032 
The British government may claim that public inquiries come to the truth and 
establish accountability but this line of argument is not universally accepted. ‘It is 
claimed that public inquiries are employed by governments not as a tool to find 
the truth and establish accountability for human rights violations, but as a way of 
deflecting criticism and avoiding blame.’1033 In other words, public inquiries are a 
mechanism of shielding the State from domestic and international criticism.  
 
8.44 One of the issues is that the terms of reference for public inquiries are set by the 
government of the day and the parameters are normally quite tightly defined. 
Given their terms of reference neither the Compton Report nor the Parker Report 
questioned the necessity or legality of the policy of internment when dealing with 
a state of emergency.  
 
8.45 The obvious example to use to demonstrate the insulating effect of a Public 
Inquiry would be the Widgery Report on Bloody Sunday. Bloody Sunday was an 
incident that took place on 30 January 1972 in the Bogside area of Derry in which 
the British Army shot twenty-six unarmed civilians during a protest march against 
internment. Fourteen people died, thirteen were killed outright, while the death of 
another man four months later was attributed to his injuries sustained on that day. 
 
8.46 The Widgery Report supported the British government’s version of events, 
finding no substantive fault on the part of the British Army and no general 
breakdown in discipline, although Widgery did speculate that at one point, the 
Army firing ‘bordered on the reckless’.1034 ‘The Widgery Report was regarded as 
unpersuasive by significant sections of the population in Northern Ireland and in 
                                                        
1031 The Scarman Inquiry and The Widgery Inquiry were set up under the Tribunals of Inquiry 
(Evidence) Act 1921. The Saville Inquiry is an example of a non-statutory inquiry. 
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Britain.’1035 However, Hegarty goes further and argues ‘the aim of the Widgery 
Inquiry was not to find out the truth, nor to provide accountability for the deaths, 
but to allow the State to validate its behaviour’.1036  
 
8.47 The Saville Inquiry, 1037 the second inquiry into Bloody Sunday came to very 
different conclusions. The Saville Inquiry concluded that:  
The firing by soldiers of 1 PARA on Bloody Sunday caused the deaths of 
13 people and injury to a similar number, none of whom was posing a threat 
of causing death or serious injury. What happened on Bloody Sunday 
strengthened the Provisional IRA, increased nationalist resentment and 
hostility towards the British Army and exacerbated the violent conflict of 
the years that followed. Bloody Sunday was a tragedy for the bereaved and 
the wounded, and a catastrophe for the people of Northern Ireland.1038 
8.48 The fact that the two Reports had such different conclusions would tend to lend 
weight to Hegarty’s argument that the British government relied upon public 
inquiries to shield itself from criticism. The argument being that in 1972, the date 
of the first inquiry, the British government needed it confirmed that the soldiers 
were in the right to open fire. In 2010, the date of the second inquiry, the peace 
process was underway and the British government’s priority was to aid the 
reconciliation process. By acknowledging past wrongdoing, the British 
government was arguably encouraging that process. What also seems clear, is that 
if the function of a public inquiry is to validate the actions of the State, then the 
British government’s dependence on public inquires during the Troubles in 
Northern Ireland would call into question the British government’s commitment 
to act within the law.  
 
8.49 If the function of a public inquiry is to vindicate State activity then there is risk 
that the public will perceive a cover-up. Any suspicion of a government 
whitewash could provide a grievance for the ‘other community’ that could in turn 
                                                        
1035 Beatson (n1028) 269.  
1036 Hegarty (n1022) 1148.  
1037 Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry (HC 30, 2010) (The Saville Report). 
1038 ibid. para 5.5 Principal Conclusions and Overall Account of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry. 
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mobilise support for terrorist organisations. Increased support for the terrorists 
could potentially lead to more violence. In other words, a perception of a 
whitewash can lead to a ‘backlash’ in the same way repressive legislation can.  
 
8.50 The use or some would say over-use of public inquiries in Northern Ireland during 
the first phase of the Troubles, arguably side-lined the justice system and ensured 
that State agents involved in committing crimes were not brought to account. 
Nevertheless, the British government did take into account at least some of the 
recommendations made in the reports published by the various public inquiries. 
‘It is certainly true that public inquiries have had more impact on investigating 
events or policies, including the policy of internment and the use of the five 
techniques than the House of Lords.’1039 
 
8.51 Internment was introduced during the recent Troubles on 9 August 1971 and 
discontinued on the 5 December 1975. During that period 1,981 people were 
detained without charge or trial during this period and of those 1,874 were Roman 
Catholics and only 107 were Protestants. Internment is ‘almost universally 
recognised … as an utter failure’1040 and has been described by one commentator 
as a ‘grotesque mistake’. 1041  O’Connor claims that ‘Most commentators also 
recognised internment as a debacle that was totally ineffective at reducing the 
levels of political violence.’ 1042 The policy of internment effectively alienated the 
Roman Catholic community partly because it targeted Roman Catholics and 
partly because ‘many of those interned had no previous involvement in 
paramilitary or terrorist activities’.1043 The brutal treatment of those interned was 
also ‘frequently identified as critical to the decision to join outlawed paramilitary 
organisations’. 1044  Another consequence of internment and the brutality those 
interned suffered was that it undermined the justice system as a whole. Lord 
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Gardiner commented that internment was ‘not considered just by members of the 
general public’ 1045  and that ‘delays, the admission of hearsay evidence, the 
inability to cross-examine witnesses and the lowered standard of proof … [were] 
not ‘British justice’.1046  
 
8.52 The introduction of these two policies raises questions about the government’s 
commitment to the rule of law. These questions relate to the reasons that 
internment was introduced and the fact that they were understood, at the highest 
levels of government, to put the United Kingdom in breach of its European 
Convention obligations. The evidence is fragmented and provides just glimpses of 
the whole picture, but does reveal that Ministers and senior military officers did 
not prioritise acting within the law in relation to these controversial policies 
despite being under the media spotlight. In addition, it has been claimed that the 
government attempted to sidestep the justice system through the use of public 
inquiries and in doing so, shield those involved in the application of the five 
techniques from prosecution.  
 
8.53 If the British government lacked commitment to the rule of law in relation to 
these two policies, the next chapter will examine the extent to which the courts, 
both domestic and international, were able to hold the British government in 
‘check’ in relation to these policies.  
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Chapter 8: The Framing of the Conflict within International Law and 
the Role of the House of Lords and the European Court of Human Rights  
 
9.1 The previous chapter examined the policies of internment and in-depth 
interrogation and how the British government chose to investigate alleged abuses 
relating to those policies. The focus of this chapter is to explore whether the 
European Court of Human Rights held the United Kingdom to account for alleged 
abuses in relation to these two policies, both during the Troubles and since the 
signing of the Good Friday Agreement in April 1998.1047 It will also explore the 
role of the House of Lords during the Troubles and the role of lawyers in Northern 
Ireland.  
 
International Law and Northern Ireland 
 
9.2 Determining which legal standard framed the conflict in Northern Ireland is a 
significant part of the conflict. Asserting that one legal framework is more 
appropriate than another, involves making claims about the nature of the conflict 
itself. Christine Bell has described this battle as a meta-conflict or a ‘conflict 
about a conflict’.1048  
 
9.3 In trying to assess the British government’s commitment to operating within the 
law, it might be useful to look at how the British government’s preferred 
international legal framework, namely the European Convention on Human 
Rights,1049 came to be essentially the only international legal framework through 
which the conflict was contested. In addition, it might be helpful to examine the 
extent to which ‘that legal framework served Britain well in terms of shielding the 
United Kingdom on the one hand, and on the other hand reinforcing its own 
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conflict-narrative’.1050 The suggestion being that this was less a commitment to 
the rule of law and more a commitment to self-interest. 
 
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law 
 
9.4 In the early years of the Troubles, the international legal framework governing the 
conflict was far from clear. The British government ‘spent much of the Northern 
Ireland conflict emphasising the ‘internal’ nature of the problem’.1051 In doing so 
it was attempting to limit the applicability of the alternative possible legal 
framework, namely international and non-international humanitarian law. 
However, at the start of the conflict in 1969, the Republic of Ireland contested its 
‘internal’ nature. Articles 2 and 3 1052  of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Ireland 1053  contained a territorial claim to Northern Ireland. Acting on this 
territorial claim the Irish Republic attempted to internationalise the conflict 
through the United Nations.  
 
9.5 In August 1969, the Republic of Ireland requested an urgent meeting1054 of the 
Security Council under Article 35 of the UN Charter.1055  Article 35 of the UN 
Charter provides that any member may bring any dispute or situation of the nature 
referred to in Article 34 to the attention of the Council or the Assembly. Article 
34 provides that the Council (not the Assembly) may: 
 
Investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction or 
give rise to a dispute in order to determine whether continuance of the dispute or 
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321, 334. 
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situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security.1056  
 
The written request by the Republic mentioned a desire to see a United Nations 
peacekeeping force deployed in Northern Ireland because the use of British troops 
was unlikely to restore peaceful conditions.1057 In an attempt to get the written 
request included on the Security Council’s provisional agenda, the Irish Minister 
for External Affairs, Dr. Hillery, addressed the Security Council. In his address, 
he emphasised that the Irish government did not accept that the United Kingdom 
had jurisdiction over the territory1058 and strongly denied the applicability of the 
domestic affairs exception under Article 2(7). ‘Dr. Hillery pointed out that the 
General Assembly had discussed the question of apartheid despite the fact that 
South Africa maintained that it came within Article 2(7).’1059 South Africa’s claim 
that the policy of apartheid was an internal matter had not prevented the General 
Assembly from discussing the matter. The argument being that the United 
Kingdom’s claim that the conflict in Northern Ireland was an internal matter 
should similarly not prevent the matter being discussed in the General Assembly. 
Dr. Hillery also brought to the Council’s attention the fact that Britain had argued 
in favour of United Nations intervention in the inter-communal troubles in 
Cyprus, a sovereign member State.1060 
 
9.6 Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter states: 
 
2. The Organisation and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in 
Article 1 shall act in accordance with the following Principles. 
 
(7) Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations 
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement 
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under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application 
of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll.1061 
 
9.7 The Irish position gained valuable support from the USSR but not enough to win 
the day.1062 The British representative, Lord Caradon, immediately insisted the 
principle of non-discussion of internal affairs stated in Article 2(7) operated to 
preclude Council jurisdiction.  
 
9.8 The Irish government then attempted on 5 September 1969 to have an item 
entitled ‘The situation in the North of Ireland’ included on the provisional agenda 
for a regular session of the General Assembly, under Rule 15.1063 The Permanent 
Representative of the Irish government, Con Cremin, sent a letter and 
accompanying explanatory memorandum to Secretary General, U Thant. In the 
memorandum, Con Cremin presented the Irish case for peaceful unification as the 
only plausible long-term solution for Northern Ireland. 1064   He argued that 
Northern Ireland was an issue for the UN because ‘partition and human rights 
violations by the Stormont government ran counter to the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the current situation was a danger to international peace 
because of its effects on Anglo-Irish relations’.1065 The Irish government cited the 
UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples 1066  and asked for the conflict to be reviewed from a discrimination 
perspective.  
 
9.9 In a cable to the FCO, the British delegate to the UN, Lord Caradon, outlined 
possible British countermoves to the Irish request.1067 He suggested that Britain’s 
best course of action would be to try to resist the inclusion of the Irish item on the 
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agenda of the General Committee on the grounds of domestic jurisdiction.1068 
Lord Caradon objected to the Irish request and ‘argued that his Government had 
taken positive and urgent action to deal with a difficult and delicate situation’.1069 
He went on to say that ‘the reforms which we wish to see are being pushed ahead 
as a matter of urgency and that a debate on the item as proposed could only 
compromise peace and progress there’. 1070 Once again the British government 
successfully argued that the conflict was a domestic affair and referred to Article 
2 (7) to prevent any debate on the issue. 
 
9.10 The result was that the conflict in Northern Ireland was defined according to the 
British claim that the conflict was an internal matter. On both occasions the issue 
was raised at the United Nations Britain relied on its international standing to 
successfully block any debate that might have undermined its own conflict-
narrative. This was despite the fact that the Sunningdale Agreement of 19731071 
and the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 19851072 both gave the Republic a consultative 
role in the peace process.  
 
9.11 Colm Campbell suggests that the British were at great pains to avoid any debate 
on the applicability of international humanitarian law to the Northern Ireland 
conflict for a number of reasons.1073 Firstly, he argues that ‘any discussion of the 
applicability of international humanitarian law to the Troubles opened up the 
possibility that not only did a liberal-democratic state have an armed-conflict 
taking place on its territory, it also may have been a participant in it’.1074 In other 
words, there was a fear that such a categorisation might have damaged Britain’s 
international standing. Secondly, the British government feared that such a debate 
would undermine its strategy of defining the conflict in terms of criminal activity 
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rather than a political struggle. 1075  Thirdly, there was desire to avoid ‘the 
possibility of creating fresh obligations for itself (…) in respect of Northern 
Ireland’.1076 The suggestion was that these additional obligations could have come 
from the application of Article 31077 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 
19491078 and also Additional Protocols I1079 and II.1080  
 
9.12 The United Kingdom signed the two Protocols in 1977 but failed to ratify them 
until 1998. It has been suggested that this fear of creating additional obligations 
was the reason why the United Kingdom failed to ratify the two Additional 
Protocols1081 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions for more than twenty years. The 
threat that either of the two Protocols might be applied to the situation in Northern 
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Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b37f40.html [accessed 2 December 2017] 
1081 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36b4.html [accessed 2 December 2017] 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b37f40.html [accessed 2 December 2017] 
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Ireland, a threat that has been described as ‘intangible’, 1082  was nevertheless, 
sufficient to delay ratification.1083 Campbell suggests that the ‘wariness appears to 
have been based on a combination of diffuse and quite specific concerns’.1084 A 
specific concern was that Additional Protocol II, if it was deemed to operate, 
would grant an amnesty at the end of the conflict1085 to those who had participated 
in the violence.1086 The idea of giving an amnesty to members of the IRA did not 
sit comfortably with the policy of criminalisation.  
 
9.13 The two Additional Protocols were ratified in 1998, the year in which ‘de-
escalation and demilitarisation in Northern Ireland really began to take effect’.1087  
By the beginning of 1998 all of the major paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland 
had announced either ceasefires or a suspension of military operations.1088 The 
fact that it took more than 20 years for the two Additional Protocols to be ratified 
and that their ratification coincided with what has been termed the ‘transition’1089 
phase of the conflict is not a coincidence, according to some commentators.1090 
 
9.14 What is more, in 1998 when the two Additional Protocols were finally ratified, the 
United Kingdom still remained cautious, and entered the following reservation 
which would have precluded the conflict in Northern Ireland falling within the 
scope of application of Additional Protocol I: 
                                                        
1082 David Turns, ‘The ‘War on Terror’ Through British and International Humanitarian Law Eyes: 
Comparative Perspective on Selected Legal Issues’ (2007) 10(2) The City University of New York 
Law Review 435, 449. 
1083 ibid.  
1084 Campbell (n1050) 332.  
1085 ibid 326.  
1086 Article 1 of Protocol II defines its ‘material field of application’ as all internal armed conflicts 
taking place in the territory of a State Party ‘between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or 
other organised armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part 
of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to 
implement this Protocol’. 
1087 Turns (n1082) 449.  
1088 Martin Melaugh, The Irish Peace Process – Chronology of Key Events (April 1998-December 
1999) CAIN web site <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/pp9899.htm> accessed on 17 November 
2017. On the 13 October 1994 the Combined Loyalist Military Council (CLMC) announced a 
ceasefire as of midnight. On the 20 July1997 the IRA renewed their ceasefire. On the 23 January 
1998 the Ulster Freedom Fighters reinstated their ceasefire.  
1089 Campbell (n1050) 326. Campbell identified three broad phases in the Troubles: the 
‘militarisation’ phase, which lasted from 1969 to 1976; followed by the ‘criminalisation’ phase 
(1977-1994) and the ‘transition’ phase from 1994-2004.  




Re: Article 1, paragraph 4 and Article 93, paragraph 3 
 
It is the understanding of the United Kingdom that the term “armed 
conflict” of itself and in its context, denotes a situation of a kind which is 
not constituted by the commission of ordinary crimes including acts of 
terrorism whether concerted or in isolation.  
 
The United Kingdom will not, in relation to any situation in which it is itself 
involved, consider itself bound in consequence of any declaration 
purporting to be made under paragraph 3 of Article 96 unless the United 
Kingdom shall have expressly recognised that it has been made by a body 
which is genuinely an authority representing a people engaged in an armed 
conflict of the type to which Article 1, paragraph 4, applies.1091 
 
9.15 The combined effect of these reservations ‘was to undercut[ing] Protocol I’s 
application to national liberation movements’ 1092 in the United Kingdom. The 
IRA claimed to be fighting a war of national liberation/self-determination in 
Northern Ireland, and in making such a claim positioned itself in such a way that 
it could have potentially made a declaration under Article 1(4). So even if the IRA 
had acceded to Protocol I, which at one point was the IRA’s declared 
intention,1093 the reservation by the United Kingdom would mean that Protocol I 
would not have applied. 1094  However, the British government’s unequivocal 
position was that the violence in the Province did not amount to an armed 
conflict.1095 
 
9.16 Additional Protocol II applies to non-international armed conflicts. In relation to 
Additional Protocol II, the British government denied that the violence in 
                                                        
1091 Letter of 28 January 1998 sent to Swiss Gov’t by Christopher Hulse, HM Ambassador of the 
UK quoted in Turns (n1082) 449.  
1092 Theodor Meron, ‘The Humanisation of Humanitarian Law’ (2002) 94(2) The American Journal 
of International Law 239, 272 
1093 ibid.  
1094 William Abresch, ‘A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The European Court of 
Human Rights in Chechnya’ (2005) 16(4) The European Journal of International Law 741, 755. 
1095 Campbell (n1050) 333.  
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Northern Ireland reached the threshold required for the application of Additional 
Protocol II. Article 1, paragraph 1 of Additional Protocol II requires that for 
hostilities to be categorised as a non-international armed conflict then the 
hostilities must take place: 
 
In the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and 
dissident armed forces or other organised armed groups which, under 
responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to 
enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to 
implement this Protocol.1096 
 
9.17 The applicability of Additional Protocol II to the conflict was much more likely 
than the applicability of Additional Protocol I. This was because it could have 
been argued that the IRA was under reasonable command and able to coordinate a 
sophisticated terrorist campaign. The IRA’s leadership consisted of an Army 
Council that issued orders to its operational units and those orders were followed. 
The units were organised into ‘commands’, ‘brigades’ and ‘battalions’. 1097  In 
addition, the IRA might arguably have met the control of territory conditions 
given their control of the ‘No-Go’ areas and certain rural areas such as South 
Armagh, where British Army patrols came under frequent sniper fire. 1098 
Nevertheless, this view of the conflict failed to gain traction. Campbell states that 
‘for much of the conflict there was little attempt to view the violence through the 
                                                        
1096 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b37f40.html [accessed 2 December 2017] 
1097 Turns (n1082) 450.   
1098 In Tadić, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) affirmed that a 
Non-International Armed Conflict exists when there is ‘protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within a State’.
 
This 
decision is widely accepted as establishing the two key criteria for qualification as a Non-
International Armed Conflict: i) intensity of the hostilities; and ii) the involvement of an organised 
armed group. In other words, the requirement for territorial control was no longer seen as necessary 
in order to establish that a non-international armed conflict existed. See Louise Armatsu, Mohbuba 
Choudhury, ‘The Legal Classification of the Armed Conflict in Syria, Yemen and Libya’  
(Chatham House Publication March 2014) 
<www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/home/chatham/public_html/sites/default/files/2
0140300ClassificationConflictsArimatsuChoudhury1.pdf> accessed 17 March 2018. 
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lens of humanitarian law apart from the occasional airing of the matter in the 
context of the status of IRA prisoners’.1099  
 
9.18 The British government’s obstruction of any discussion about the nature of the 
conflict in Northern Ireland at the Security Council or in the General Assembly 
and the failure of successive British governments to ratify the Additional 
Protocols until 1998 can be understood as straightforward devices used by the 
United Kingdom to on the one hand, protect itself, and on the other hand, 
reinforce the British conflict-narrative that the Troubles amounted an internal 
disturbance and that the violence was criminal in nature. Colm Campbell also 
suggests that ‘one effect of the very long delay in the ratification of Protocols I 
and II seems to have been to direct attention away from even the limited 
provisions of common Article 3’.1100  
 
9.19 With international humanitarian law effectively sidelined due to a failure to 
engage the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly,1101 then outside 
of domestic courts, the European Convention on Human Rights1102 was the only 
way by which policies and practices and allegations of abuse in Northern Ireland 
could be challenged.  
 
The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Relation to the 
Policies of Internment and In-depth Interrogation during The Troubles   
 
9.20 In the first inter-State case ever heard by the Court, Ireland v United Kingdom in 
19711103 although the existence of an emergency was conceded, it was claimed by 
the Irish government that the scale of detention was not strictly warranted by the 
                                                        
1099 Campbell (n1050) 330.  
1100 Campbell (n1050) 333.  
1101 There was another attempt in 1972 by Amnesty International. Amnesty International 
documented incidents of torture of prisoners by the British in Northern Ireland and communicated 
those to the UN under its ‘1503’ procedure which investigates allegations of ‘gross and persistent 
violations of human rights.’ The United Nations Sub-committee on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities began considering the situation in Northern 
Ireland. But this was a secret investigation and so had no effect. See Howard Tolley, ‘The 
Concealed Crack in the Citadel: The United Nations Commission on Human Rights’ Response to 
Confidential Communications’ (1984) 6(4) Human Rights Quarterly 420, 435. 
1102The European Convention (n1049) 
1103 Ireland v United Kingdom Application No. 5310/71 (1972) 15 YB 67. 
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circumstances and that the five sensory deprivation techniques amounted to 
torture, a non-derogable right under Article 3. The fundamental issue for Ireland 
was whether the five techniques amounted to torture under Article 3 of the 
Convention. 1104 
 
9.21 The case was argued before both the European Commission1105 on Human Rights 
in 1972 and the European Court of Human Rights in 1978.1106 The Commission 
found that the five techniques amounted to torture under the Convention. The 
Commission unanimously held the ‘combined use of the five techniques in aid of 
interrogation in the illustrative cases constituted a practice of inhuman treatment 
and torture in breach of Article 3’1107 of the ECHR. 
 
9.22 However, the finding of the Commission, in relation to the five techniques, was 
appealed in 1978. In Ireland v United Kingdom, the European Court of Human 
Rights ruled in relation to the five techniques and decided that although the five 
techniques met the threshold for inhuman and degrading treatment in breach of 
Article 3, they did not amount to torture. The Court’s decision however clearly 
stated that interrogation in-depth contravened Article 3 of the Convention. 
However, the impact of that determination was entirely overshadowed by the 
decision of the Court that in-depth interrogation did not amount to torture.  The 
Court stated: 
 
(167) Although the five techniques, as applied in combination, undoubtedly 
amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, although their object was the 
extraction of confessions, the naming of others and /or information and 
although they were used systematically, they did not occasion suffering of the 
particular intensity and cruelty implied by the word torture as so understood… 
                                                        
1104 Ireland’s application to the commission also made other allegations and these included an 
allegation that internment without trial breached article 5 and 6 (the right to liberty and security and 
a fair trial), an allegation that internment was discriminatory and in breach of Article 14 (the 
prohibition on discrimination). 
1105 Ireland v United Kingdom (1976) YB ECHR 512 (European Commission of Human Rights) 
(Report of the Commission) at 148. The European Commission no longer operates. 
1106 Ireland v United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 25. 
1107 Ireland v United Kingdom (1976) YB ECHR 512 (European Commission of Human Rights) 




(168) The court concludes that recourse to the five techniques amounted to a 
practice of inhuman and degrading treatment and was in breach of Article 
3.1108 
 
9.23 The difference of opinion between the two Convention agencies according to 
David Bonner ‘arises from a different perception of the level of severity of 
suffering required in order to place the conduct at the torture point on the 
spectrum of maltreatment ranging from degrading treatment at one end and torture 
at the other’. 1109  This divergence of opinion was not down to significantly 
different definitions of torture. 1110 Instead, the Court emphasised the need for 
‘very serious suffering’ and this led to the two very different opinions.  
 
9.24 What is also of interest here is that because this was an inter-State dispute, the 
evidence in the case was adduced by the European Commission on Human 
Rights. The Commission complained that the United Kingdom ‘did not always 
afford it the assistance desirable’.1111 This would tend to undermine British claims 
to a determined commitment to operate within the law.  
 
9.25 The Court also had to consider whether internment could be justified pursuant to 
Article 15(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 15(1) 
provides:  
 
In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any 
High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations 
                                                        
1108 Ireland v United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 25 para 167 and 168.  
1109 David Bonner, ‘Ireland v United Kingdom’ (1978) 27(4) The International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 897, 900. 
1110 The Commission view, as expressed in the first Greek Case, considered that torture generally 
constituted an aggravated form of inhuman treatment, that is the infliction of severe mental or 
physical suffering, which is applied for such purposes as extracting information or confessions 
from victims. The Court’s view was essentially similar and referred to torture as being ‘deliberate 
inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering’. 
1111 Ireland v United Kingdom Report of the Commission (n1092) para 148.   
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under this convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation.1112 
 
9.26 The Court was the final arbiter in terms of what the Convention required but the 
derogating State was given a wide margin of appreciation1113 both is terms of 
whether an emergency existed and in terms of what measures were required to 
overcome it. Whether or not an emergency existed was not looked at in Ireland v 
United Kingdom as the Court considered the existence of an emergency on 
Northern Ireland as obvious. The test laid down in Lawless as to whether an 
emergency existed was as follows: an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency 
that affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of 
the community of which the State is composed. 1114 The Court found that the 
situation in Northern Ireland satisfied this test.  
 
9.27 In terms of internment, the issue came down to whether internment without trial 
was strictly required by the exigencies of the situation in Northern Ireland. In 
Lawless this question was broken down into two sub-issues. The first was whether 
any less harsh measures could have been sufficient to deal with the situation 
without resorting to internment without trial. The second issue was whether 
internment was subject to adequate safeguards to protect personal liberty as far as 
the situation allowed. In relation to the first sub-issue the Court decided that the 
actions taken by the United Kingdom were reasonable.  In relation to the second 
sub-issue, the Court held that the Special Powers Act with what has been 
described as ‘very limited, technically orientated judicial review’1115 fulfilled the 
Conventions requirements. Clearly, the suggestion that internment was introduced 
for political reasons rather than for security reasons, if that could be proved, 
would mean that internment was not strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation.  
 
                                                        
1112 The European Convention (n1087).  
1112 Ireland v United Kingdom Application No. 5310/71 (1972) 15 YB 67. 
1113 Brannigan and McBride (1992) 17EHRR 539. 
1114 Lawless v Ireland (no.3) (1961) 1EHRR 15. 
1115 Bonner (n1094) 905.  
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9.28 However, this is not the end of the story in terms of Ireland v United Kingdom. 
New evidence has been unearthed recently in the British National Archives.1116 
These newly discovered documents suggest that the British government did not 
reveal all the evidence available during the course of the proceedings.1117 Instead, 
it would appear that the British authorities produced evidence before the Court 
that was contradicted by its own internal evidence.  
 
9.29 These newly discovered documents raise two issues. The first is that the British 
government was aware that the effect of the five techniques would be severe long-
term mental and physical illness. Although the British government’s expert 
witness Dr. Leigh argued that the acute psychiatric symptoms developed during 
interrogation were minor and related to the stress of living in Northern Ireland. 
Dr. Leigh’s later assessment revealed a report written in 1975 that he had come to 
a very different conclusion after having assessed one of the 14 men. In the Report 
Dr. Leigh concludes that ‘other psychiatric symptoms were probably the result of 
deep interrogation’.1118 
 
9.30 The second issue is revealed in a recently discovered letter dated 31 March 1977 
from Merlyn Rees, the then Home Secretary, to the British Prime Minister, James 
Callaghan. In the letter Merlyn Rees states, that:  
 
In his view (confirmed by Brian Faulkner) that the decision to use torture in 
Northern Ireland was taken by Ministers, in particular Lord Carrington, then 
Secretary of State for Defence and therefore, prosecutions of members of 
the security forces should not take place. The Ministry for Defence 
concurred.1119 
 
9.31 This is significant because the UK government did not admit that the five 
techniques, as applied in Northern Ireland, amounted to allegations of ill treatment 
                                                        
1116 Aisling O’ Sullivan, ‘The Torture Files: New Evidence of Use of the ‘Five Techniques’’ (14 
June 2014) <http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/2014/06/the-torture-files-new-evidence-of-
use.html> accessed on 8 July 2016   
1117 ibid.  
1118 ibid.  
1119 ibid.  
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as claimed by the Irish government, let alone torture. Nor did the British 
government accept that any of the alleged acts were the responsibility of the 
United Kingdom’s government. In fact, the United Kingdom’s position was that 
the five techniques did not constitute ill treatment contrary to Article 3 and nor 
did the five techniques amount to an administrative practice. The letter from 
Merlyn Rees makes it quite clear that the five techniques were sanctioned at the 
highest level of government and taken at face value makes it appear that inside the 
British government the techniques were understood to be torture.  However, the 
significance of the statement by Merlyn Rees ought to be put in context. Merlyn 
Rees was commenting on a previous Conservative administration and he may 
have been rather more circumspect had he been discussing decisions taken by a 
previous Labour government. 
 
9.32 In light of this new evidence the Irish government on the 2 December 2014 
decided to ask the Court to re-open the case1120 under Rule 80 of the Rules of 
Court. 1121  The argument will be that the evidence suppressed by the British 
government, would have been enough, had it been known at the time, to secure a 
finding of torture under Article 3. Lord Bingham in A v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department (No.2) [2005] indicated that the five techniques might now fall 
within Article 1 of the Torture Convention1122 and justify a finding of torture 
under Article 3.1123  The implication is that the British government was not just 
less cooperative than would have been desirable as was suggested by the 
Commission, but instead the British government deliberately misled the Court.  
 
9.33 In addition to decisions relating to the specific measures introduced by the British 
government to deal with the violence, the European Court of Human Rights also 
                                                        
1120 Amnesty International, Ireland Decision to Reopen “Hooded Men” Court Case Triumph of 
Justice after Four Decades of Waiting  <https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-
releases/2014/12/ireland-decision-reopen-hooded-men-court-case-triumph-justice-after-four-de/> 
accessed 12 March 2018. 
1121 Under Rule 80 (1) ‘a party may, in the event of the discovery of a fact which might by its 
nature have a decisive influence and could not reasonably have been known to the Court and could 
not reasonably have been known to that party, request the Court, within a period of six months after 
that party acquired the knowledge of the fact, to revise the judgment’.  
1122 The European Convention (n1049).  
1123 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No.2) [2005] UKHL 71 para 53 
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judged the arguments put forward by the British to justify derogating from 
Convention obligations.  
 
9.34 Although the British government denied the existence of an armed conflict in 
Northern Ireland claiming that the level of violence was insufficient to amount to 
an armed conflict. The British did however acknowledge a lower level of 
violence, and claimed that the lower of violence was sufficient to constitute a 
public emergency that threatened the life of the nation under Article 15 of 
ECHR.1124 That claim allowed the British government to enter a derogation under 
Article 15. The United Kingdom ratified the ECHR1125 in 1951 and entered the 
first derogation under Article 15 in 1957. Between 1957 and 1984 continuous 
derogations were in force.1126  
 
9.35 Brice Dickson has concluded that overall the ‘European Court has been quite 
deferential to governments when assessing whether their decisions to ‘derogate’ 
from the Convention are justifiable.’1127 Article 15 of the Convention requires a 
public emergency threatening the life of the nation. In agreeing with the United 
Kingdom that the IRA and other Republican terrorist groups presented such a 
threat, Dickson claims that the court has been ‘quite indulgent to (…) the UK’.1128  
 
9.36 Colm Campbell claims that the intensive interrogations that took place in one of 
the three specialised ‘holding centres’ involved extended detention that 
necessitated that the British government derogate under Article 15 1129  of the 
ECHR.1130 In 1984, the United Kingdom withdrew its derogation from the ECHR 
in the mistaken belief that there was no incompatibility between its emergency 
and anti-terrorist legislation and the UK obligations under the Convention. 
                                                        
1124 The European Convention (n1049).  
1125 ibid.  
1126 The dates of the notices are as follows: 25 September 1969, 20 August 1971, 23 January 1973, 
19 September 1975, 12 December 1975 and 18 December 1978.  
1127 Brice Dickson, ‘Counter-Insurgency and Human Rights in Northern Ireland’ (2009) 32(3) 
Journal of Strategic Studies 475, 488. 
1128 ibid.  
1129 Campbell (n1050) 327.  
1130 The European Convention (n1049).  
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However, in Brogan v UK 1131 the court ruled that detention for four days and six 
hours without a derogation was incompatible with the Convention. The United 
Kingdom’s response to this judgment was to issue a new derogation allowing 
detention for seven days. The new derogation was challenged in Brannigan and 
McBride. 1132 The conflict at this point was in its 20th year. The argument put to 
the Court was that the wide margin of appreciation allowed at the beginning of the 
conflict should be narrower after twenty years.1133 The Court resisted this idea and 
instead allowed the United Kingdom to determine both the existence of an 
emergency and the measures necessary to deal with it. Dickson’s conclusion 
being that the ‘ECHR jurisprudence on Northern Ireland up to the end of 1994 
was one of considerable deference to conflict-related state claims’. 1134  It is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that that ‘At this early stage, the European Court 
of Human Rights exercised no discernable constraint on operations.’1135 
 
The Role of Domestic Courts in Relation to the Policies of Internment 
and In-depth Interrogation 
 
9.37 One way to assess the role of the courts in the conflict is to examine the number 
of times British government legislation and policies relating to counter-terrorist 
measures were successfully challenged in the domestic courts. Another way to 
gauge the role of the courts is to assess the level of judicial activism. In other 
words, to assess the extent to which the courts took the opportunity to raise issues 
of concern relating to the emergency legislation and government policies relating 
to the conflict. For example, the courts could have mentioned the fact that 
Parliament expended great effort and time on new legislation governing powers of 
arrest and search, but spent little time considering laws governing the use of lethal 
force by members of the Security Forces. Perhaps another example would be that 
the courts could have explored the potential application of international 
humanitarian law to the conflict. In other words, the role of the courts can be 
                                                        
1131 Brogan v UK (1989) 11 EHRR 117. 
1132 Brannigan and McBride (n1106). 
1133 Amicus brief submitted by Liberty, Interights and the Committee on the Administration of 
Justice.  
1134 Campbell (n1050) 342.  
1135 Huw Bennett, ‘Smoke Without Fire’? Allegations Against the British Army in Northern 
Ireland, 1972-5’ (2013) 24(2) Twentieth Century British History 275, 286. 
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understood, not just in terms of successful challenges to legislation and practices, 
but also in terms of the issues that they raised when the opportunity presented 
itself. It is certainly possible for the Law Lords to respect the supremacy of 
Parliament, and yet at the same time make their views known.  
 
9.38 The House of Lords remained the final court of appeal for most issues within 
Northern Ireland’s domestic legal system including issues arising from the 
conflict and the government’s response to the violence. According to Stephen 
Livingston between 1969 and 1993 only thirteen cases relating directly or 
indirectly to terrorism and the legal measures taken to deal with the terrorists 
reached the House of Lords. 1136 Brice Dickson has identified a fourteenth case, 
Linton v Ministry of Defence [1983], in which a man was injured during a 
shooting exchange involving soldiers and terrorists.1137 Between 1994 and 2005 a 
further 12 conflict related cases were decided.1138 Of these cases, not one dealt 
with the legality of the policy of internment or the legality of applying the five 
‘sensory’ techniques.1139  
 
9.39 In the 13 cases identified by Livingston, the judges had an opportunity to 
comment on various aspects of the conflict in Northern Ireland but chose not to. 
In these cases, using Livingston’s terminology, the House of Lords ‘found for the 
government’1140 in all but two cases.1141 Brice Dickson suggests that the decisions 
                                                        
1136 Stephen Livingstone, ‘The House of Lords and the Northern Ireland Conflict’ (1994) 57(3) The 
Modern Law Review 333, 334.  
1137 Brice Dickson, ‘The House of Lords and the Northern Ireland Conflict – A Sequel’ (2006) 
69(3) Modern Law Review 383, 384. 
1138 ibid 388.  
1139 Livingston (n1136) 335 claims that four cases concern the use of force by the security forces in 
Northern Ireland (these are Attorney General for Northern Ireland’s Reference (No.1 of 1975), 
Farrell v Secretary of State for Defence (1979), McKerr v Armagh Coroner (1990), Breslin v 
Attorney General for Northern Ireland (1992). Four cases relate to aspects of the criminal law and 
procedure (Lynch v Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland (1975), Maxwell v 
Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland (1978), R v Brophy (1982), Murray v 
Director Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland (1994)). Two cases concern emergency arrest 
and search powers (McKee v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (1984), Murray v 
Ministry of Defence (1988)). Two cases raise issues of political expression and opinion 
(McEldowney v Forde (1969), Brind v Secretary of State for the Home Department (1991)). The 
final case concerns prisons regimes (Hone v Board of Visitors Maze Prison (1988).  
1140 ibid.  
1141 Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] 1 ALL ER 913; R v 
Brophy (Edward Manning [1982] AC 476. 
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by the House of Lords showed ‘widespread alignment with, and endorsement of, 
establishment values in the United Kingdom as a whole, a phenomenon which 
permeated the entire jurisprudence of their Lordships’.1142  The criticism here is 
that the judiciary could have raised questions about the emergency legislation in 
Northern Ireland, but all too frequently did not. ‘It is their failure to exercise this 
limited freedom between 1969 and 1993 which the Law Lords of the time can 
justifiably be blamed for.’1143 The prevailing view appears to be that between 
1969 and 1993, by deferring to the executive’s appreciation of necessity during 
the Troubles the ‘House of Lords ruled itself out of playing a role in the 
conflict’.1144 Dickson summed up the situation stating that the courts ‘were unable 
to hold the security forces properly to account for their wayward COIN 
practices’.1145 
 
9.40 However, Dickson argues, that the twelve cases that were decided by the House of 
Lords between 1994 and 2005, reveal that the Law Lords have been willing to 
take a different approach. Dickson, however, having reviewed each of the cases in 
detail argues that the Law Lords became much more willing to factor in the 
context when dealing with conflict related cases. In one case, R v Northern 
Ireland Human Rights Commission1146 he identified a clear admission by the Law 
Lords that ‘when deciding cases from Northern Ireland they are often dealing with 
matters that are essentially political’.1147 He concluded that that the Law Lords 
‘granted leave to appeal in more cases and (…) indulg[ed] in much fuller and 
more contextualised legal analysis when delivering their judgments’. 1148  His 
conclusion was that it could not be claimed that ‘in the last decade the Law Lords 
have been inappropriately ‘pro-government’ in relation to Northern Ireland’. 1149 
 
                                                        
1142 Dickson (n1137) 388.  
1143 ibid 387.  
1144 Livingston (1136) 359.  
1145 Brice Dickson, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Conflict in Northern 
Ireland (Oxford University Press 2010) 23. 
1146 R v Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission [2002] NI 236. 
1147 Dickson (n1137) 411.  
1148 ibid 414.  
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9.41 These two sets of cases were decided in different phases of the conflict. The first 
thirteen cases were decided during, what has been described as, the ‘outbreak and 
militarisation’ phase and the ‘criminalisation’ phase.1150 The second twelve cases, 
on the other hand, were decided during the ‘transition’ phase. It is generally 
accepted that during the initial phases of the conflict, where the levels of violence 
are rising and unpredictable, the courts are more likely, using Livingston’s 
terminology, to ‘find for the government’ than they are in the later stages when 
the violence has stabilised. The different treatment by the Law Lords of the two 
sets of cases may simply be a reflection of this. However, as Dickson himself 
points out,1151 during the transition phase from violence to peace after 1994, when 
the second set of cases were decided, it is actually much more difficult to decide 
whether a decision is pro-government or not. This is because the two sides of the 
conflict at that time were working together and had what might be described as a 
common purpose. Therefore, it may be the case that judging decisions as pro-
government or otherwise after 1994, has less significant than it had prior to 1994.  
 
The Role of Lawyers in the Conflict 
 
9.42 Throughout the conflict the number of lawyers in Northern Ireland steadily 
increased. The number of barristers increased from 60 in 1965 to 330 in 1993. 1152 
The number of solicitors increased from 500 to 1000 between 1965 and 1993.1153 
But despite this increase in the number of lawyers ‘the closest many of them got 
to conflict related work is the processing of criminal injury claims’.1154 Just 5% of 
lawyers in Northern Ireland were employed in conflict related work. 1155 Jackson 
and Doran observed that a very small core of barristers, perhaps just 20 or 30, 
regularly appeared for the prosecution and defence in conflict related trials.1156  
 
                                                        
1150 See chapter 1 for a more detailed breakdown of the phases of the conflict. 
1151 Dickson (n1137) 417.  
1152 Brice Dickson, The Legal System in Northern Ireland (3rd edn SLS Publications 1993) 98. 
1153 ibid.  
1154 Stephen Livingston, ‘And Justice for All? The Judiciary and the Legal Profession in Transition’ 
in Colin Harvey (ed) Human Rights, Equality and Democratic Renewal in Northern Ireland (Hart 
Publishing 2001) 131, 132. 
1155 ibid 132.  
1156 J Jackson, Sean Doran, Judge without Jury (Oxford University Press 1995) 83 
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9.43 The conflict in Northern Ireland presented, not only those lawyers involved in 
conflict related work, but the whole legal profession with an opportunity to 
consider the role and responsibility of lawyers in a conflict situation both, inside 
and outside, the court room. It required the legal profession to consider whether a 
narrow version of professionalism focusing on the provision of competent 
services was more appropriate than a wider version of professionalism 
encompassing broader social, political or moral responsibilities in a conflict 
situation. In other words, the conflict forced the legal profession to decide 
whether or not to support the traditionally held view that the legal profession was 
‘neutral’ or ‘independent’, arguably a political position itself, or to challenge that 
view and instead see the role of lawyers as essentially political.   
 
9.44 Instead of looking at the role of lawyers throughout the conflict, Keiran McEvoy 
has instead looked at the role of lawyers at ‘critical junctures’. 1157  McEvoy 
defines ‘critical junctures’ as key phases of the conflict.1158 In other words, critical 
junctures are:  
 
[D]efining moments in the history of organisations and institutions which 
offer us insights into how they work, the power relationships at work, 
within and without, the ways in which they are pressures and remembered, 
and thee ways in which they see themselves.1159  
 
He has identified four key phases in the conflict. These are the emergence of a 
civil rights movement, internment, the introduction of the Diplock Courts, and the 
murders of two lawyers, Pat Finucane and Rosemary Nelson.  
 
9.45 In the years prior to the outbreak of sustained political violence in 1969, Northern 
Ireland saw the rise of a civil rights movement. Those involved in the civil rights 
movement in Northern Ireland adopted tactics such as sit-ins, marches, and public 
                                                        
1157 Kieran McEvoy, ‘What Did the Lawyers Do During the ‘War’? Neutrality, Conflict and the 
Culture of Quietism’ (2011) 74(3) The Modern Law Review 350, 355. 
1158 ibid.  
1159 Keiron McEvoy, Rachel Rebouche, ‘Mobilising the Professions? Lawyers, Politics and the 
Collective Legal Conscience’ in John Morison, Kieran McEvoy, Gordon Anthony (eds) Judges, 
Human Rights and Transition (Oxford University Press 2007) 275, 279. 
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demonstrations designed to expose the inequalities between the two communities 
and the sectarianism of the police.1160 What is relevant here is that ‘neither law 
nor lawyers played a particularly significant role in the civil rights struggle in 
Northern Ireland’. 1161  The various organisations involved in the civil rights 
movement 1162 appeared not to ‘view legal challenges as central to delivering 
upon their objectives’.1163 This was very different from the generally accepted 
role played by lawyers in the civil rights movement in the United States. In the 
United States, it is generally accepted that ‘lawyers were instrumental in 
constituting the civil rights movement’.1164  
 
9.46 In the early 1960s one of the first organisations to emerge was the Campaign for 
Social Justice (CSJ). This group was set up with the ‘purpose of bringing the light 
of publicity to bear on the discrimination that exists in our country against the 
Catholic section of the community representing more than one-third of the total 
population’. 1165  
 
9.47 The group gathered evidence of discrimination and other forms of 
institutionalised malpractice and presented it in 1964 to the British Prime 
Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home. His response was that legal redress should be 
sought through the courts.1166 The CSJ sought legal advice and was advised that 
‘discrimination practiced by Local Authorities is not capable of review by the 
courts under the terms of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, or any other 
statutory provision’.1167  The CJS then attempted to seek legal redress through the 
European Court of Human Rights 1168  but this failed at least in part ‘because 
                                                        
1160 Gregory Maney, ‘Transnational Mobilisation and Civil Rights in Northern Ireland’ (2000) 
47(2) Social Problems 153. 
1161 McEvoy (n1157) 357.  
1162 Examples of organisations involved in the civil rights movement include the Campaign for 
Social Justice, the Derry Citizens’ Action Committee and the Northern Ireland Civil Rights 
Association.  
1163 McEvoy (n1157) 357.  
1164 Austin Sarat, Stuart Scheingold (eds), Cause Lawyers and Social Movements (Stanford 
University Press 2006) 7. 
1165 Campaign for Social Justice, Why Justice Can Not be Done (CJS 1964) 2  
1166 ibid. 
1167 ibid 3. 
1168 The European Convention (n1049).  
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Northern Irish solicitors were unable or unwilling to take on such cases’. 1169 
McEvoy concludes that it is the ‘comparative absence of lawyerly mobilisation or 
indeed significant attention to strategic litigation that is most noteworthy during 
the civil rights period’. 1170  The term ‘strategic litigation’ is not defined but 
presumably refers to focusing on cases involving allegations of discrimination or 
abuse of State power. In other words, strategic litigation involves identifying 
appropriate cases that could be used to promote and advance the civil rights 
agenda.   
 
9.48 McEvoy claims that even organisations that focused on legal and constitutional 
liberties, for example the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), 
appeared to place little faith in the courts to achieve legal redress. He makes the 
point that in 1969 NICRA did lodge various applications with the European 
Commission on Human Rights alleging that the banning of civil rights marches 
was a violation of the right to demonstrate. 1171 However, he also goes on to 
explain that these cases were removed from the list because the Commission 
determined ‘the applicants have shown a clear lack of interest in pursuing these 
applications’.1172  He also makes the point that this lack of sustained attention to 
litigation is also revealed in the archives of groups like the Derry Citizens’ Action 
Group (DCAG), the Derry Housing Action Committee (DHAC) and the Peoples 
Democracy (PD).1173 What McEvoy is describing is a lack of mobilization within 
the ranks of the legal profession and he refers to this absence of activity by 
lawyers as a ‘culture of quietism’. 1174  He goes on to suggests that this was 
‘noteworthy’ and ‘striking’ as the Province descended into violence’.1175 
 
9.49 The second critical juncture that McEvoy identifies is the re-introduction of 
internment on 9 August 1971. At this point the legal profession had a choice. 
They could refuse to participate in the internment hearings and abandon their 
clients to represent themselves or take part in the hearings and in doing so 
                                                        
1169 McEvoy (n1157) 358.  
1170 ibid 359.  
1171 ibid 359. 
1172 A and Others v UK (App No 3625 and others) (1970) Ybk 340, 434. 
1173 McEvoy (n1157) 358.  
1174 ibid 350 
1175 ibid 350, 359, 360.  
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legitimise the proceedings. Boyle and others have suggested that the decision by 
lawyers to participate in the internment proceedings is partly down to a desire to 
help their clients but was also ‘in part due to the very substantial remuneration 
which had been provided’.1176 
 
9.50 The third critical juncture identified by McEvoy was the introduction of Diplock 
courts. Lord Diplock was asked to consider ‘what arrangements for the 
administration of justice in Northern Ireland could be made in order to deal more 
effectively with terrorist organisations… otherwise that by internment’.1177 The 
Diplock Report 1178  made various recommendations designed to facilitate the 
conviction of suspected terrorists. 1179  Arguably the most significant was the 
introduction of juryless trials and then later the ‘supergrass’ trials.  McEvoy 
concludes that the legal profession in Northern Ireland again failed to speak out 
against these fundamental changes. Stephen Livingston similarly concludes that 
‘lawyers generally avoided public statements on emergency legislation, its content 
and its application’.1180 
 
9.51 The fourth critical juncture identified by McEvoy was the murder of Pat Finucane 
in 1989 and Rosemary Nelson in 1998. He comments that the ‘culture of quietism 
is perhaps best highlighted by the response of the legal profession to the murder 
of two of its own members, defence solicitors, Pat Finucane and Rosemary 
Nelson’.1181 
 
9.52 The Law Society issued a statement condemning the murders but failed to follow 
this up with a call for a Public Inquiry for nearly ten years. The American based 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights in 1993 stated that ‘We are left with the 
impression that for the large part of the legal profession in Northern Ireland, the 
                                                        
1176 Kevin Boyle, Tom Hadden, Paddy Hillyard, Law and the State: The Case of Northern Ireland 
(Martin Robertson 1975) 67. 
1177 Report of the Commission to consider legal procedures to deal with terrorist activities in 
Northern Ireland (Cmnd 5185, 1972) (Diplock Report). 
1178 ibid.  
1179 See chapter 2 para 3.66-3.72 
1180 Livingston (n1136) 133.  
1181 McEvoy, Rebouche (n1159) 284.  
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obligations of lawyers to assert fundamental human rights against abuses of the 
state is a low priority.’1182 
 
9.53 Various reasons have been identified as to why lawyers did not speak out. They 
include the fact that the legal profession was small and tended to be made up of 
small firms and sole practitioners. The argument is that this tended to work 
against lawyers coming together to work as a unified profession. 1183  Another 
factor that has been identified to explain why lawyers acted the way they did is 
the nature of the conflict itself. Lawyers that spoke out in defence of the rule of 
law were by definition challenging the British government’s response to the 
violence. In a situation where loyalty to the State was a fundamental dimension of 
the conflict it is perhaps not surprising that lawyers remained silent.1184  Another 
obvious reason why lawyers remained silent was they feared for their lives. The 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights concluded that ‘...credible evidence 
suggests that Patrick Finucane’s murder was simply the most heinous instance of 
systematic harassment of defense lawyers for simply doing their job’.1185  
 
9.54 Another reason that has been suggested why lawyers failed to speak out is that by 
distinguishing themselves from the problem, lawyers were able to remain above 
the conflict and by doing so ensured that the law was available to all. 1186 
Livingston has summed up the situation stating that a ‘paradigm of neutrality, plus 
fear and a sense of independence would appear to have constrained Northern Irish 
lawyers from contributing to the extensive public debate which has raged on the 
institutions of justice’.1187 Perhaps yet another reason why lawyers failed to be 
more visible in the early years of the conflict was that they viewed their role as 
merely providing competent legal services based on the instructions of their 
clients. This narrow interpretation of professionalism, sometimes referred to as 
the ‘standard conception’ of a lawyer, was and still is widely accepted within the 
                                                        
1182 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights and Legal Defense in Northern Ireland 
(1993) 41 quoted in McEvoy, Rebouche (n1159) 287.  
1183 McEvoy (n1157) 378.  
1184 ibid 380.  
1185 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights and Legal Defense in Northern Ireland 
(1993) 25 quoted in McEvoy, Rebouche (n1159) 287.  
1186 Livingston (n1136) 139.  
1187 ibid.  
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profession. It might also be the case that lawyers were cynical about the ability of 
the Unionist dominated judiciary to rule in their favour and consequently held 
little faith in the justice system as a mechanism to bring about change.  
 
9.55 Although McEvoy is describing what he describes as a culture of quietism he 
makes the point that it would be wrong to ‘give the impression that lawyers were 
entirely silent during the formative years of the civil rights era’. 1188 It is also the 
case that although lawyers may have shied away from the criminal courts, they 
were more active in getting their clients compensation through civil actions for 
damages. 1189 
 
9.56 Whatever the reasons for what has been described as this ‘shameful organisational 
silence’ 1190  the real question in relation to this thesis is what were the 
consequences of this silence on the activities of successive British governments. 
In other words, had lawyers spoken out about changes to the judicial system and 
the introduction of emergency legislation, would it have made a difference? The 
question requires a certain amount of speculation but Stephen Livingstone has 
made it clear that in his opinion a mobilised legal profession would have made a 
difference.1191 He described Northern Ireland during the Troubles as a ‘society 
without effective functioning political institutions’ 1192  and therefore the 
‘deafening silence’1193 from Northern Ireland’s legal profession, in relation to the 
emergency legislation and policies, meant that the British government could 
introduce legislation and polices without fearing criticism. That is not to suggest 
that a mobilised legal profession could necessarily have successfully challenged 
any of the legislation or the policies introduced by the British government to deal 
with the violence. However, even unsuccessful legal challenges and press 
announcements from a profession with such symbolic capital might have had an 
impact on what successive British governments felt they could get away with.  
 
                                                        
1188 McEvoy (n1157) 359. 
1189 Please refer to paras 5.75-5.81 
1190 McEvoy, Rebouche (n1159) 292.  
1191 Livingston (n1136) 139.  
1192 ibid.  
1193 McEvoy (n1157) 383.  
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Conflict Legacy Cases  
 
9.57 The array of measures and devices that were utilised by the British government to 
limit the reach of law during the Troubles was comprehensive. Yet since the 
peace process began successive British governments have introduced yet more 
mechanisms and devices to frustrate attempts to shine a light on the State’s past 
activities and by doing so limit accountability.  
 
9.58 The British government proposed a package of measures to deal with the legacy 
of the conflict in response to a series of cases that came before the European 
Court of Human Rights sometimes referred to as the ‘McKerr’ group of cases.1194 
In these cases the court found against the United Kingdom in relation to a failure 
to provide effective and independent investigations under Article 2 of the ECHR.  
 
9.59 In the ‘McKerr’ group of cases the court set out the minimum requirements for 
such investigations which were that the investigation should be initiated by the 
State, independent, effective, sufficiently open to public scrutiny, involve the next 
of kin to the extent necessary to safeguard their legitimate interests and be prompt 
and carried out with reasonable expedition. The British government proposed that 
Coroner’s Courts and inquests could meet these Convention obligations in 
relation to unresolved contentious killings. Coroners Courts seek the truth, they 
lay blame, witnesses can be compelled to be subject to cross-examination and 
families are fully engaged and represented.  
 
9.60 However, the Committee for the Administration of Justice has identified six 
limitations that it argues cumulatively prevent this mechanism meeting Article 2 
requirements. The key issues include both intrinsic problems with the system and 
include criticisms which relate to how efficiently inquests are being administered 
in practice.  
 
                                                        
1194 McKerr v United Kingdom (application number 28883/95) [2002] ECHR 329; Hugh Jordon v 
the United Kingdom (application number 24746/94)) [2001] ECHR 328; Shanaghan v the United 
Kingdom (application number 37715/97) [2001] ECHR 330; McShane v United Kingdom 
(application number 43290/98) [2002] ECHR 469, Finucane v the United Kingdom (application 
number 29178/95) [2003] ECHR 328. There are two other cases in this group; Hemsworth v UK, 
judgment final on 16 October 2013 and McCaughey & others, judgment final on 16 October 2013. 
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9.61 The key issues include:  
 
• the process of appointing a jury is anonymous and therefore there is 
inadequate provision for vetting jurors who may have a conflict of interest 
or potential bias; 
• an inquest jury in Northern Ireland, unlike elsewhere in the United 
Kingdom, needs to reach a unanimous decision; 
• inquests in Northern Ireland cannot issue verdicts of lawful or unlawful 
killing, which falls short of international standards; 
• there are protracted delays and litigation involving the Police (PSNI) and 
armed forces ministry (MOD) in relation to disclosure to next-of-kin, of 
material that is submitted to be relevant, such as details of witnesses’ 
involvement in other lethal force incidents which falls within the broader 
circumstances of the death; 
• there are concerns about failures to secure attendance of security force 
personnel at the hearing; and 
• inquests continue to be subject to excessive delays.1195 
 
9.62 Whether or not the coronial system can in theory provide an Article 2 compliant 
mechanism remains controversial but what is clear is that in practice very few 
legacy inquests have actually taken place. Fifty-six cases involving ninety-seven 
deaths are still outstanding and twenty-two of those cases are over 40 years old. 
The system is plagued with inordinate delays. The Lord Chief Justice, Sir Declan 
Morgan QC, in his annual address to mark the opening of the new legal year, said 
that addressing the significant backlog of legacy inquests was a matter of real 
concern. He warned that ‘If the existing legacy inquests are to be brought to a 
conclusion under the present system someone could easily be hearing some of 
these cases in 2040.’1196  
                                                        
1195 Committee on the Administration of Justice, Submission from the Committee on the 
Administration of Justice (CAJ) to the United Nations Committee Against Torture on the UK’s 5th 
Periodic Report under the Convention Against Torture [April 2013] para 19 
<http://www.tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/…/GBR/INT_CCPR_INT_CAT_NGO_GBR_50
_19801_E-3.doc> accessed on 17 March 2017. 
1196 Alan Erwin, ‘Northern Ireland judge warns inquests into deaths involving alleged state 




9.63 The ability of the coronial system to meet Article 2 obligations was questioned by 
the European Court when dealing with McCaughey and Grew v the United 
Kingdom. 1197  The Court ruled that delays are incompatible with the State’s 
obligations under Article 2 to ensure effective investigations into suspicious 
deaths.1198 Judge Kalaydieva went further and suggested that State agents were 
benefitting from virtual impunity. She stated that:  
 
After decades of being faced with demonstrated reluctance and what would 
appear to be an attempted obstruction of justice…The period demonstrated, if 
not deliberate, systemic refusals and failures to undertake timely and 
inadequate investigation and to take all necessary steps to investigate arguable 
allegations under Article 2 and 3 seem as a matter principle to make it possible 
for at least some agents of the state to benefit from virtual impunity as a result 
of the passage of time.1199 
 
9.64 The effect of these delays is to protect the State and its agents from being held to 
account for past abuses. The Committee on the Administration of Justice have 
concluded that the ‘evidence points to a common purpose between the UK 
government and elements within the security establishment to prevent the truth 
coming out and maintain a cover of impunity for state agents’.1200 This conclusion 
is partly based on the fact that the British government has firstly expanded the 
scope of the 'national security' exemption when releasing information and 
                                                                                                                                                                       
<http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/Norther-Ireland/Northern-Ireland-judge-warns-inquests-
into-deaths-involving-alleged-state-collusion-could-go-on-until-2040-30750819.html> accessed 
17March 2017.     
1197 McCaughey and Grew v the United Kingdom (application number 43089/09) [2013] ECHR 
682. 
1198 Hemsworth v the United Kingdom – Chamber Judgment (application number 58559/090 [2013] 
ECHR 683 para 73.  
1199 McCaughey and Grew v the United Kingdom (application number 43089/09) [2013] ECHR 682 
p38. 
1200 Committee on the Administration of Justice, ‘The Apparatus of Impunity Human Rights 
Violations and the Northern Ireland Conflict: A narrative of official limitations on post-
Agreements investigative mechanisms’ (Committee on the Administration 2015) 40 <http://s3-eu-
west-1.amazonaws.com/caj.org.uk/2017/03/15131009/No.-66-The-Apparatus-of-Impunity-Human-
rights-violations-and-the-Northern-Ireland-conflict-Jan-2015.pdf> accessed 17 March 2017. (CAJ 
Apparatus of Impunity) 
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secondly has introduced what have been referred to as 'secret courts'.1201 
 
9.65 The ability to effectively investigate the past is obviously dependent on having 
access to the evidence. The British government transferred responsibility for 
covert policing to the Security Service in October 2007. The transfer was 
announced in Parliament in 20051202 and the details were set out in the annex 
provided by the British government to the 2006 United Kingdom-Ireland St 
Andrews Agreement.1203 One consequence of the transfer of responsibility to the 
Security Service is that this area of policing falls within the sphere of national 
security and therefore beyond the reach of the oversight bodies such as the 
Northern Ireland Policing Board and the Police Ombudsman. Another 
consequence is that because the Security Service has a blanket exemption from 
disclosing information under the Freedom of Information Act, information that 
could have potentially have been accessed previously, is now unavailable.1204 
 
9.66 In 2010, the British government drafted a Protocol for the handling arrangements 
for national security related matters. 1205  The Protocol states that the British 
government will retain responsibility for 'those aspects of the PSNI's work – past, 
present and future - that have a national security element or dimension’.1206  The 
obvious problem will be how to determine whether a case has a national security 
dimension given that the term national security is not defined in any legislation. 
The risk is that the Protocol could be used to control disclosure of material in 
relation to legacy cases in Northern Ireland.  
 
9.67 The United Nations Commission on Human Rights has created a ‘Set of 
Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to 
                                                        
1201 ibid.  
1202 Written Ministerial Statement, National Security Intelligence Work, Paul Murphy MP, 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, House of Commons Official Record, 24 February 2005, 
column 64WS. 
1203 Annex E UK - Ireland St Andrews Agreement 2006. 
1204 Freedom of Information Act 2000 s23-24. 
1205 NIO Protocol on Handling Arrangements for National Security Related Matters after the 
Devolution of Policing and Justice to Northern Ireland Executive quoted in CAJ Apparatus of 
Impunity (n1187).  
1206 NIO Protocol on Handling Arrangements for National Security Related Matters after the 
Devolution of Policing and Justice to Northern Ireland Executive Annex A para 3.1. quoted in CAJ 
Apparatus of Impunity (n1179).  
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Combat Impunity’ (UN Impunity Principles).1207 The Principles define impunity 
as:  
 
The impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators of violations 
to account - whether in criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary 
proceedings- since they are not subject to an inquiry that might lead them to 
being accused, arrested, tried and, if found guilty, sentenced to appropriate 
penalties and the making of reparations to the victim.1208  
 
These Principles provide ‘an authoritative ‘soft law’ statement of international 
standards applicable to the UK and are binding where they are otherwise reflected 
in customary international law’.1209 
 
9.68 The second development has been the use of what have been termed 'Secret 
Courts'. These Closed Material Procedures are remarkable because not only are 
the press and the public excluded from the court but also the parties (other than 
the State) and their lawyers are excluded at from the court. Evidence is presented 
to the court but the parties have no opportunity to see or hear it and more 
importantly challenge it. A 'Special Advocate' is appointed to represent the parties 
but he/she is not allowed to discuss the evidence that has been presented in secret. 
All that the Special Advocate is allowed to reveal is a general overview of what is 
being alleged. The United Nations Committee against Torture commented that 
‘Closed Material Procedures may adversely impact on the possibility to establish 
State’s responsibility and accountability’.1210 
 
                                                        
1207 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection 
of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 17 April 2013, A/HRC/23/40, available at: 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/51a5ca5f4.html> accessed 17 December 2017] 
1208 ibid.  
1209 Daniel Holder, ‘Covert policing and collusion, running informants and the human rights 
framework’ (Committee on the Administration of Justice 2016) 
<http://www.caj.org.uk/files/2016/5/12/Covert_Policing_and_Ensuring_Accountability_Ten_Year
s_on_from_the_Corey_Collusion_Inquiry_Reports_Now.pdf> accessed 12 February 2017. 
1210 United Nations Committee against Torture, Concluding observations on the fifth periodic 
report of the United Kingdom, adopted by the Committee at its fiftieth session (6-31 May 2013) 
para13 (c) at <www.crae.org.uk/media/63835/cat-concluding-observations-may-2013.pdf> 
accessed 16 December 2017. 
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9.69 Two of the first five applications for Closed Material Procedures were cases 
relating to the Troubles in Northern Ireland. The first case was a civil claim by 
Margaret Keeley who is suing the Police Service of Northern Ireland, the MOD 
and Freddie Scapaticci. Scapaticci is alleged to have been a British Army agent 
codenamed ‘Stakeknife’ while being the head of the IRA's internal security unit, a 
unit linked to more than 50 murders.1211 Margaret Keeley alleges that she was 
wrongfully arrested and falsely imprisoned by the police in order to protect her 
husband’s cover. On her release from police custody the IRA’s security unit 
interrogated Margaret Keeley. The second case involves Martin McGartland who 
alleges that the IRA shot him after it was discovered that he was an informer 
working for the Security Service.1212 His claim is that the Security Service failed 
in its duty of care towards him.  
 
9.70 These cases had the potential to uncover human rights violations by a British 
agent and expose unlawful behaviour by the State. However, successful 
applications by the British government for Closed Material Procedures ensured 
this did not happen. This is despite the fact that this legislation was never intended 
to be used in conflict-related cases but instead had been implemented to deal with 
terrorism related to Islamic extremism.  
 
9.71 Another development has been the replacement of the Tribunal of Inquiries Act 
1922 with the Inquiries Act 2005. The new Act according to Hillyard ‘reduces 
substantially the independence of an inquiry and also provides the Minister with 
the power to determine what aspects of the inquiry should be held in public and 
what should not be revealed’.1213 Hillyard speculates that ‘Cynically the change 
could be seen as a way to grant an inquiry which could then be tightly 
controlled.’1214  
 
9.72 It would appear that successive British governments continue to try and protect 
those involved in allegations of abuse from being held to account. Nils Muižnieks, 
                                                        
1211 Keeley v Chief Constable Police Service Northern Ireland (PSNI) and others (2008 No 
133645). 
1212 McGartland and another v Attorney General [2014] EWCH 2248 (QB). 
1213 Paddy Hillyard, ‘Perfidious Albion: Cover-up and collusion in Northern Ireland’ (2013) 22(4) 
Statewatch Journal 1, 11.  
1214 ibid.  
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the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights, speaking in Belfast on 
the 6 November 2014 stated that:  
 
Until now there has been virtual impunity for the state actors involved (…). 
The issue of impunity is a very, very serious one and the UK Government has a 
responsibility to uphold the rule of law. This is not just an issue of dealing with 
the past, it has to do with upholding the law in general.1215  
 
9.73 The overall picture seems to be that during the Troubles both domestic and 
international courts failed to effectively constrain successive British governments.  
The legal profession also chose not voice any concerns relating to either 
legislation or policies of the British government and the practices of the Security 
Forces.  In doing so successive British governments, lacking commitment to the 
rule of law, were allowed to operate free from criticism from those at all levels of 
the legal system. 
Conclusions 
 
10.1 The question posed at the beginning of this thesis was to what extent was the law 
able to constrain or limit the activity of the British State during the conflict in 
Northern Ireland. The question clearly relates to the role of Parliament and the 
courts, but also relates to the commitment shown by the British government to 
operating within the law and the rule of law. That is, how far was the British 
government prepared to put aside its own aims and objectives, in order to promote 
the rule of law?  
 
10.2 In order to answer the question, the role of Parliament and the role of the courts, 
two of the three principal institutions of a State, have been examined in relation to 
the extent to which both limited the activity of the British government and other 
State actors. In order to assess the level of commitment to the rule of law the 
attitudes of senior ministers, civil servants, senior military officers and soldiers 
                                                        
1215 Vincent Kearney, ‘UK must pay for Troubles killings investigations says European official’ 
BBC News 6 November 2014 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-29941766> 
accessed 20 August 2017. 
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have also been examined. The attitudes held by these different groups can be 
inferred from comments that were made at the time and deduced from what was 
actually done. Although the research provides a fragmented picture, it is still 
possible to draw some conclusions about the extent to which the law limited the 
activity of the State and State authorities and agents.  
 
10.3 In looking at the role of the courts, the focus was on the role of both the House of 
Lords and the European Court of Human Rights. In terms of the House of Lords, 
what emerged was that the role of the courts changed over the course of the 
conflict. At the outbreak of the conflict the House of Lords consistently decided 
cases ‘in the government’s favour’1216 and shied away from using the opportunity 
when dealing with conflict related cases to comment on any aspect of the 
emergency legislation, content or application, or the appropriateness of framing 
the conflict outside the scope of humanitarian law. In other words, there was a 
clear lack of judicial activism. The Law Lords did not appear to view their role as 
positioning the court between the rights of the people and the excesses of 
government. The conclusion being that the House of Lords failed to operate as a 
‘check’ on the activities of successive British governments for the first twenty-
five years of the conflict. This may not have been the case, at least to the same 
extent during the transition phase of the Troubles post 1994, but during the most 
violent years of the conflict, when arguably the most draconian measures were 
introduced, the role of the House of Lords was minimal in constraining 
government activity.  
 
10.4 The role of both the European Court of Human Rights and the European 
Commission of Human Rights has also been examined. It appears that both the 
European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission, during the first 
two phases of the conflict between 1969 and 1994, deferred to conflict-related 
claims made by the British government. This was the case in relation to the 
existence of an emergency and the methods necessary to deal with that 
emergency. This deference limited the role of the Court and Commission in 
constraining the activity of successive British governments and came at a cost to 
                                                        
1216 Stephen Livingstone, ‘The House of Lords and the Northern Ireland Conflict’ (1994) 57(3) The 
Modern Law Review 333, 335.  
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human rights in Northern Ireland. The conclusion being that neither the domestic 
nor the international courts constrained, to any real degree, the activities of the 
British government during the Troubles.  
 
10.5 In relation to the role of Parliament what emerged was that although the 
emergency legislation for Northern Ireland was enacted at Westminster where it 
ought to have been heavily scrutinised, there are compelling reasons to think that 
the scrutiny was less than it might have been. The first is that all major political 
parties in the United Kingdom took a bi-partisan approach to conflict related 
matters. That bi-partisan approach may well have resulted in proposed Bills 
receiving less attention than they would have otherwise done. The second is that 
the amount of attention given to any proposed Bill was limited by the mechanism 
by which the proposed legislation was introduced. Emergency legislation in 
Northern Ireland was introduced through Orders in Council. However, Orders in 
Council are secondary legislation and as a consequence any Parliamentary debate 
‘is limited to no more than one–and-a-half hours, and the draft must be approved 
or rejected in its entirety’.1217 The third reason why Parliamentary scrutiny may 
have been limited was because only 17 out of the 650 Members of Parliament 
represented constituencies in Northern Ireland. This, in combination with the 
intractable nature of the problem, may have provided little incentive to devote 
attention to the proposed legislation. The conclusion is that successive British 
governments had the opportunity to introduce emergency legislation drafted in 
vague terms, granting sweeping powers to the Security Forces, and have 
confidence that the legislation would be passed by both Houses of Parliament. 
 
10.6 The doctrine of the separation of powers suggests that the principal institutions of 
state, the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, should be divided in person 
and in function in order to safeguard against tyranny. During the Troubles the 
operation of that doctrine came under pressure because all major political parties 
in the United Kingdom adopted a bi-partisan approach to conflict related matters 
and there was a lack of judicial activism by the Law Lords. In addition, the 
                                                        
1217 Leo Whelan, ‘The Challenge of Lobbying for Civil Rights in Northern Ireland: The Committee 
of the Administration of Justice’ (1992) 14(2) Human Rights Quarterly 149, 151.   
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European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission were overly 
deferential so reducing the ability of these institutions to effectively limit the 
British government’s activities in Northern Ireland.  
 
10.7 What has also emerged is that the legal profession in Northern Ireland, both 
barristers and solicitors, chose not to comment on the emergency legislation and 
policies introduced by the British government to deal with the conflict. Their 
silence removed yet another layer of potential opposition to any British 
government initiatives in the Province.  
 
10.8 With little effective opposition, a very quiet House of Lords and legal profession 
and over deferential European institutions, the British government had 
considerable freedom in terms of how and what legislation it drafted and what 
policies it introduced to deal with the conflict in Northern Ireland.  
 
10.9 In order to assess the extent to which the law acted as a constraint during the 
conflict, it was necessary to try to piece together the prevailing attitudes to the law 
and the rule of law, held by government ministers, civil servants, senior British 
Army officers and soldiers.  
 
10.10 In relation to government ministers the picture that emerged was that all too often 
members of the government failed to prioritise either the law or the rule of law. 
There is evidence to suggest that this attitude towards the law and the rule of law 
existed at the top of government and members of the cabinet. 
 
10.11 Chronologically, the first significant failure by the British government to uphold 
the law was in relation to the constitution and the role of the British Army. Right 
from the beginning, the emergency situation in Northern Ireland brought into 
sharp relief the disparity between the constitutional status of the military and the 
assumptions made in a democratic State about who controls the British Army. 
Under the constitution, the military are under a duty to suppress public 
disturbances as and when they occur. However, the British government 
introduced administrative practices that effectively transferred control of the 
British Army to the government. In doing so the British government undermined 
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both the constitutional status of the military and the rule of law.  These 
administrative norms that had no basis in law, but which nevertheless placed 
power in the hands of the British government, were prioritised over the 
constitution. The conclusion being that successive British governments were not 
constrained by constitutional law in their dealings with the British Army. 
 
10.12 This was followed closely by further failures to uphold the law. For example, the 
British government allowed the continued existence of ‘no-go’ areas and there is 
some evidence to suggest that known members of the IRA, a prohibited 
organisation, were deliberately not arrested.  In addition, there were failures by 
the British government in relation to the policies of internment and in-depth 
interrogation that were introduced in 1971. Days before internment was 
introduced, Edward Heath told his cabinet that although internment would more 
than likely put the United Kingdom in breach of its obligations under the 
European Convention of Human Rights, it was nevertheless necessary in the 
circumstances given the escalating violence in the Province. That statement alone 
is evidence that acting within the law was not the main priority.  
 
10.13 In relation to the use of the five sensory-deprivation techniques there is also 
evidence to suggest that the government sanctioned the use of these techniques on 
a small group of detainees that were interned. There is also evidence that at the 
highest levels of government these techniques were understood to be torture. The 
Home Secretary, Merlyn Rees, described the five techniques as torture in 
correspondence with James Callaghan, the then Prime Minister. There is also 
evidence to suggest that the British government failed to fully co-operate with 
fact-finding attempts by the European Court of Human Rights in a case relating to 
these five techniques, and at worst, intentionally deceiving the court in order to 
shield itself from a more damning verdict. 
 
10.14 This evidence reveals glimpses of the attitudes held by those at the highest levels 
of government to operating within the law in relation to these policies. The 
introduction of both policies would indicate a clear lack of commitment to 
operating within the rule of law given that there was an acknowledgment that one 
of the policies would leave the United Kingdom in breach of its European 
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Convention obligations and the other was understood to amount to torture. Given 
the highly contentious nature of these two policies and the level of media scrutiny 
they would inevitably attract, if the British government lacked commitment to 
operating within the rule of law in relation to these policies then it seems 
reasonable to assume that the British government lacked commitment to operating 
within the rule of law generally. 
 
10.15 That assumption appears to be borne out in relation to covert operations.  
Although the British government relied heavily on clandestine investigations in its 
fight against terrorism in Northern Ireland, these activities were never legally 
regulated. There is also credible evidence to suggest that the basis of policing was 
changed from preventing and detecting crime and maintaining law and order to 
that of gathering intelligence. This change was based on the recommendations set 
out in a secret report known as the Walker Report. Sir Patrick Walker was a 
senior civil servant working for the Security Service and the report was 
commissioned by the RUC. These changes to the basis of policing could never 
have been lawful unless an act of parliament had authorised them.  
 
10.16 The Home Office has confirmed the existence of the Walker Report but refuses 
even now, nearly fifty years later, to release the Walker Report to the public on 
the grounds of national security.1218 The more cynically minded might suggest 
that the real reason the Walker Report is still being withheld from the public is 
that it is just too damning of all those involved and reveals a contempt for the law 
that might provoke a public outcry and calls for a public inquiry even now.  
 
10.17 This change to the basis of policing had far-reaching implications for the conduct 
of covert operations. Covert operations in Northern Ireland relied heavily on 
information from informers. The use of informers will always present intractable 
dilemmas but during the conflict there is evidence that informers were allowed to 
continue to commit serious offences and were then protected from prosecution in 
order to allow the flow of intelligence to continue. In other words, some crimes 
                                                        
1218 At the time of writing this thesis the Walker Report had not been released to the public. 
However, in 2018 a lightly redacted copy of the report was released by the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland to the Committee for the Administration of Justice.  
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were never investigated properly and informers were protected at the expense of 
other people. There is also strong evidence to suggest that members of the 
Security Forces colluded with the UDA to murder IRA members and suspected 
IRA members. 1219 
 
10.18 In relation to the British Army the allegations go further. It has been claimed that 
the British Army also relied on intelligence collected using clandestine operations 
involving surveillance and undercover units. The suggestion is that these 
undercover units assassinated members of the IRA during the Troubles. 1220 
 
10.19 The fact that covert investigations were unregulated throughout the Troubles and 
that there is credible evidence that the basis of policing was changed without 
parliamentary approval or knowledge, reveals a total contempt by the British 
government for the rule of law. It suggests that at least some elements of the 
British State felt it could act with impunity.  The fact that elements of the British 
Army colluded with the UDA or worse still were themselves involved in 
assassinating members of the IRA is again a clear indication that the law utterly 
failed to constrain the activity of certain elements of the Security Forces.1221 
 
10.20 In order to gauge the extent that senior British Army officers were constrained by 
the law, the contingency plans drawn up for Northern Ireland were examined in 
some detail. The contingency plans, namely the Tuzo Plan and Operation 
Folklore, were initially drawn up by the British Army but then later contributed to 
by other government departments. The contingency plans were drawn up to deal 
with a situation of escalating violence falling short of civil war. The plans 
involved increasing legal powers under the Special Powers Act but more 
importantly involved introducing powers that were described in the plans as 
‘powers of a different kind’. These powers of a ‘different kind’ included removing 
the need for soldiers to act with minimum force, which would require a 
suspension of the common law and the instructions on the Yellow Card. The Tuzo 
Plan included powers to open fire other than at a target, and a right to use heavy 
                                                        
1219 Please refer to paras 6.19-6.23. 
1220 Please refer to paras 6.24-6.30.  
1221 Please refer to paras 6.31-6.42 and 6.42- 6.47. 
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weapons. Perhaps most disturbingly both plans included a right to open fire when 
there was no threat to life.  The Plans also included a blanket immunity for British 
soldiers.  
 
10.21 These powers would have been problematic at a domestic level and would have 
put the United Kingdom in breach of its duties under the European Convention of 
Human Rights. The plans were never implemented but they reveal that for those 
involved in drawing up the plans, senior military officers and senior civil servants, 
the legality of the plan was a low priority. Although the picture is very fragmented 
there are glimpses of an approach that effectively sidelined the rule of law. Once 
again, the implication is that parts of the British State, namely the military and the 
Civil Service, did not feel constrained by the law. This lack of commitment 
towards the law by officers in the British Army was also revealed when British 
Army officers gave evidence to the Parker Inquiry. It emerged that the military 
‘forgot’ to even inquire about the legality of in-depth interrogations before 
applying the five sensory-deprivation techniques to the detainees.  
 
10.22 In order to assess the extent to which the ordinary criminal law was able to 
effectively constrain the behaviour of individual soldiers in Northern Ireland, it 
was first necessary to assess the chance of a soldier being convicted of a serious 
crime and then look at the length of time a soldier could expect to serve in prison 
if convicted.  
 
10.23 What seems clear is that using the ordinary criminal law, although entirely legally 
proper, proved problematic when dealing with soldiers during the Troubles. It 
proved problematic because so few soldiers were charged with offences, and of 
those that were charged even fewer were convicted. The four soldiers that were 
convicted of unlawful killings, one had his conviction quashed on appeal and the 
other three served less than four years in prison before returning to serve with 
their units.  
 
10.24 This may have been down to the fact that the investigation process and the 
prosecution process were far from normal when British soldiers were suspected of 
committing serious offences. The investigation process was delegated by the RUC 
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to the British Army Police, and the prosecution process gave senior members of 
the military influence over the ultimate decision of the DPP to prosecute. The 
change to the investigation process was probably illegal and giving senior officers 
influence, without any legal basis, over the decision to prosecute was almost 
certainly illegal.  
 
10.25 The soldiers were further shielded by a reduction in the powers of the coroner. 
Inquests could have played an important role in ensuring effective investigations 
but the role of the coroner was reduced, limiting the coroner’s powers to influence 
investigations. Another factor that may have reduced the number of soldiers 
convicted of serious crimes was the use by the British government of Public 
Inquires to investigate incidents rather than using the justice system.  
 
10.26 The conclusion is that successive British governments used the ordinary criminal 
law to bring soldiers suspected of crimes to justice, but behind the scenes 
manipulated the investigation and prosecution process in order to shield the 
soldiers from being brought to account. In doing so successive British 
governments displayed a desire to maintain the perception of legality while 
showing disregard for the rule of law behind closed doors. Again, the implication 
is that successive British governments were not constrained by the law. In 
addition, there is some evidence to suggest that the average soldier knew that the 
chances of being found guilty of any alleged serious offences were slim. It 
therefore seems reasonable to assume that as a consequence the control function 
of the law on individual soldiers was undermined.  
 
10.27 The overall picture is disappointing. The constraints imposed on the British 
government by the courts, domestic and international, and by Parliament were 
limited. With no effective opposition, successive British government set about 
taking advantage of every legal mechanisms and device available to it in order to 
limit the reach of law on its activities. These included exploiting any jurisdictional 
uncertainties that existed, using mechanisms that restrict Parliamentary oversight, 
and using discretionary powers to shield members of the Security Forces from 
prosecution. It also included the use, or over use, of public inquiries. The 
suggestion being that public inquiries sidestep the justice system and those 
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responsible for abuses avoid being held to account. Successive British 
governments also relied heavily on covert investigations. The level of secrecy 
involved in these investigations means that allegations of abuse against covert 
operatives are more difficult to prove in court and a heavy reliance on covert 
operations is a well-known device to limit the reach of law. In addition, 
successive British governments implemented emergency and anti-terrorism 
legislation giving sweeping powers to the Security Forces and drafted the 
legislation in vague terms making it difficult to pursue allegations of abuse 
through the courts. It is unsurprising that ‘legal scholars tend to see the law as 
permissive rather that restrictive in this period’.1222 
 
10.28 In relation to international law successive British governments used derogations 
and reservations to allow behaviour that would otherwise be illegal. Between 
1957 and 1984 continuous derogations of Article 15 of the European Convention 
of Human Rights were in force.1223 The use of derogations is entirely legitimate 
but the suggestion here is that the derogations were left in place when they could 
no longer be justified. In other words, successive British governments failed to 
remove the derogations when the levels of violence in Northern Ireland dropped 
and the argument that the violence constituted a public emergency threatening the 
life of the nation became untenable.  At the same time, in agreeing with the 
British government that the IRA presented such a threat, the European Court 
failed to provide any real ‘check’ on the British government’s power. In relation 
to the European Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human 
Rights there is also some evidence to suggest that the United Kingdom not only 
deliberately failed to co-operate with fact-finding attempts by those European 
institutions in order to shield itself from criticism, but also intentionally deceived 
them.1224  
 
                                                        
1222 Huw Bennett, ‘Smoke Without Fire’? Allegations Against the British Army in Northern 
Ireland’ (2013) 24(2) Twentieth Century British History 275, 285. 
1223 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 
5, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3b04.html [accessed 11 April 2018] 
1224 Please refer to paras 9.28-9.32 
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10.29 In other words, there were no effective ‘checks’ on power and commitment to the 
rule of law was not always given the priority that perhaps it should have been. 
There are clear examples of government ministers including one Prime Minister, 
civil servants, senior British Army officers and soldiers on the streets of Northern 
Ireland displaying a clear disregard to operating within the rule of law. It is 
therefore perhaps not surprising the British State stands accused of creating the 
‘apparatus of impunity’ and allowing the ‘institutionalising of impunity’.1225  
  
                                                        
1225 Committee on the Administration of Justice ‘The Apparatus of Impunity? Human Rights 
Violations and the Northern Ireland Conflict: a narrative of official limitations on post-Agreement 
investigative mechanisms’ Committee on the Administration of Justice [CAJ 2015] 4. <http://s3-
eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/caj.org.uk/2017/03/15131009/No.-66-The-Apparatus-of-Impunity-
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